Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, as I understand it, the purpose of the amendment is to introduce an independent commissioner principally to monitor the detention and treatment of terrorist suspects held under Section 41 and also to be present at police interviews, monitor their compliance with relevant safeguards, and interview suspects and so on during the proceedings. I step into this debate somewhat nervously, bearing in mind that we have had a triumvirate, if not a quadrumvirate, of noble and learned Lords, many of whom seem to have been involved in setting up this apparatus for Northern Ireland at some time in the past. I bear in mind that in 1650 on this day HMS ““Black Prince”” was burned by parliamentarians, and so it is not an auspicious day in that sense. I think that there is already very adequate independent scrutiny of those detained before charge. I should like to run through what is in place because it is important. It is true that the amendment would have significant cost implications and that there would be an increase in bureaucracy. Almost certainly because of jurisdictions, there would be three independent assessors, plus the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and no doubt they would want some staff. Therefore, I think that there would be some considerable costs. However, these things can be got round and, if it is really important, it can be done. It is worth stating what is already done to look after those who are held in custody awaiting charges on a terrorism offence. It is important to get that into Hansard. As has been said, some of the minorities might feel that they are not looked after well. Section 61 of the Police Reform Act 2002 already provides for independent custody visiting of persons held in police detention, including all detainees held under terrorism provisions. Under the Act every police authority is required to make arrangements for detainees to be visited by persons who are independent of the police and the police authority. The Act formalised independent custody visiting, formally known as lay visiting, which had been established following the Scarman report into the Brixton riots in 1981. Not surprisingly, the independent custody visiting process developed with a clear and strong focus on public confidence. The reason why I make this point is that the key strength of independent custody visiting is the way in which it is founded on the engagement of the local community. Members of the local community are given access to the detainees in their local police station. I wish to strengthen, rather than dilute, that important aspect. As we made clear in the PACE review consultation paper published on 28 August this year, we are looking to strengthen community engagement in custody and are working with the Association of Police Authorities and others to look at how best to raise the status of independent custody visitors and other community members and draw on their knowledge and expertise to inform local and national change. Alongside that, we continue to work closely with the Association of Police Authorities and the Independent Custody Visiting Association in the provision of national guidance, training and support materials for independent custody visitors and police authorities who administer the schemes in their area. Independent custody visitors can visit suspects, and their visits are random, unannounced and normally conducted out of hearing of an escorting officer. A report is completed after each visit and copies are provided to the police, the police authority and the Home Office. Those reports provide a vital source of information on the environmental and welfare conditions in which detainees are held. Although independent custody visitors cannot sit in on interviews with suspects, safeguards are already in place, in addition to the right to legal advice, to ensure that juvenile, mentally vulnerable—