Helmand Province

I am not quite sure how to follow that excellent contribution, which was rather colourful in places. Nor am I sure whom the hon. Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway) was referring to when he mentioned helicopters and unseasonable suntans in the middle of the night, but he certainly added colour to our proceedings. It feels like the old gang are back together because the hon. Gentleman, the hon. Member for North-East Milton Keynes (Mr. Lancaster) and I visited Afghanistan together as members of the Select Committee on Defence. Thanks to the Pakistan air force, however, I never actually made it to Helmand—that was not because of a clash between the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, or because of a war of words, but simply because an innocent prawn cocktail made sure that I stayed in the base in Kabul. I was disappointed not to have made it down to the south to see the provincial reconstruction teams for myself and hear from the troops about their experiences of development work. As he has shown this morning, the hon. Member for Gravesham has extensive knowledge of Afghanistan and Helmand. He is probably the only Member of Parliament to have visited the country using his own means and to have heard about the situation in the south for himself—without spin and without being influenced by Government officials. I do not necessarily agree with all his analysis and I do not claim to be as knowledgeable as him—I simply go on the information and advice that I receive from various reports—but I am not as pessimistic as him. Excellent work is being done, although there are challenges. The Liberal Democrats support the mission in Afghanistan, although we recognise that we should not use the grand rhetoric that Ministers have unfortunately used about it, including in the past week. The task ahead is extremely hard. We should not always talk about democracy and human rights in Afghanistan in terms of British standards, and although we should always strive to achieve the best, we should be realistic about what we can achieve. One of my main criticisms is that we took our eye of the ball in Afghanistan when we invaded Iraq. The efforts of the great minds in the Department for International Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office were primarily focused on Iraq. Massive numbers of troops were in Iraq at the time, but that was exactly when we should have been investing in reconstruction in Afghanistan, particularly in the south. We should not have started investing only five years later, when we had already started to lose the hearts and minds of people in the south. None the less, the Liberal Democrats support and completely agree with the comprehensive strategy that the Prime Minister set out at the end of last year. There are issues about implementation, but we agree overall with the strategy, which takes a sensible approach. Distinguishing between the different players in the south of Afghanistan—whether they are Taliban, al-Qaeda, Pashtun or tribal leaders—is difficult. That is why we need the professionals and the military on the ground to determine who is what. People will shift between the different categories at different times, but we sometimes look at these issues far too simplistically. I agree that we should be more sophisticated in our approach to identifying who is hostile and who is not. We should leave it to those on the ground to determine such things. Sometimes we will think that people are friendly, but they will suddenly become hostile again because they fear that those who are hostile will be stronger than those in our military. The answer is to use the military and the professionals on the ground to make the judgments. Foreign Office officials recently got into difficulties when they were negotiating with individuals in the south. President Karzai did not appreciate the fact that they had gone beyond what he thought was their remit. These are difficult issues, and we must be intelligent in our approach. The Minister might be aware of the Oxfam report ““Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian Priorities””, which was published in January. Oxfam has been very critical of the humanitarian and development effort. In the summary at the beginning of its report, it says:"““While aid has contributed to progress in Afghanistan, especially in social and economic infrastructure—and whilst more aid is needed—the development process has to date been too centralised, top-heavy and insufficient. It is has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responding to Afghan needs””," which is very much what the hon. Member for Gravesham said. The report covers a huge range of issues. I do not necessarily agree with the tone of some aspects of it, but it is pretty comprehensive. It covers aid effectiveness, governance, agriculture, counter-narcotics, education, health, the protection of non-governmental organisations, community peace building, regional action and the provincial reconstruction teams, and I want to spend quite a bit of time discussing how effective the PRTs have been. However, the main criticism in the report is that the Afghans have been fed a diet of development over which they have had little say, which has been delivered by outsiders and which is not good value for money. Before I look at that, however, I want to discuss how much of the aid pledged by foreign Governments has been delivered. Since 2001, $25 billion of aid has been committed, but only $15 billion has been delivered. I am aware that more money was committed at last week's conference, but I am not sure how much of it was new money and how much has been delivered already—only time will tell which category it falls into. According to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief—an alliance of international aid agencies working in Afghanistan, of which the Minister will probably be aware—the US is the worst offender, having delivered only $5 billion of the $10 billion that it has committed. We should be generous to the US because it has committed considerable sums—much more than any other individual country—but there is a difference between pledging and committing. The UK, Canada, Italy and Japan have a good record of delivering on their pledges, but there is still a $10 billion shortfall overall compared with the amount pledged. The UK has a £200 million shortfall for 2002-08. Why has that money not been spent? What, in general, is the Minister's response to the report? Another issue picked up by the Oxfam report relates to value for money and local delivery. Large chunks of the aid that is actually delivered flow back out of the country simply because we use external contractors, advisers and consultants, rather than indigenous support. According to the Oxfam report, about 40 per cent. of the money spent by the donor countries, including the US and the UK, goes into corporate profits, consultants' salaries and other costs. That vastly pushes up the cost of projects, so we get less for the money that we spend. For example, a road between the centre of Kabul and the international airport cost the US $2.3 million per kilometre, which is at least four times the average cost to the Afghan authorities of building a road. To take another example, a classroom costs $14,000 when built by the Afghan Government, $17,000 when built by NATO, $21,500 when built by a private contractor and a staggering $51,000 when built by an international developer. I am sure that there are sometimes reasons why it is appropriate to use an international developer, but I would hope that this is an extreme case and that such things are not common. My fear, however, is that they are. Perhaps it is far too easy to opt for an international developer. I appreciate that DFID has a good track record of trying to filter money through Afghan institutions, including the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund, but US aid is bypassing the Afghan civilian Government. What discussions have our Government had with the US Government to spread the lessons learned from DFID's good practice and to allow the United States to benefit from our knowledge? It is important that Afghans see the money being spent wisely, but it is also important to us to ensure value for money. What monitoring measures are in place to ensure that? There are about 25 provincial reconstruction teams, led by 13 different nations, and standards and operating practices for each PRT are an issue. Although we do not want complete uniformity, we want some consistency among the PRTs and a general working practice. According to their mission statement, PRTs should"““assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts””." However, the handbook also says that there should be an interim structure. Oxfam has criticised the PRTs for going well beyond their remit at the expense of the development of local Afghan institutions and Government structures. Rather than a help, the PRTs could be seen as a hindrance. Whether to use PRTs and quick improvement projects to ensure early delivery is a dilemma. Making immediate improvements to the quality of life in an area demonstrates to the individuals living there the clear benefits for their families of having the British military on site. But if we are trying to build up Afghan institutions, we must sometimes wait, but how long should we wait before institutions are ready to deliver their own reconstruction? Developing their skills and capabilities helps the Afghan Government to gain authority in the regions. That is another part of the parcel. Security is obviously important. Members might be aware of the story of two Afghan decorators who were hired to spruce up a local school in Musa Qala. Refreshing the rather untidy and unkempt school was supposed to be a good-will gesture to the local community, but during the decorators' 50-mile trip back to their house after completing the task, their convoy was ambushed. The Taliban discovered that they had been working for the British, and they were promptly hanged. In that climate, why would any citizen of Afghanistan want to help the British? Their security is not personally guaranteed, and locals are not absolutely convinced that the British will stay there for a long time. In Musa Qala, for instance, we had control and then lost it, and now we are back in. How many Afghans in Musa Qala believe that the British will be there for the long run, and wonder how long it will be before the Taliban come back? Why would they help in those circumstances? I understand the difficulties of trying to build up local structures and local capability for reconstruction, but in that climate—again, I depart from the hon. Member for Gravesham on this point—it is perhaps no surprise that outside agencies are reluctant to enter zones where even the security of Afghanistan's own citizens is not guaranteed. Again, that is a matter for the professionals on the ground. It has been asked whether we are too risk-averse. Are we sending the appropriate individuals to such areas to help with indigenous reconstruction? Are we being too timid in our approach? A risk assessment needs to be done. It is not for us to make that decision in this Chamber—it must be made by those on the ground with an understanding of security and safety—but it is a problem. Indigenous reconstruction is not happening at the pace that Oxfam and others would like. Oxfam says that we should restrict the use of PRTs to situations in which they are absolutely necessary and the security situation prevents other development. Those are the parameters for risk assessment. The Select Committee on International Development found in its report on Afghanistan:"““If the goal of the international effort is to build up Afghan capacity, PRTs should not perform functions which could be performed by Government of Afghanistan structures.””" I think that everybody would agree with that, but exactly when does that happen? When is it safe to allow external bodies to come in and help with a reconstruction effort that is primarily indigenous? That is a decision for the commanders and professionals on the ground. Concerns have been expressed about the lack of funds flowing through to the military when the conditions—