Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I now turn to the Bill. It is beyond doubt that we are being threatened now by forces of terrorism that constitute a unique challenge to our society in general and to our security, intelligence and law enforcement services in particular. The nature and severity of that threat are unprecedented. This Bill is a serious attempt to deal with that threat while trying to preserve our democratic principles and practices. The introduction of some unparalleled safeguards and parliamentary involvement is the result of the widespread consultation in all directions in an attempt to obtain the broadest possible support, although unfortunately the much desired cross-party consensus has not been obtained on many crucial issues. I will never be able to understand the Conservative position on some of these issues. We will have an opportunity to discuss details of the Bill in future stages. At Second Reading, I will speak on only two points: making intercept material available to coroners and pre-charge detention. The House has often heard the concerns expressed by myself and others about the use of intercept as evidence in courts. It has never been a question of principle for any of us, but one of practicality. The Chilcot committee of privy counsellors, in its excellent and thorough report, laid down nine considerations which would have to be satisfied if intercept was to be used as evidence. These nine considerations encompass all the points we have ever argued of the difficulties and dangers of using intercept as evidence. The Chilcot report was accepted by the Government, and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made clear that only when the nine conditions were safeguarded could the matter progress. The privy counsellors entrusted with putting this into practice are in the process of doing so. It is therefore with considerable surprise that one finds Clauses 80 and 81 in Part 6 of the Bill, amending RIPA so that intercept can be used in inquests and inquiries. I am unimpressed by the so-called safeguards enumerated in the Bill. The clauses seem to fly in the face of the assurances given by the Prime Minister and repeated in this House by the noble Baroness the Leader of the House. I understand that there is a coroners Bill planned for the next parliamentary Session, which would seem the appropriate place for this. There is also the work of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen of Whitekirk, in Scotland, on fatal accident inquiries to be taken into account. On Report in another place, these points were all raised by some distinguished former Ministers—my right honourable friends Reid, Ingram and Spellar—by the opposition Front Bench and by two Chilcot privy counsellors, the right honourable Alan Beith and the right honourable Michael Howard. The Minister, my right honourable friend Tony McNulty, responded to their concerns by confirming that amendments in this House would meet their points. I look forward to those government amendments in Committee. These clauses should be deleted, sunseted or sunrised, and they should definitely be amended so that they do not come into effect before the work on the nine Chilcot requirements is complete. Apparently, the motivation for these two clauses is concern about one particular case. I say only this: there must be a way to solve this other than inserting two clauses into a wholly inappropriate Bill with serious, far-reaching, unintended consequences, in contradiction to assurances given in both Houses on the Chilcot considerations. As the House knows, I and other noble Lords—the noble Baroness, Lady Park, the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, and my noble friend Lord Foulkes—moved on a previous Bill an amendment for pre-charge detention for up to 90 days, reviewed every seven days by a High Court judge and sunseted. I remain as convinced now as I was then that a maximum of 28 days in our legal system is inadequate in the face of the distinctive terrorist challenge of our time. I would also rather give the Home Secretary a reserve power for a possible increase than legislate in the emotional heat of a terrorist crisis. The reasons for the need for increased time have been rehearsed often in this House: the sophisticated complexity of the material; the vastly increasing amount of computer product, often encrypted; the need for the police to intervene at an early stage to avoid the risk of letting a terrorist plot run; the request for the increase from all the senior police officers directly working operationally on terrorism; the multiple identities of suspects—it often takes time to establish who an arrested person is; and the global reach of contacts involved, which in these cases often necessitates reliance on liaison services for information. We are fortunate in our intelligence and security services, which have a history of close and successful relationships with foreign intelligence and security services, often built up painstakingly over many years. No one should think that this is easy or can be taken for granted. Liaison services have varied degrees of competences, resources and speed of working, and of course varying degrees of willingness to pass on all they know or discover. This is not always from ill will but sometimes because of their own national interests. The various safeguards and the parliamentary role built into this Bill result from the widest possible consultations—I have never known a Home Secretary or Minister of State to consult more widely. They are an attempt to satisfy concerns about civil rights and parliamentary control. No one pretends it will be easy to implement them; it would be much easier to do without them. It is ironic that criticism about the practicality and difficulty of some of these measures comes from those most concerned about civil rights and democratic control. I support this Bill.