Iraq: Future Strategic Relationship

Indeed, I am aware of that. I am afraid that I do not accept responsibility for that; those were the actions of the previous Government, and, I have to say, not a very credible series of actions. Today, violence across Iraq is at its lowest level since 2003. While still capable of truly appalling atrocities, al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered very severely at the hands of coalition forces. Increasingly—this is the positive side of it—Iraqi authorities are able to deliver security on the ground with only limited coalition support. Coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 560,000 Iraqi security forces personnel since 2004, meaning that there are about four Iraqi security personnel for every coalition soldier deployed in that country. In parallel, the coalition has worked very closely with the Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministries to develop their capacity both to support the front-line security forces and to exercise effective oversight of them—something that is very important in a functioning democracy. No one should be complacent, and we certainly are not, about the security situation across Iraq as a whole. Violence remains at an unacceptably high level in some parts of the country, and undoubtedly significant security challenges remain. However, I believe that there is now good reason to be optimistic about the future of Iraq. That is very much the mood—as I found for myself and other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen have too—in the city of Basra and in and around southern Iraq. The Defence Committee reported last July that the security situation in Basra was ““a world away”” from what it had been the year before. Very recently, the US ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, spoke of the situation in the south of Iraq as being ““an extraordinary transformation””. I saw that for myself during a visit to downtown Basra last year. The locals with whom I spoke were confident in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to preserve the peace that they now enjoy and were optimistic about the future. We should celebrate that. I believe that that sense of optimism is now widespread across Iraq. A few days ago, I spoke to the British commander in Basra, Major-General Andy Salmon, who is doing a fantastic job there—I hope that that is also the view of others in this place. He reported that morale among our military and civilian personnel in Basra is extremely high. It is high because they are confident that they will leave behind a positive and lasting legacy—not just of improved security but of increasing prosperity, about which I want to say more in a few moments. Basra is now reaping the dividends of coalition strategy in southern Iraq. Since 2003, UK forces have worked tirelessly to provide security, while simultaneously developing the capacity of the Iraqis themselves so that progress can be sustained over the long term. We have trained more than 20,000 Iraqi soldiers since 2004: first, as part of building up the 10th Iraqi army division in south-eastern Iraq; and, since 2007, training the 14th division in Basra itself. UK personnel have also helped the coalition to train Iraqi naval personnel and marines and more than 22,000 policemen. That long-term project to empower the Iraqis has proved instrumental in transforming the security situation. Only a year or two ago, as we all know, the situation was very different. Our presence in Basra—and I accept this—was acting as a magnet for militia violence and as a propaganda tool for extreme nationalists. We knew, as the Iraqi Government knew, that the British armed forces could not by themselves solve all Basra's security problems. It was essential that the Iraqis took the lead. We therefore developed, in consultation with the Iraqi Government and our coalition partners, a strategy under which we made a calculation about the right moment for UK forces to withdraw from the centre of Basra—very much on our own terms and to our own time scales—and adopted a role of tactical overwatch. The Iraqi authorities were given control of security. As General Petraeus, who personally approved the strategy, said at the time, that was"““a positive step on the path to Iraqi self-reliance””" and it began rapidly to change the security dynamics in Basra. It is one thing for a nationalist Shi'a militiaman to aim his rifle and to shoot at a British soldier whom he perceives as an occupier. It is quite another for him to shoot a soldier wearing the uniform of his own country.