Iraq: Future Strategic Relationship

I think we need to be a bit careful about how we interpret why certain people have been there. I did not agree with a lot of what the Secretary of State said about the pull-out of troops from Basra to Basra airport. That is of relevance to the point made by the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot). I think his Conservative colleagues agree that that was a UK political decision, and that it was not, perhaps, supported by the generals or the Iraqi Government. Indeed, colleagues of mine who have gone to Iraq and talked to Prime Minister al-Maliki and others get the impression that the Iraqis were never terribly keen on how we behaved at that point. Many people feel that either we should have been all-in and doing the job properly or we should have withdrawn many months ago. That is a consistent position, but I think the UK approach to our troops being there over the past 12 to 24 months has been completely wrong and the worst of all possible worlds. In respect of the withdrawal, it is quite possible that the security situation will significantly worsen; the ethnic rivalry might escalate. The hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) rightly warned us about the possibility of Arab-Kurd tensions, as well as of Sunni-Shi'a tensions and, indeed, intra-Shi'a clashes breaking out again. It is also not absolutely clear that the extremists—be they al-Qaeda, some of the Sunni militias or others—will not revive, and that Iran or other states will not try to foment trouble. Tensions are bound to occur when all the displaced families return, too; millions of refugees will come back, and that is bound to cause tensions and, potentially, violence. As I have said, these are the concerns of General Petraeus; they are not simply made up by those on the Liberal Democrat Benches. That is why I would like to ask the Secretary of State the following questions—he did not allow me to intervene on this matter, although he was generous in allowing interventions—and I hope that his ministerial colleague will respond to them at the end of the debate. What assessment have the Government made of the dangers of unrest when the troops are withdrawn? What is the Government's assessment of the strengths of the militias? From looking at recent history, it is not clear to me that it is the success of either the coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces that has led to the downturn in the violence. It may well be down to strategic political decisions by the militias—particularly the Mahdi army, but also others—not to take to the streets at this moment. I know there is no certainty on this and it is a difficult question to answer, but this is clearly a critical decision for the months ahead, and I hope Ministers can give some indication of the Government's thinking on it.