Counter-Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. We face an unprecedented terrorist threat. In film sound-bite terms, there is ““a clear and present danger”” to our population. Indeed, the prime reason for my agreement to join the Government was the level of threat and the belief—I hope, not misguided—that perhaps I could do something, no matter how small, to enhance the safety of our people and nation. The terrorists are more ruthless than those we have faced in the past: they aim at causing mass civilian casualties without prior warning, involving suicide attacks. Plus they have the aspiration to use chemical, biological or radiological weapons. The threat is international, drawing on loosely affiliated networks across the globe that travel and share experience, training and funds. The threat is much more complex than historically, with multiple connections in many countries and terrorists exploiting new technology not only to plan and perpetrate attacks but to cover their tracks and hinder investigation. It is of an unprecedented scale, with more than 200 groupings or networks and around 2,000 individuals of concern to the police and security service in the United Kingdom alone. This figure is the highest it has been. It is not a spike but represents a sustained level of activity by those who wish to undermine the fundamental values that all of us, including the vast majority of Muslims, share. This threat demands a co-ordinated and multifaceted response from all of us. That is why we have made far-reaching changes to our counterterrorism strategy and created the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism to co-ordinate our response. That office has become a real centre of excellence, and we have made huge strides in the past year. We have significantly increased the resources available to deal with terrorism, with Security Service staffing now double the pre-9/11 level, and more than £1 billion being added to the security budget by 2011. We have also—this is important—redoubled our efforts to prevent violent extremism taking hold in the first place. Our long-term challenge, and our priority, must be to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists, and we have provided new funding to support communities and organisations who are taking on and disrupting those who promote violent extremism. We must continue to pursue vigorously those who commit terrorist crimes and bring them to justice. Since the beginning of 2007 alone, 68 terrorists have been convicted. As the DPP has made clear, the CPS is currently enjoying a 92 per cent successful conviction rate in terrorist cases compared with 77 per cent for other crimes. It is also the case that nearly half of those convicted pleaded guilty to their crimes. This shows, I believe, that the actions we are taking are working. But as the threat from terrorism evolves so our laws must change and we must continue to ensure that the front-line agencies have the right legal tools they need to do the job. One of the arrows in our quiver of measures to remove the cancer of extremist terrorism is our anti-terrorist legislation. That is why we have comprehensively reviewed it to ensure that it remains effective. This review identified a number of areas where our laws needed strengthening, and these are covered by the measures in the Bill. In particular, these measures will ensure that better use can be made of information when taking action against terrorists and that we have effective measures in place to deal with terrorist suspects after they have been charged and convicted. On the first of these, the Bill contains measures to provide a proper statutory framework to retain and use DNA and other forensic material related to terrorism; to provide statutory gateways for sharing information with the security and intelligence agencies; and to make sure that all information can be used for defined challenges against asset-freezing decisions. The Bill will also allow the questioning of terrorist subjects after charge, a measure that has broad consensus from all sides. Together with the other measures in the Bill, we believe that this will help the police and prosecutors to ensure more successful convictions. Post conviction, the Bill will ensure that those found guilty of terrorist-related offences receive a sentence that reflects the seriousness of their crimes. There will also be a new requirement for convicted terrorists to provide the police with key personal information when they are released from custody, thereby strengthening the arrangements for monitoring terrorist offenders in the community. In addition to these measures, the Bill contains new powers covering the removal of documents for examination, new offences relating to information about the Armed Forces and others, and new provisions relating to control orders, forfeiture and the policing of gas facilities. We have consulted widely, and the proposals have been scrutinised by relevant committees in Parliament, and by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As a result, I believe that many measures in the Bill have already achieved broad support. However, I accept that there is not a consensus on everything, and I turn now to the issue of pre-charge detention, which has caused most debate, both inside and outside Parliament. Two factors are relevant to the issue of pre-charge detention, and to my assessment that there will be exceptional cases where the police will require more than 28 days to frame charges. First, because of the severe consequences of a successful terrorist attack, the police often need to intervene much earlier in terrorist cases. They cannot afford—and I would not want them to—to wait until an attack has happened, and may need to step in at a very early stage of an investigation, before they have had the chance to gather admissible evidence. In the Dhiren Barot case, for example, former Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, the then National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations, said that, "““there was not one shred of admissible evidence””" at the point of arrest. This is different from what happens in most other crimes, where there are victims, witnesses and forensic material that can be used as evidence. Barot subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 40 years. Secondly, the clear trend is for terrorist investigations to grow in scale and complexity. In 2001, for example, when the police investigated the last major IRA case, they had to analyse the contents of one computer and a handful of floppy disks. The suspects used their own names, and their activities were confined to the Republic of Ireland and the UK. In 2004, the investigation into Dhiren Barot involved the seizure of 270 computers, 2,000 computer disks and 8,224 exhibits. There were seven co-conspirators and, during the investigation, police carried out enquiries in the United States of America, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, France, Spain and Sweden. I make no apologies for banging this home. In another recent case, 30 addresses were searched within two hours of the start of the arrest phase of the operation; and 400 computers and 8,000 computer disks were seized, along with more than 25,000 exhibits. I have looked in detail at the possibility of throwing resources—both people and money—at the problem, to reduce timescales and boost our technical capability of looking at these things. However, the choke points of other jurisdictions and encryption mean that this will not solve the problem. In addition, the consequences of radiation, chemical or biological contamination could delay investigations by days if not weeks. I fear that all the indications are—and I do not say this lightly—that it is not a matter of if such an attack will be plotted, but when. As a result of the increasing complexity of investigations, and the need to intervene early, the police have held 11 suspects for more than 14 days before charging them. Investigations have already needed all 28 days, and the indications are that this may be insufficient in future. That is why the police asked us to look again at the issue. The question we face is: will there be a potential need for pre-charge detention of more than 28 days? I have looked at this in depth for nearly 12 months and I believe that there will. Therefore, we face the problem of whether to legislate now. I believe that it is better for us to legislate calmly, on a precautionary basis, than to find ourselves scrambling for emergency legislation in the heat of a serious operation. That is why we have included in the Bill a proposal to extend the pre-charge detention limit in future if required. This proposal contains a number of important safeguards, as it should do. First, the reserve power in the Bill can be brought into force in future only where the Home Secretary is able to confirm to Parliament that she is satisfied that it is needed for investigating serious terrorist offences arising out of a ““grave exceptional terrorist threat””; that is, an event or situation involving terrorism which causes or threatens serious loss of human life, serious damage to human welfare in the United Kingdom or serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the Home Secretary will need to have received a report from the Director of Public Prosecutions and a senior police officer, and both will have had to be convinced that more than 28 days is necessary. Thirdly, both Houses of Parliament will vote on the order making the higher limit available within seven days of it being laid. Fourthly, the reserve power will be in force for 30 days only. In addition, there are other safeguards. Individual detention beyond 28 days will be authorised by a senior judge, who may issue a warrant of further detention only if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that further detention is necessary for the investigation into a serious terrorist offence and that the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously. It may be for a matter of hours, a couple of days or a maximum of seven days at a time. That seems a very considerable safeguard. However, over my very short time in your Lordships’ House, I have noticed that I seem to have more faith in our senior judiciary than most noble Lords do. The independent reviewer will report on whether individual suspects were held in accordance with requirements governing detention, whether proper procedures were followed for applications for detention beyond 28 days and whether it was reasonable for the Home Secretary to make the higher limit available. The proposal on pre-charge detention is therefore very different from the original proposal. It does not change the pre-charge detention limit now but it does enable the limit to be increased in future in specific and exceptional circumstances, and then only for a strictly limited period. I believe that this new proposal achieves the balance that we have always sought between providing the police with the powers that they need when they need them and protecting the rights of individuals being investigated for these most serious of crimes. Finally, I turn to the issue of coroners’ inquests. The Government have put forward these proposals because there is a genuine problem when an inquest into a death must be held with a jury but it involves the consideration of sensitive material which cannot be disclosed publicly. When an inquest has to consider such material, currently there is the potential for it to be incompatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights if the sensitive material is central to the purpose of the inquest. The Government are firmly of the view that the proposed changes will ensure that an Article 2-compatible inquest can be held in all cases, including those where there is a possibility that state actions may have caused or contributed to the death, while protecting the integrity of the material in question. The vast majority of inquests will continue to be held in public. However, in the very few cases which the Secretary of State has certified will involve consideration of material that cannot be disclosed publicly without damaging the public interest, it will be necessary for the part of the inquest to which that evidence relates to be held in private. Our proposals will not result in material that would otherwise have been heard in public being heard privately, but they will allow material to be considered that could not otherwise have been taken into account. I recognise that these provisions were the subject of detailed comment in the other place. Equally, I am aware that some Members of your Lordships’ House, including the Constitution Committee, have expressed concerns about them. We are all attuned to these sensitivities but we also recognise that there is a real-world issue with which we must deal—not least in meeting our obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR and in enabling certain cases to be concluded, allowing the families involved to achieve some kind of closure. My right honourable friend Tony McNulty indicated in the other place that we would look to amend these provisions to include a sunset clause. I stress to the House this afternoon that, as ever, we want to listen to the views of noble Lords, reflect on them and work to alleviate any concerns, if possible. I know that we will have a full and interesting debate this afternoon; I have been looking forward to it. Although there is, I believe, a large degree of consensus on many of the measures in the Bill, it is clear that the issues of pre-charge detention and coroners’ inquests, in particular, need to be fully and properly debated. I know from my time here that everyone in this House is aware of the terrible threat we face from terrorism and is committed, in their own way, to doing everything we can to address it. In a democracy such as ours, this involves striking the very difficult balance between providing the law enforcement agencies with the legal powers they need to protect our people and the need to protect individual civil liberties. That difficult balance is something that this House is expertly placed to address, and I know that the debate will be positive and constructive. I commend the Bill to the House. Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord West of Spithead.)