Planning Bill

Three specific issues have been raised in relation to the new enforcement regime established under Part 8. I shall speak, first, to Amendment No. 396 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, which seeks to amend Clause 154. Before I do that, however, it may be helpful if I provide a little information on the nature of IPC consents and the two offences provided for in Clauses 153 and 154. An order granting development consent will provide all the necessary consents needed to construct a nationally significant infrastructure project. As well as giving consent for the main development, the IPC can also make provision for ancillary matters, such as an electricity line to connect a generating station to the grid, or grant consent for associated development connected to the project, such as an access road. As part of this, the IPC can place conditions on the promoter, such as requirements that might mitigate the negative impacts of a project. To ensure that development on a nationally significant infrastructure project does not take place before an order is granted, Clause 153 makes the carrying out of such works without consent an automatic offence. We believe, as I am sure do noble Lords, that it is important that such projects should come about only after a promoter has made full disclosure of his plans and that these have been tested for their compatibility with national policy and with legal and environmental requirements. To ensure that promoters work within the terms of an order, Clause 154 makes it an offence to breach those terms without reasonable excuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether under Clause 154 a development built not in precise accordance with the terms of an order granting development consent would constitute an offence. I think I can reassure her on this matter, and on her other point about what would happen if a project is only half-built. Essentially, it is a matter of proportionality. Part 8 establishes an enforcement regime that allows a relevant local authority, where it suspects an offence under Clauses 153 or 154, to take steps to determine whether there is substance to that suspicion. This might be under Clause 160, where the local authority can require information by serving an ““information notice””, or by authorising a person under Clauses 156 or 157 to enter the land in question, both issues that are subject to the other amendments tabled by Members on the Benches opposite. Where a breach of the terms of an order granting development consent is identified, we would expect the local authority to discuss this with the promoter and agree what steps should be taken to remedy the breach. Local authorities are not unused to enforcement and we are confident that when investigating possible offences under the Bill, they will continue to use good common sense. Where a promoter fails to take steps requested by a local authority, or perhaps if the breach is serious enough, the relevant local authority might decide to issue formal legal proceedings against the promoter under Clause 154. In either case, the local authority would need to have sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed before bringing a prosecution. In addition, Clause 154 provides that a person commits an offence only where they have failed to comply with an order granting development consent without ““reasonable excuse””. The offence is not one of strict liability and a prosecuting authority would be mindful of this before commencing proceedings. As a consequence, I would not expect a promoter to be found guilty of an offence for a minor or accidental breach except where they had failed to rectify that breach. I would also expect promoters of such large-scale projects to be fully reputable, and no doubt they will take the terms of an order extremely seriously. Amendment No. 396 might also have an unintended consequence, as adding the words ““fully in accordance with”” could be interpreted to mean that partial completion of a project would amount to an offence under Clause 154. My noble friend Lady Andrews raised this matter with the noble Baroness earlier today, and she thought it would be a good idea to explain for the record the position for half-completed projects, perhaps because of a lack of finance. I am happy to oblige. I should stress that these are major undertakings that require considerable planning and funding. I would certainly expect the IPC to consider whether the necessary finance was in place before proceeding with an order to grant development consent. I would be surprised if any promoter decided to abandon a project after investing the amount of capital that would be required. In the unlikely event that a promoter could not complete a project, we would expect an agreement to be reached with the relevant local authority by agreeing, for example, to construct only part of the project, such as one section of a proposed new railway line, or to construct a smaller gas storage facility. This might need to be supplemented by an application to the IPC under the provisions in Schedule 6 to modify the original order granting development consent, and possibly by a separate consent from the local planning authority where the resulting development did not meet the thresholds for an NSIP. I turn now to Amendment No. 396A tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin and Lord Dixon-Smith, and the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart. The amendment seeks to remove one of the mechanisms by which a local authority can extend the period in which enforcement can be brought against a promoter. As I have just set out, local authorities have powers to require information under Clause 160 and to investigate land under Clauses 156 and 157 where they suspect that an offence may have been committed under Clauses 153 or 154. A local authority can also apply to the High Court or county court for an injunction under Clause 164 where it feels that activity is taking place which constitutes an offence under the aforementioned clauses. These powers provide local authorities with the tools necessary to investigate and restrain any unauthorised development. In general, we believe that four years provides the necessary time to exercise proper oversight of any development authorised by the Infrastructure Planning Commission. However, this period sets out when legal proceedings can be brought against a promoter. As such, we need to cater for when an offence, or potential offence, has been identified towards the end of this period. In such a scenario, it would not be proportionate or cost-effective to require a local authority to bring immediate legal proceedings. For instance, a local authority might have insufficient evidence collected at that point, in which case it would be left with the difficult choice of bringing expensive legal proceedings or losing the ability to do so altogether. Such a cut-off point would also remove any chance of discussions between the local authority and the promoter, and would make recourse to the courts an option of first rather than last resort. It is for this reason that we have provided local authorities with the ability to extend this initial four-year period by either seeking an injunction or serving an information notice. Noble Lords are seeking to remove the latter of these, and I would urge them to reconsider. What would a local authority do if prohibited development has already taken place and is noticed only towards the end of the initial four-year period? Without the ability to collect further evidence via an information notice, and thus provide additional time to investigate, the local authority would again be left with the same difficult choice we are seeking to avoid; that is, whether to bring expensive legal proceedings either for an injunction or for an offence under Clause 153 or 154 without all the evidence, or lose the ability to prosecute altogether.