Iraq: Future Strategic Relationship

As I think that I have made clear, it is a matter for the Iraqi Government, as they increasingly take control of their economic, military and political processes, to determine whether we should become involved at any particular place or time. They clearly feel that they have the internal security apparatus to deal with the undoubted problems that will exist as a result of the tensions inherent in their political system when the elections take place at the end of the month. All that we can hope is that they have made the correct judgment, and time will tell whether that is the case. There will also be a regional impact in respect of Iraq's own increasing military capability. The Iraqi army is now at 203,000 personnel and has a current growth ceiling of some 300,000. The Iraqi military is currently purchasing hundreds of American M1A1 main battle tanks and a number of C-130s, and there is the possibility of procuring American F-16 fighter jets. Obviously, those purchases make some of the neighbours nervous. It seemed early on that the procurement process in Iraq itself was quite chaotic—the Ministry of Defence is not alone—and that the hardware was being bought without due thought to training and support. I think that that is now being ironed out and that most observers feel that under American advice, some of those processes are being smoothed out. Perhaps it is just a lesson to those in Iraq that they do not want to run before they can walk, and that they should listen to the advice offered without regarding it as interference from outside. That advice is well meaning, because, having made so many sacrifices, the US and the UK want Iraq to succeed and do not want to interfere in how it does things. A strong Iraq is in all our interests, and a large and capable Iraqi army can contribute in many ways to a regional balance, especially towards Iran. Conversely, we must understand the impact that a large Iraqi military has on its neighbours such as Kuwait, which has shown mixed feelings towards the al-Maliki Government. If we simply look at a snapshot of Iraq's regional relations, we can see the difficult road that lies ahead for Baghdad. Although Prime Minister Al-Sabah recently visited Iraq, Kuwait is naturally cautious about Baghdad's motives, and there are still concerns over unpaid debts. Iraq and Iran have poor relations, although Iran was the first country in the region, if not the world, to set up an embassy in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion. The issue remains of Tehran attempting to maximise its influence with Shi'a members of the Iraqi Government and Shi'a-dominated regions, which our forces have seen with deadly consequences in the south, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) has mentioned. Iraqi-Syrian relations are only a little better. Iraq accuses Syria of not doing enough to stop the flow of militants, while there is also concern about the large number of senior-ranking Ba'athists who fled Iraq in 2003 and who are currently resident in Syria. These tensions need to be defused over time, but perhaps the most urgent need is for an improved relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government have yet to send an ambassador to Baghdad. That is unfortunate, as it leaves the Iranian influence unbalanced. It would be to the benefit of all if the Saudis, as a regional leader, were to have a stronger diplomatic presence in Iraq. Iraq and Jordan enjoy good relations. King Abdullah was the first Arab Head of State to visit Iraq since the 2003 invasion, and Jordan receives cheap oil from Iraq. The main concern is the status of Iraqi refugees, but that issue is capable of resolution. Iraq's relationship with Turkey is a pivotal one. Turkey has been a very constructive and helpful partner in the development of the new Iraq, for which the international community should give it greater credit. There is, however, one problem about the forthcoming elections, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East has alluded. There will be a temptation for the Iraqi Government to play the ““Arab-identity card”” in those elections, which might attract Sunni voters and diminish the support that al-Qaeda still seems to have in parts of the north. However, it would be extremely unfortunate if Sunni-Shi'a tensions were to be replaced by Arab-Kurd tensions. Any destabilisation of the Kurds is likely to have a negative effect on Iraq's neighbours, particularly Turkey, which would be destabilising for the region and strategically bad for all of us. Finally, whatever mistakes were made in the early part of the war in Iraq, the decision to surge American forces was brave and effective. As we look to Afghanistan, we need to understand why the surge in Iraq worked. More forces enabled a change in the strategic approach, where forces moved off their forward operating bases to give security to the population where they lived. There was also an Iraqi surge with a huge increase in security forces to hold areas once they had been cleared of insurgency and militias. There were consequently no safe havens for insurgents, who were relentlessly pursued throughout Iraq. Support was given for the tribal uprising against al-Qaeda in Iraq and the political mission to separate the ““reconcilables”” from the ““irreconcilables”” under General Petraeus was absolutely key. The Iraqi Government showed that they had the will and the ability to deal with the Shi'ite militias—possibly the single most important event since 2003—and their more open and honest engagement with the media has greatly helped, too. All those things have helped to contribute to a more stable and secure Iraq. A stable, secure and prosperous unified state is in all our interests. Nothing, however, can be taken for granted. Progress has been made, but the situation remains fragile and therefore reversible, which requires all the help that we can give.