Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments in my name. One problem with legislation being produced in this way at a very late stage in the consideration of a Bill is that it is impossible fully to understand its purpose. Consequently, my amendments are largely directed at clarification and are probing. I do not propose to refer to Amendment No. 61AC but, so far as concerns Amendment No. 61AD, I ask the Minister why offences of this nature require jurisdiction throughout the United Kingdom. Paragraph 34 of the new schedule proposed in Amendment No. 61A says: "““Where an offence under this Schedule is committed … proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in the United Kingdom, and … the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed at any such place””." I follow the argument that it mirrors the provisions of Clause 29 in the Bill but I am not sure why it is applicable to offences of this type. I look forward to hearing the explanation. My next amendments refer to the time limits of summary proceedings in paragraph 35 of the proposed new schedule. Normally magistrates’ courts have limited jurisdiction for six months and sometimes 12 months, but apparently jurisdiction may be claimed in a magistrates’ court, "““at any time within three years after the commission of the offence, and … within twelve months after the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to justify the proceedings comes to the knowledge of the prosecutor””." Why do we require the jurisdiction of magistrates to be extended in this way? Paragraph 35(4) states that, "““a certificate of the prosecutor … as to the date on which such evidence … came to their notice is conclusive evidence””." In other words, the prosecutor can say, ““Well, we didn’t think in this particular month that there was a case but we did in a later month, and that is conclusive. Our view is absolutely conclusive as to when the time runs””. That strikes me as an odd sort of provision, which goes against many of the principles relating to time limits in a magistrates’ court. With regard to paragraph 36 and my remaining amendments, I question why an officer of a company or of a body corporate should be guilty of an offence not if he or the company does something with his connivance or consent but merely if he is neglectful. Why do criminal sanctions have to be applied and why is negligence brought into the criminal concept in this schedule? I should be grateful for explanations. Had we had these provisions before us at the beginning of our consideration of the Bill, there would have been no need for these questions to be raised. However, they have been thrown at us at the very end, when we have only Report and Third Reading in which to take stock of what is being assessed. That makes it extremely difficult for us to pass legislation, particularly when it appears to be in breach of some of the principles of jurisdiction and of the time limits to which we have always adhered in this country.