Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [Lords]

Anybody listening to the debate on saviour siblings, both in Committee today and in the wider media—I exempt the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) from this, but there are other speeches still to come—might be forgiven for falling under the misapprehension that the moral argument lies entirely in one direction and that the legislation has been drafted by a latter-day Mary Shelley who wants to allow scientists to create monsters. I am not exaggerating in making that remark—when we debated the amendments to clause 4, the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) prayed in aid Mary Shelley. When one hears comparisons between this Bill and, for example, the Third Reich, it is easy to forget that we are discussing treatments that, if successful, could save lives and prevent needless suffering. We should make decisions based on the best available evidence and put highly charged language to one side. As with most contentious issues, no one side has a monopoly on moral argument, and it is important that we avoid such pretensions and focus on real people's lives and the effects on real people's lives, as supported by evidence. I respect the views of those who have reservations about the Bill, but the three main arguments against saviour siblings are flawed. I will discuss those arguments and touch on some of the moral arguments that support our moving in that direction. The first argument that is often put is that saviour siblings would be treated as commodities. In other words, parents who choose to have a further child in the knowledge that that might save the life of its sibling are somehow driven by unacceptable motives. At the heart of that argument lies the alarming notion that the state has the right to question the motives of prospective parents. It does not take a great deal of thought to realise the odd directions in which that could take us. I strongly believe that it is up to parents to decide their own justifications for having children. In practice, to be perfectly honest, it is unclear how it would be possible accurately to judge intentions in every specific case. I do not want too far from the point, Mr. Hood, but it does not take a great deal of imagination to envisage a number of different cases where any of us would disapprove of the circumstances in which a child was conceived. However, would we have the right to condemn their birth? That example has a direct parallel with the argument that I have mentioned. The second argument expressed by opponents of saviour siblings suggests that saviour siblings would be the first step on a slippery slope to designer babies. Frankly, that argument could be put only in a completely different context, because the rules in the Bill explicitly prevent such a development. If we went through life rejecting Bills on the basis of what subsequent legislation might propose, we would probably never pass any laws whatever. The third argument suggests that saviour siblings may be physically and/or psychologically harmed. It is flawed for several reasons. First, the Bill includes an amendment that limits other tissue, so it does not include whole organs and will have the effect of preventing an embryo from being tested if the intention is to remove an organ from a child. Although it is true that, according to all reports, making a bone marrow donation is not a pleasant experience, there is little, if any, evidence that donors suffer any lasting adverse effects. In fact, the contrary is true: as the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon suggested, many people who can offer the gift of life report an overwhelming psychological benefit. Arguments against saviour siblings are weak. What are the arguments in favour of them? More importantly, what principles should guide us on the issue?