Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill [HL]

I disagree with the noble Baroness. I was hoping to get across how closely the police work with the border force in every area and at every level—strategic, operational and tactical. You do not have to be formed up as a unit to achieve those things. We are very clear that it is into the area covered by this Bill that we should put our current energies and finite resources of people and money. It will provide the advantages of robust collaboration, but without the drawbacks of pursuing the significant structural change that would be involved in establishing a new national police force. Those drawbacks would be substantial. I shall come to them shortly, because it is important to explain these things and talk them through. Just on collaboration, we have proposed measures in the Policing and Crime Bill, presently in another place, which clarify and strengthen the legal framework for police collaboration and which, as I understand it, have received broad support. As we have heard already today, there are very different views on border policing issues, but our bottom-line judgment is that we have not yet seen a robust, compelling case for the operational benefits to be derived from creating a new national border police force, such as would outweigh the potential risks and delays involved. The case for fundamental structural change has not been made. Having said that, and having set out what the Government are doing to improve our border security, I should like to spend a moment or two exploring the complexities around the amendment proposed. It is a serious and complicated proposal of which we need to consider the detail. There are significant issues which are simply not addressed in the amendment. They go to the heart of what is practical and what can be done. On the functions of the proposed new force, I am slightly quizzical about the fact that although the amendment tabled by noble Lords proposes the establishment of a UK border police force, it does not ascribe explicitly to that force any of the three broad elements of policing which take place at the border—namely, Special Branch, which is responsible for national security and counterterrorism; protective security, providing policing to secure the infrastructure of ports; and general policing, dealing with crime and disorder. I am not clear either about how many functions of the UK Border Agency or the border force the proposed force would absorb, what would be left and what it would form in terms of a coherent set of responsibilities—the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, I think, touched on this concern. On personnel, there is no detail on who would make up the border police force, from where they would come, what powers they would have, and what the terms and conditions of the staff would look like. We need to be clear that people are at the heart of this. The amendment is silent on leadership. Who is in charge of the force? Is it a chief constable—the noble Lord, Lord Dear, touched on that. From that discussion flow some crucial questions about accountability of the force. To whom is the new force to be accountable? Is there to be a new, bespoke police authority-type body? What about the constitution? How are priorities set? Who monitors outcomes and progress? Are noble Lords opposite planning on putting key immigration functions into the hands of a chief constable? Would that mean a chief constable reporting directly to the Home Secretary, including on operational matters? Where does that leave the debate on the politicising of policing? Is there an inspection function of the proposed new force? What about a mechanism for people who would like to complain about their treatment by it? Does it come under the ambit of the Independent Police Complaints Authority? There is also the devolution question, as was raised very accurately by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. There is a major issue here. There are 52 territorial forces in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the picture is very complex. Policing in Scotland is a devolved matter, and I can see huge complications. How will it work? What will happen in Northern Ireland? Finally, we need to consider the crucial question of funding and who will pay for the establishment of a new force. Would it be from top-slicing of the general policing grant—I think it probably would have to be—by carving out money from existing specific policing grants, or by some other means? Has there been any discussion with the police authorities about this? When one day long in the future the party opposite comes into power, I shall be fascinated to go through in some detail the 300, 400 or 500 clauses required for this sort of proposal. I make no apologies for raising these issues. My intention in doing so is not to be ““clever”” but to illustrate just how complex this area is, because we have been wrestling with it. As a Government, we are in a position of having to work through how practically to bring about change and make improvements in public services. We are making the nation safer already with a stronger border and joined-up border force, and this Bill reinforces what has been done already and what needs to be enacted to get the full benefit and effect. We have a clear way forward for our border force and for its relationship to border policing, which will certainly enhance public protection and security. The case for fundamental structural change in terms of creating a UK-wide border police force has not been made out. Even if it could be, the present proposal leaves so many questions unanswered as to make it unworkable as an immediate practical proposition. Part 1 of the present Bill, on the other hand, gives us a well grounded, practical basis for building on the substantial progress that we have already made. I hope that the House will agree that this is a substantial bird in the hand, which we should not put at risk for the sake of a flash of colourful feathers in a rather ill defined bush. The noble Baroness, Lady Miller, raised the issue of e-crime. She is absolutely right that this is an area of great concern and worry, but we have done a lot about it recently—we have now formed an e-crime unit. More broadly, the newly formed National Security Secretariat, which I have set up in the Cabinet Office, addresses the key issue of cyber-security, with a number of papers tackling that matter. People are pushing on there; it is becoming a much greater worry. I said that I would talk about the smuggling of meat. The border force will have customs powers to tackle that. We have actually had some success since the force was established; something in terms of 238,000 kilogrammes of products of animal origin have been picked up—things that should not have been brought into this country—which is quite staggering. Mention was made of an article by Sir David Omand about data. We make a proposal on how data will be looked after, as we see that as very important. Sir David was being quoted with reference to the IMP and the IMP consultation document. The reason why we produced such a document is that this is such a significant issue; we need to look at it very carefully and get it right. One of my concerns is not so much about government, because we are scrutinised and we take it seriously. Sometimes I get concerned about how much data on people are flowing around privately, whether on Twitter, Facebook or whatever—and even when people use their credit cards. Some of those things I find quite worrying. I turn to the question of clauses stand part. I know that this response seems rather long, but the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, was right that I should address those clauses and go through them. I shall do so in some detail, which I hope will give some clarification. Clauses 1 to 5 give the Secretary of State the power to exercise general customs functions concurrently with the commissioners. Clause 1 specifically prevents the Secretary of State from exercising any of the revenue functions of the commissioners or HM Revenue and Customs and any of the commissioners’ non-revenue functions that are not relevant to the UK Border Agency’s role, such as the work of HM Revenue and Customs inland. We are pulling part of HMRC out, and she should not be responsible for any of that work inland. Clause 2 enables the Secretary of State to make an order to amend the list of matters specified in Clause 1(2) that are considered general customs matters for the purposes of the Bill and to make any necessary consequential modifications to other enactments. Clauses 3 to 5 set out the arrangements by which functions relating to general customs matters will be exercised by the Secretary of State’s officials. In effect this will allow the Home Secretary to designate immigration officers and any other of her officials as designated general customs officials. Later, I shall expand on the detail of what exactly that means. On Clauses 6 to 8, as I have explained, customs functions will not be vested in the Secretary of State. By convention decisions on tax liability, including customs duties and tax administration generally, are kept at arm’s length from Ministers. The Bill therefore puts in place a different arrangement for dealing with customs revenue matters than that relating to general customs matters. While the general customs functions set out in Clause 1 are vested in the Secretary of State and designated general customs officials, Clause 6 creates within the Home Office the position of Director of Border Revenue. The customs revenue functions of the UK Border Agency will be vested in the director and those customs revenue officials will be designated to her. Clause 7 sets out what these revenue functions are and Clause 8 enables the Treasury, by order, to add to, remove or modify the list of the director’s functions. Clause 9 enables the Director of Border Revenue to delegate his or her functions to allow for operational flexibility. In practice most of the director’s functions will be undertaken by officers of the Border Agency under the designation arrangements set out in Clause 11. Only those designated officers will be able to exercise the coercive powers currently relied on by officers of HM Revenue and Customs at the border for law enforcement purposes. Clause 10 requires that the Director of Border Revenue, in the exercise of any of her functions, and any person to whom such functions have been delegated, must comply with any directions of a general nature given by the Treasury. This reflects existing provisions in Section 11 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, which require the commissioners to comply with any directions of a general nature given by the Treasury. While this power enables the Treasury to make directions relating to the Director of Border Revenue’s strategies, critically, it does not permit Treasury directions to be issued in relation to day-to-day or operational decisions. Clause 10 also requires the director to act in accordance with the policies of the Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs. This includes the application of any concession published by the commissioners and any interpretation of the law issued by the commissioners. This requirement will ensure that there is consistency in the administration of taxes between HM Revenue and Customs and the UK Border Agency. Clauses 11 to 13 set out arrangements for enabling the Director of Border Revenue to designate officials for the purpose of exercising functions and powers relating to customs and revenue matters.