UK Parliament / Open data

European Union (Amendment) Bill

My Lords, my concerns relate to that part of the Lisbon treaty that the draftsmen call the ““external action”” of the Union—matters that we think of as foreign policy and defence, security in the most important sense of the term, and controlled military action in support of those policies as required by our national interest. That it is right for us to consider these with some care is underlined by the fact that the procedure followed by Her Majesty’s Government in the other place meant that the amendments on these concerns were not debated. The tests that I believe it is right to apply to the treaty in relation to these matters are: first, what do the countries of Europe need to do to be able to work together more effectively on these matters; and, secondly, how far will the provisions in the treaty advance useful answers to these needs? By common consent, the nations of Europe need to strengthen their military capabilities, make better use of their defence budgets and so organise themselves that they can act together more decisively when intervening in conflicts, conflict prevention and the response to threats and attacks in the several insidious forms that they can take in the world today. So how does the treaty come out when tested by these objectives? At first sight, it gets a middling grade at best. It says a number of the right things and appears to hold back from some of the more objectionable changes that it might have entrenched. But, when it is examined more closely, it can be seen to point in dangerously wrong directions. Over and beyond the wish and the decision to act, there is the all important matter of the perceived readiness to act and the capability to do so. As the recently published Command Paper The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World correctly puts it, "““our demonstrable political will to deploy””," our Armed Forces is of the essence. In this—the development by the countries of Europe of improved and more effective capabilities, force generation and the deployment of that force—the European Defence Agency is designated by the treaty as having considerable importance. In debating the Bill, we have the benefit of the thorough examination of the treaty undertaken by our European Union Committee and, in particular, Sub-Committee C, working under the well informed chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Roper. Today we are invited to take note of that report, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment. Considering this necessarily substantial document will help us to understand how important, and how potentially damaging to our national interest, this treaty is. I commend to the House another recent report by the Defence Committee of the other place, The Future of NATO and European Defence. While the scope of the report extends well beyond the difficult—indeed, contentious—issue of NATO-EU relations, it emphasises in relation to the Lisbon treaty how important it is that the treaty should not undermine the fundamental, leading role of NATO in the security and collective defence of Europe and its member nations. The report gives a carefully considered, unanimous, all-party view. I believe that the continuing leading of NATO is of the highest priority. The report refers to NATO as, "““the essential embodiment of the transatlantic relationship””—" a relationship that I enthusiastically support. I am therefore pleased to find that in their national security paper the Government state: "““The partnership with the United States remains our most important bilateral relationship, and central to our national security””." These words from the heart of government caution us, if words mean anything, to move only very carefully, if at all, in the direction of European defence as envisaged by the draftsmen of the Lisbon treaty. On the NATO-EU relationship, I differ emphatically from Her Majesty’s Government, who, as the Defence Committee points out with concern, have not included an improvement of that working relationship as a key British objective at the forthcoming NATO summit in Bucharest. In this I stand absolutely with the committee and its views, developed over two years of careful and extensive inquiry, and against the Government with their basically dismissive attitude. If the Lisbon treaty may exacerbate rather than ease that relationship, that is of itself a sufficient reason for the United Kingdom to reject the Lisbon treaty. In this connection, I invite noble Lords to consider section 6 of the Defence Committee report, which discusses NATO and the European security and defence policy and recounts the evolution of the ESDP since it was launched by the former Prime Minister and President Chirac in 1998 at St Malo. The section begins by pointing out that the Lisbon treaty enshrines, "““the ESDP in a Treaty for the first time””," and proposes, "““a series of innovations in the policy””." So much for the Government’s contention that the Lisbon treaty changes nothing and that therefore it does not merit a referendum. I turn from issues of procedure to the substance of the treaty. I shall highlight briefly five points that roused my anxieties, as they point away from responsible co-operation between the nations, which I welcome, towards a single, centrally controlled system, disconnected from direct responsibility to the public. First, on the role and powers of the high representative, that appointment confuses the important distinction between the role of the Commission and the responsibilities of the Council of Ministers, strengthening the former at the expense of the latter. The high representative, by also being Vice-President of the Commission and head of the European Defence Agency and by having a right of initiative to propose EU military operations, will for the first time blur the line between what is intergovernmental and what is supranational in EU defence planning. My second concern relates to the diversion of scarce defence resources into structures that duplicate those of NATO and add nothing to sharp-end capabilities. Thirdly, and directly linked to the previous point, I point to the apparent determination in planning EU operations to sidestep the Berlin-plus arrangements with NATO. This illustrates all too clearly how a sensible and reasonable declared arrangement can be negated in practice by those working to a different agenda. Fourthly, I refer to the concept of permanent structured co-operation in defence. At first sight, the headline is thoroughly attractive, but an examination of a list of ingredients shows quite the opposite. Direct, one-to-one bilateral arrangements between nations that are willing and able have everything to commend them, as between ourselves and France over the aircraft carriers, but that is not what the permanent structured co-operation means in the treaty. It means multilateral arrangements allowed only when subject to detailed preconditions and when sanctioned and organised through Brussels. My final point brings me back to the European Defence Agency. Similar considerations and objections apply to the treaty provisions for this as apply to permanent structured co-operation. What started off as an acceptable measure of intergovernmental international co-operation is converted by the treaty into a device substituting for that co-operation and mandatory centrally directed Community action. The Title VI provisions of the Lisbon treaty are in substantially the same terms as those of the rejected constitutional treaty. They make significant changes in the arrangements of shared defence and security. Thus, quite apart from anything else in the treaty, these provisions merit—indeed, they properly require—a referendum in accordance with the election manifesto on which this Government were returned to office.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
700 c958-60 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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