Housing and Regeneration Bill

My notes to respond to this amendment are rather longer than the words used by the noble Baroness to move it, and I apologise for that. However, I think that what I have to say will allay any suspicions. The effect of the amendment would be to make it impossible for the regulator to charge an individual provider the cost of a survey unless the regulator could prove that its suspicions when starting the survey were justified. A survey allows the regulator to enter a property to see whether a provider has improved the home or carried out maintenance to the agreed standard. It is an existing Housing Corporation power and is one of the ways in which the regulator can investigate a breach of maintenance standards either in response to tenants’ concerns or on its own suspicions. It can check, for example, that a roof has been mended or a boiler installed. A regulator which prioritises accommodation standards for tenants would use this power. It is not our intention that the Government should pay the regulator’s running costs and it is anticipated that the regulator will raise almost all of its income from fees recovered from registered providers. Clause 177 allows the regulator’s costs to be met largely by fees imposed on the whole provider sector. It is likely, for example, that an annual fee will be paid by all registered providers. Additionally, specific powers in the Bill allow the regulator to charge individual providers on the ““polluter pays”” principle. If the regulator were not allowed to charge individual providers for a survey, it would have to absorb the cost. That means, in effect, that the other providers would ultimately pay through increased fees. If the concern is that the regulator will use this power irresponsibly, I can offer some comfort. The regulator cannot charge more than the survey costs and can charge part or none of its costs if it thinks that is appropriate. So the regulator cannot possibly profit from running a survey. It must follow objective 10, which prevents unnecessary regulation, and it can charge none, part or all of the costs to respond to individual circumstances. We want a proactive regulator, not one that responds at the last minute in cases of serious abuse by a provider. If the regulator cannot charge for a survey unless it can prove its suspicions are justified, we fear, not unreasonably, that it will either be discouraged from carrying out surveys proactively unless it is very certain in its concerns or, more likely, it will charge the costs to all providers in general rather than only the individual provider whose stock it surveyed. A question of fairness is involved in this issue. In order for the amendment to work, the regulator would have to set out its suspicions publicly before the survey. That would add to bureaucracy. It may not be easy to tell, based on the survey alone, whether its suspicions are justified. I pose the question: what happens if the regulator considers its suspicions are upheld but the provider disagrees? Would there be legal challenges? This could end up costing more than the survey fees. That would benefit no one as all providers have to pay for the regulator to defend such cases in their annual fee. Overall, it would discourage the regulator from charging for surveys whatever the result and place the cost instead on the annual fee. By reasons of equity, that would not be fair. We would rather leave the choice of whether to charge directly to the regulator. I hope that answers the noble Baroness’s points.