Planning Bill

That is correct in relation to the classes that we were talking about. Consultation will take place on the different sectors that might be affected and those consultations will then be reflected in regulations specific to those sectors. Nobody is nodding from the Box, but I think I am right. The regulations themselves will be consulted on. It will be the normal process. I think we will secure precisely those protections that we want to see for the sectors that have been identified. Amendments Nos. 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 425, 427, 428 and 426A all concern minor changes to planning permissions relating to land where changes are not material. I shall pick my way through my speaking notes. Clause 184 enables a local planning authority to make a minor change to a planning permission relating to land in its area where it is satisfied that the change is not material. By ““not material”” we simply mean a change that would not be significant in planning terms. We are making this change because when someone seeks to implement their permission they often find that minor changes to their original proposal are necessary. One could hold up an entire office block by trying to establish that the entrance to an office ought to be slightly to the left or right. In the past such minor changes were dealt with locally with planning authorities making a judgment about whether they were so minor that they could be allowed without any formal procedure, and that worked well. The problem has been that recent case law has thrown doubt on whether that approach is acceptable. There has been widespread uncertainty for planning authorities and developers and this has become a serious burden. All we seek to do in this clause is to reintroduce a little practical flexibility. A similar provision has existed in Scotland for around a quarter of a century and has worked very well. However, I understand that noble Lords seek reassurance on this. Amendments Nos. 421, 422, 423, 424 and 426, about which I wrote to the noble Lord, question how this will work in practice. Amendment No. 421 is unnecessary because Schedule 1 achieves the purpose of that amendment. Amendments Nos. 422, 423 and 424, which seek to limit a local authority’s scope to exercise this power in relation to a material change, would not make much difference to what we are trying to do. If I put this into context, the concept of whether something is material is a longstanding one. Local planning authorities are well used to deciding what it means. They are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the planning system and it is fundamental that they exercise that judgment to ensure the system works. Removing the references, as the amendment suggests, would have little practical effect unless we were in a position to set out exactly what a non-material change was. Since it covers practically everything you can think of, we cannot address that in legislation. Moving a window might be material or non-material depending on the window, the dwelling or whether it was in a conservation area. I think that I addressed that in my note. Amendment No. 426 would remove the ability to make changes that are not material by removing or altering existing conditions or imposing new ones. It would prevent a local planning authority making very minor changes to an existing planning condition. However, if it is accepted that it should be possible to make non-material changes to a planning permission and the planning authority is best placed to decide that, whether material or not, there does not seem much reason to impose a restriction that would prevent a minor change to the planning condition. We are trying to ensure that we have proper flexibility and that local authorities will not suddenly make significant changes to their schemes after planning permission has been given. Amendment No. 426A in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin of Roding and Lord Dixon-Smith, and the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, is similar. It would prevent a condition being imposed. I accept that imposing a condition would in effect amount to a material change having been made. However, there might be occasion when the flexibility to do so would be useful. For example, if a developer asked whether a change could be made to reposition a window, the planning authority might consider that not to be material; for example, if it were obscure glazed to prevent overlooking. Therefore, I think that is covered by process. Amendments Nos. 425, 427 and 428 were spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and would make a slight change to the provision at Section 96A(2) of the 1990 Act. Subsection (2) requires that when determining whether something is not material, a planning authority must consider any other minor change that has already been made to the original permission under this power. As she said, this is intended to stop the cumulative impact of a number of minor changes to the original planning permission leading to a material change occurring. As she also said, removing the words ““under this section”” from the provision would require consideration to be given to any other change of any degree of significance that might have been made. The other way in which changes might be made is through Section 97 of the 1990 Act. That section is not used frequently, but is exercised to make changes that are significant. However, the significant point here is that the process has important safeguards, including a requirement that the changes are agreed by all parties, including affected third parties. However, we are not concerned with that situation here. This measure is about the sensible use of very minor adjustments to agreed permissions, which will remain substantially the same. Therefore, I do not see much advantage in linking the two measures. Indeed, from these amendments I pick up a concern across the Committee that Clause 184 would somehow undermine how the planning system operates by allowing significant changes to be made against the public interest. However, I believe that the safeguards the clause contains as regards the limits on who can apply for a change and who determines the scale of any permitted change deal with that. The proposal was welcomed by the planning profession, the Royal Town Planning Institute and the Planning Officers Society, and has been in place in Scotland for a quarter of a century. As regards Amendments Nos. 427 and 428 and a change being made only at the request of someone who has an interest in the land, the noble Baroness asked me specifically whether an applicant might not have an interest in the land and therefore could not use this power. In fact, an applicant for planning permission would be viewed as having an interest in the land under this provision, and therefore would be covered. I think that addresses the main points of those amendments. I am making progress; I now deal with the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, which was not what I expected. I thought that some other case would be made, to which I shall not draw attention. However, I now realise that he was interested in the change in use process with regard to second homes. I wish that I could give him more satisfaction on that, but I cannot. There is real difficulty in introducing a new use class for dwellings used as second homes. He made a wonderful and entirely persuasive speech, but the problem is that the properties used as second homes are usually normal dwelling houses, irrespective of how regularly they are used. It might be very difficult to prove use of a dwelling as a second home. People use second homes for a wide range of interests and purposes and lifestyles are so different that enforcement is likely to be very difficult. As tempting as it might be to see this as an easy solution, it is not. Whether a person purchasing a property already owns another property elsewhere is not a land use planning consideration. To take into account these factors in information that has no relevance to a decision on a planning matter would be ultra vires. The noble Lord referred to certain reports. Matthew Taylor’s report has recommended that the Government should trial planning rules limiting changes in use of full-time homes to second homes or holiday lets in one of more of the national parks. We are looking at Matthew Taylor’s report in detail and we will publish a response later this year, but we are not convinced that the recommendation for trialling planning rules with the aim of controlling second homes and holiday lets is a workable solution to the wider issue of housing affordability. As the noble Lord knows better than most Members of the Committee, to address rural affordability one needs a wide range of policies which create a synergy and incentive which respect human rights and the real needs of people who are being priced out of those areas where the ratio of affordability to prices is eight or nine to one—as high as it is in central London. We are well aware of that. I think that the noble Baroness said that she was not moving Amendment No. 430, so I shall move swiftly on. Amendments Nos. 431 and 432 are government amendments that correct an unintentional drafting error that would have given excessively broad powers for the making of tree preservation regulations under the new Section 202G(1) of the 1990 Act that is introduced in Clause 186. The amendment would provide similar provision to that currently in Section 194A of the 1990 Act, and it is consistent with the recommendations of the DPRRC. Amendment No. 432 corrects a minor drafting error in Schedule 8. The tree preservation provisions that we have made in the Bill are excellent, but I am not sorry that we are not debating them. The noble Baroness kindly gave notice of Amendment No. 432A, which covers the situation faced by the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority in developing sites that are subject to easements and restricted covenants because they have no access to the provisions of Section 237 of the TCPA. The Government are sympathetic to the problems faced by the FEPA, which I understand languishes in a legislative lacuna. The predecessor was a precepting authority, which fell within the definition of a local authority and therefore had access to the benefits of Section 237. The FEPA functions, in the main, like a combined fire authority, which is also specifically defined as a local authority. All those definitions are in the definition of local authority in Section 336(1)(a) of the TCPA. It may well be that Amendment No. 432A, by making the FEPA a local authority only for the purposes of Section 237, would create another anomaly. We need to discuss with the FEPA and others whether its status as a local authority should go wider than Section 237. Although that is the trigger for this debate, it is not the only issue that is raised. The amendment raises a number of complex points, which I would like to explore further. Amendment No. 433 was tabled by the Government in response to concerns expressed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the excessive scope of the powers in the substituted Section 303 of the TCPA 1990 to amend, repeal or revoke other legislation. The amendment restricts that power, so that it can only happen in the appropriate circumstances. Those circumstances are the effect of paying or failing to pay a fee or charge in accordance with the regulations in subsection (5)(f) or making incidental, supplementary, consequential, transitional or transitory provision and savings in subsection (6)(a). We have reflected the committee’s suggestion that we restrict the scope of the power. I am aware of the speed at which I have gone through this. I hope that I have answered most of the questions raised by the amendments. I would be happy to write to noble Lords if they feel that I have not done so.