House of Lords Bill [HL]

My Lords, it has been observed that there is nothing new to be said about the subject of House of Lords reform but I respectfully beg to disagree. More important, however, than novelty is the quarter from which the opinion comes, which is why we shall be so interested in listening to the Minister at the end of the debate. I only regret that he is not able to give us an indication of where the Government are coming from at the beginning. It might have been unconventional but it might also have enabled us to focus on the Government’s reasoning during the debate, which would have been valuable. Talking about where opinions come from, we had to sit up and take notice when another place recommended an all-elected second Chamber—we have moved a very long way from 1968 and the rejection of Dick Crossman’s proposals for reform. What it says to me is that the other place must modify its commitment to the dominance of the other place over this Chamber, as an all-elected upper House would plainly have legitimacy to develop the use of its powers. I believe that the Bill before us today—I did not speak at the introduction of the previous measure by my noble friend—should be judged by two broad tests. First, would the proposed changes improve the workings of this House? There is no doubt that they would. They certainly address a number of the perceived weaknesses of our present structures and lacunae in the law. Secondly, would the Bill’s enactment impede further reform? My conclusion is that it would make no obstacles to later reform. Since the agreement between the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in 1997 to have a joint programme on constitutional reform, including reform of this place, I never had any doubt that we would have to proceed incrementally through three stages, which seems to be the Government’s position. My only objection to that is the time that it has taken to get from one stage to another. However, it is right to consider whether the final stage—that does not mean the end stage in the sense that reform would not come further down the track—of the conceived democratisation of the second Chamber is consonant with the Bill that we have before us. Does this Bill advance or hold up that process? In my opinion, it is an improvement but it makes no impact on the wider case for reform. The Bill addresses some very important current issues—for example, the size of this House. I do not believe that it is possible to justify 1,000 Members being elected to Westminster. Those of us who sit in this House could not conceive of such a gross body, particularly if we were concerned to strengthen local representative government. Arguably, the Bill makes a change in the provisions for permanent leave of absence, which I consider to be helpful. However, I do not believe that they will enormously alter the structure or size of the House, and I am not entirely sure that I like the implication that Members might be strong-armed by their own parties into standing down under the arrangements envisaged in the Bill. Another broad consideration is the widespread awareness that the central problem of our constitutional architecture is the over-mighty power of the Executive. Governing with the consent of their party supporters in the House of Commons—the putative beneficiaries of their patronage—there is little that a British Government cannot choose to do. Does the Bill before us advance the prospect of more effective accountability being realised? In so far as it might enhance the moral authority of this place, I believe that it could make a useful contribution, but it does not address, even by inference, the powers of this place. Perhaps the longer-term goal of the present Bill—it is a very fair one—is to enhance the reputation of this House as a forum of wise, experienced and not unduly partisan people. However, the Bill leaves the balance of power undisturbed under our constitutional arrangements. To many, that may be commendable but I ask whether it is enough. In my opinion, whatever strengthens the ability of this House to discharge its present revising role, and its scrutiny role, particularly of European Union matters, is to be welcomed, but later reform must provide for those needs as well. There is more to do. What is required is more than the burnishing of the reputation of this House, whose work is valued by those who notice it. The goal of reform needs to be to rebalance the power of the legislature and the Executive, giving greater representative authority to the second Chamber by freeing it altogether from Executive patronage. If that Chamber is to be truly distinguished and command respect, it must be small—as small as the German Bundesrat, as was preferred by the late Robin Cook, or as small as the United States Senate, as I would personally prefer. That smaller size precludes the full deployment of oversight and revision that is exercised at present by this Chamber, and that deficiency would need to be made good. In my opinion, it could be made good by the appointment of a council of state with an experienced and distinguished membership, not to block government but, through its wisdom, to offer advice that would be difficult to resist. These changes are for later consideration. I believe that the Bill before us today should command widespread respect and support, and I hope that it will be seen as an indication of the House’s willingness to move, and to move now.