Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [Lords]

I question whether the definition is tighter, but I do not believe that it should be because the decision should be left to doctors and patients, under the regulator's guidance. It is difficult for us decide at the outset that something is not serious when the regulator, the doctor and the patient might consider it serious. When pre-natal diagnosis is done through amniocentesis, with an indication for termination of pregnancy, not at an embryonic but a foetal stage, weeks into the pregnancy, there are no criteria for seriousness. It is illogical to have a high threshold for embryonic steps to avoid illness when amniocentesis and pre-natal diagnosis in an established pregnancy require no such threshold. Doctors have written to me saying that they do not understand that distinction: why one can terminate a pregnancy without a seriousness threshold—the doctors and patients decide—when we set such a threshold for embryo testing, before a pregnancy is established. Let me consider the important speech of the hon. Member for South Derbyshire (Mr. Todd) about the extent to which it is appropriate to conduct invasive procedures on a child to derive tissue for transplant to a sibling. I am a member of the BMA Medical Ethics Committee. The BMA wrote that it is not worried about that ethical problem because there is already provision for taking the child's best interests into account. In the case of disagreement by doctors and parents or between parents, a court must be involved. Paragraph 44 of the Human Tissue Authority code of practice states clearly, if briefly:"““Courts have identified certain important decisions which require court approval where one person with parental responsibility consents against the wishes of another. If there is any dispute between persons with parental responsibility or any doubt as to the child's best interest, the matter should be referred to court for approval.””" Invasive procedure could be sanctioned only when there is no doubt that it is in the child's best interests. Of course, that is relevant to every sibling, not only the small minority of saviour siblings, who may be a match for an affected child. It is wrong to suggest, in the few cases that the Bill covers, that there is a problem with common law, medical ethics and the guidance to doctors about the best interests of a child for invasive procedures if we do not extend those provisions to the many more children in that position. The Bill strikes the right balance on saviour siblings and I urge hon. Members to bear that in mind. I respect the commitment of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes) and the way in which he presented amendment No. 4, on which I am sure the Committee will divide. However, it is clear from advisers on cord blood banking that, however much one expands cord banks, it will not remove the need in a minority of cases for saviour siblings. I hope that he accepts that I can find no medical opinion, including from those who run the banks, to support the view that expansion would do away with the need for legislation on saviour siblings in a minority of cases. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.