Counter-Terrorism Bill

Mr. Deputy Speaker, I was not in any sense going to comment on the trial. I was simply going to make the point that two of my constituents were held under Overt and not charged. I know that one of those men was held for 28 days. Of course, I am not a Minister. Those of us who are not and have never been Ministers should be mindful of the responsibility that they carry and of the fact that Ministers often have access to information that the rest of us do not have. Given that, it would be irresponsible to oppose in principle an extension to 42 days. However, the harm that such an extension would undoubtedly do to winning Muslim hearts and minds, and to civil liberties more broadly, must be justified in practice by any good that it might do by preventing and deterring terror attacks. A central difficulty for the Government—the Home Secretary could not avoid this today—is that by Ministers' own admissions it has not been necessary in any case to date to hold any suspect for longer than 28 days to charge them. If Ministers had broad and deep support for their claim that an extension to 42 days—apparently, that is a completely arbitrary figure in itself—was necessary, we would have to weigh it carefully. However, as we have heard, the broad and deep support is for not going beyond the status quo. We read today that that support is shared in private by the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General. The complex manoeuvres in the Bill to give the Commons a say in the holding of suspects beyond 28 days is a move by Ministers to break up that broad and deep support and to shore up their position with their Back Benchers. If that is the case, the first part of the manoeuvre has clearly failed. We wait to see whether Ministers have more success with the second. I have at least one constituent who was charged within the 28-day limit—that suggests that the current limit is sufficient—and I must not forget that one of my constituents was held for that period and not charged. Whatever a man's character or history, it is no small matter for him to be held without charge for the best part of a month. That can have no small effect on his family, and perhaps on his employment and health. The Government's case is not helped by the persistent suggestion that Ministers are no more concerned with security than they are with spin. As recently as this morning, a Government spin doctor—I am using a newspaper's phrase, not mine—was quoted thus:"““We may have a parliamentary challenge on our hands…but in the end the public will see that””" the Leader of the Opposition"““has out-sourced counter-terrorism to…Liberty””." It would be risible if Ministers who recently failed to prevent a convicted terrorist from leaving prison early and to ban Ibrahim Moussawi from entering Britain were to try to portray others as soft on extremism and terror, but that might well be the game. If so, the House can conclude only that Ministers are prepared to risk the position of Britain's mainstream Islamic leadership in the quest for a quick political win as the grim opinion polls stack up for the Prime Minister. Whatever the motive, the House must ask itself whether that risk is worth taking. Al-Qaeda is seeking to lure young, vulnerable Muslims away from their traditional religious faith. It is trying to drive a wedge between them and their families, and to open up a chasm between them and the prospect of a happier, better and more fulfilled life that is no less authentically Islamic for being completely British. It is trying to set Muslims against non-Muslims. Those of us in the House who are not Muslims have perhaps a particular responsibility not to make that strategy easier to accomplish. I have tried to warn consistently in the House of the dangers of separatism and extremism. That has not invariably been a popular course to follow in all quarters of my constituency. If it were proved to me that it was necessary to extend from 28 days to 42, I would vote to do so, but the House should not be willing to compromise good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, increase the heavy burden that Britain's mainstream Muslim leadership bears, make more difficult the flow of information to the police and contradict key elements in the Government's Contest anti-terror policy for no tangible security gain in perhaps the greatest struggle of our time, in which all Muslims and non-Muslims should be, and yet can be, united.