European Union (Amendment) Bill

If I may, I will start my comments on these amendments with a quotation: "““By common consent, the nations of Europe need to strengthen their military capabilities, make better use of their defence budgets and so organise themselves that they can act ""together more decisively when intervening in conflicts, conflict prevention and the response to threats and attacks in the several insidious forms that they can take in the world today””.—[Official Report, 1/4/08; col. 958.]" Those were the words of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, at Second Reading on 1 April—words which I and my colleagues on these Benches happily endorse. The fundamental difference between us is that while we believe that the Lisbon treaty takes us in this direction, the noble Lord believes that it risks taking us in the opposite direction, or at least gives rise to certain doubts to that effect, a number of which are reflected in the amendments that we are discussing this evening. Since its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the European Union has undertaken roughly 20 missions under its European security and defence policy. Although these operations have been relatively small—the largest was a 7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia that is now down to 2,500—most ESDP missions have not been primarily military operations. More interesting have been their complexity and range: preventing civil unrest in Macedonia, reforming the Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system, training Afghan and Iraqi police forces, monitoring the Rafah crossing point in Gaza and overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh. Demand for EU action is growing—witness the developing deployments in Kosovo and eastern Chad. The UK has always supported foreign policy co-operation with our EU partners. If we now want meaningful foreign policy co-operation that amounts to common policies and action among 27 countries, it is in the UK’s interests to support the arrangements needed to make this possible. The UK has the ultimate safeguard in the CFSP in that no decision can be taken without its consent or at least acquiescence. Under the Lisbon treaty, the important decisions will continue to be taken unanimously. There is a provision in the existing treaties for implementing decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting, but it is never really used. There is also the so-called emergency break, or safety net. If a likely QMV decision will affect a member state’s vital interests, no vote can be taken. If no agreement can be reached, the issue can be referred to the European Council, but the European Council decides the issue unanimously. On the relationship between a closer European defence policy and NATO—it is a great privilege to follow the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson—we on these Benches do not believe that there is any conflict, and we fully accept the primacy of NATO. As the impact assessment from our own committee on the treaty of Lisbon concludes: "““The central role of NATO in the defence policy of certain Member States such as the UK will continue to be recognised under the new Treaties””." As Victoria Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, made clear in a speech on 22 February, "““I am here today in Paris to say that we agree with France—Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs—a stronger, more capable European defense capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough””." Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Astor, said, again in his Second Reading speech, "““the continuing leading of NATO is of the highest priority””.—[Official Report, 1/4/08; col. 959.]" We concur with that sentiment. As the impact assessment concluded: "““As regards the EU Member States, such as the UK, which are also members of NATO, the Lisbon Treaty will not change the current situation with regards to their collective defence, which will continue to be organised and implemented in the framework of NATO””."