Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, it is with a sense of trepidation that I address your Lordships’ House this evening, as I sense that my view is a minority one. My contribution to the debate will be, again, on the controversial subject of the detention of suspects, of which I have some 35 years’ experience at the sharp end of policing as a working detective up to the rank of chief superintendent. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that it is not my intention to detain your Lordships for too long this evening. During my service, I arrested all types of suspect in cases ranging from theft to murder. The law is quite clear that the police have a right to detain a suspect on reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offence and, at that stage, evidence is not required. It is sufficient reasonably to suspect. It could be on the basis of what the officers have been told by the victim, or indeed the actions of the suspect himself, or perhaps scientific evidence linking him to the crime. Any of these could be grounds to detain the suspect. One thing is certain: the suspect is entitled to be told of the grounds upon which he is being detained as soon as possible after the arrest. No one should be detained without knowing why. The law used to be governed by the common-law judges rules until procedures were eventually developed under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of which we have talked this afternoon. This sets out the time limits for detention and the procedures for extending it in certain circumstances. The law is equally clear about charging a suspect. Generally speaking, he should be charged where there are sufficient grounds to justify taking him to trial. It is then that other restrictions kick in. I mention this simply to set the scene, because the distinctions may well not be totally clear to all Members of your Lordships’ House. Terrorism is a completely separate matter and of course different rules have been developed over recent years under new legislation. Today we are discussing the period of detention before charging to enable police in these very complex cases in which there are international connotations, often involving conspiracies between continents, and with thousands of mobile phone records to be checked, hundreds of hours of CCTV images to be examined, and encrypted computer records to be deciphered in what can be the most complex and time-consuming investigations. It is said that there are currently 30 known plots, over 200 groups or networks and some 2,000 individuals being investigated. This takes time and investigating officers should be allowed sufficient time to complete these inquiries within a reasonable time. What is to be done? The Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, of the liberal Benches, a champion of human rights throughout his life, has clearly indicated that he believes that there is a case for increased powers to detain before charging. Like me, he hoped that a consensus could be reached between the various parties. I had hoped that, with judicial oversight, a way forward could be agreed to extend detention in extreme circumstances. Having looked at all the circumstances and the evidence, I part company with colleagues—former police officers—in this House, because in my view a maximum 42 days, with all the safeguards, is not unreasonable if the alternative is to release the suspect, who may well then go on to thwart the investigation. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald, agrees that long periods to investigate are required. His remedy is to charge sooner than normal by lowering the bar, without having the evidence that would normally be required. The police would then have to secure the proof within the period before charging, after charging, and appearing before the court. At first I found this quite an attractive argument, but on further examination it seems to be very subjective. What if the next DPP does not agree with that particular level of the bar? What if the police are unable to get the evidence required, or more evidence, after charging? Would the charges be dropped after months, or perhaps even over a year, on remand? Would that not be a greater infringement than 42 days? That is what happens in other jurisdictions. But because of differing judicial systems, comparisons between them are fatuous. For example, on 19 January, 14 Asians were arrested in Barcelona on suspicion of plotting an attack. They were held in preventive detention until indicted some four and a half months later. I understand that the detention could have been for four years. Comparisons between the systems are not realistic. In my view, this Bill is far more transparent and sets out clearly the required judicial safeguards. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, I am unhappy with the parliamentary and ministerial oversight. But, on balance, the measures to extend up to 42 days would be rarely used and they are necessary to protect the public against the terrorist threat. The public are strongly in favour in such reserve powers and Parliament should respond accordingly in order to safeguard British people of all faiths—and of none—in the interests of national security. I commend the provisions to the House.