Iraq: Future Strategic Relationship

Of course I think that they are better off. However, although I listened to what the hon. Gentleman said and will make one or two points about it shortly, it is clear from the opinion polls that I have seen—conducted by American academic institutions that study opinion in Iraq—that there is no homogenous view that everything is rosier, and that the coalition troops are welcome in Iraq. Far from it: according to the latest analysis of opinion by the Brookings Institution, nearly three quarters of Iraqis oppose the presence of coalition troops. I think that the hon. Gentleman should be a little more cautious in his own analysis. Unusually—because I respect the way in which the hon. Gentleman approaches this issue—I did not think that much of what he said carried any force. I think that he underestimated the costs of the Iraq war, not in terms of finance or lives but in terms of the historic failure that it was and the historic legacy that it will leave: the damage that it has done to this country's reputation and the moral leadership of America—which is so important in the world—and indeed to the cohesion of the world, in such difficult times as those that we are experiencing now. When the hon. Gentleman talked of whether it had been right to go to war in Iraq, he failed to remind the House of the reasons that we were given for the war. In debates such as this, it is essential that we do not try to rewrite history. Too many victors in the past have had the privilege of rewriting history, but we must not do that in an open democracy. I pay tribute to the Secretary of State, for at least he did not try to do it. We were told by Tony Blair that if Saddam Hussein was to give up his weapons of mass destruction, he could stay. This was absolutely not about regime change. Let us remember that before we get on our high horse and become too self-righteous about the way in which we voted in the debate on the issue.