European Union (Amendment) Bill

My Lords, I speak in support of the Lisbon treaty and, as a member of the Select Committee, I commend to your Lordships the report of the European Union Committee on the treaty. I start by congratulating the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester on his maiden speech and particularly on his masterly steering round controversy in a European Union debate. He may find that is not so easy to do in future but I am very pleased that he supports the treaty. I spent too long in government, and perhaps too long working at pretty close quarters with some of our colleagues in the EU, not to recognise its faults. My experiences, particularly in the fields of trade, defence and foreign policy, left me at times frustrated, often irritated and, on occasions, frankly, pretty indignant. But none of those experiences leads me to doubt that our membership and our growing involvement in and commitment to the European Union are anything but right. I cannot help reflecting that in decades to come succeeding generations will find it hard to believe that we have made such a song and dance about our relationship with our closest neighbours. Today I want to concentrate particularly on the way in which this latest treaty impacts on European Union foreign policy and to say something about the referendum issue, particularly the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, who I am very sorry is not in his place. At this stage in our relationship with Europe, we, the British, must maintain control of decision-taking on the major issues of our foreign policy. It is doubtful whether we shall ever be ready for a European institution to assume that responsibility for us but we certainly are not ready for it now. The framework for decisions on EU foreign policy will continue to be the member states, and the Lisbon treaty ensures that the principle of unanimity for decisions in this respect will be maintained. That is not to say that the treaty proposes no changes on CFSP issues—it clearly does—but these do not undermine our ability to take our own decisions. On the contrary, the changes should improve the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s foreign policy when we decide that we need to act together. This is very important because it is not simply a question of holding a red-line position—a ““thus far and no further”” doctrine. We need to get on to the front foot and, when there is a commonality of view between Governments, to pursue European policies more effectively. I think particularly of the Middle East peace process, where a more proactive Europe could play a far more positive role. Another change is that the high representative will be able to suggest to the European Council that he should be tasked with preparing a proposal but, for that to happen, the request to him must be unanimous. The overwhelming weight of evidence presented to our Select Committee was that the treaty has preserved the independence of our foreign and defence policy and that the fundamental principles of the CFSP will not change. In particular, we concluded that the principle of unanimity and the search for consensus in decision-making will continue to apply to the CFSP. There has been a great deal of comment on the strengthening of the position of the high representative as provided for in the treaty. The renamed post will bring together three functions that already exist: the Council presidency, the commissioner for external affairs and the high representative. At this stage, it is of course very difficult to assess how this will work in practice, but the objective is to bring about more effective and coherent EU external action. Obviously, a great deal will depend on the working relationships within the EU with the president of the Council and the president of the Commission, but most importantly with the member states, particularly as the high representative will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, which is a real innovation that will undoubtedly give the incumbent a great deal more clout. In a practical sense, the less ambitiously framed role of the current incumbent is already far more influential than it used to be. His current functions may not be as extensive as those laid out in the treaty, but his influence is already very considerable. The influence of the new role is really nothing to fear. It will develop, and it may vary from incumbent to incumbent. Frankly, we above all people should recognise that. It is not so unlike Parliament’s relationship with Ministers. Some Ministers are very influential and others are less so. Much depends on the man or woman concerned. Lastly, there is the impact of the treaty on our position at the United Nations. Concerns and myths have proliferated about this. If one believes some parts of the popular press, we shall lose our seat on the Security Council and our right to speak; we shall lose our very veto. Whatever such rabble-rousers are prepared to try to persuade the British public to believe about their own Government, do they really think that they can persuade anyone, however naive, that the French would give up any of those? There is a change that provides for member states on the Security Council to request that the high representative be invited to speak to present the EU’s position, where that position is unanimously agreed. The request must be made; that is all. The Security Council may agree or not agree. There is nothing so extraordinary in that; diplomats and others are already regularly invited to speak to the Security Council. Our right to speak, our right to vote and our veto remain unaffected, and we made that very clear in paragraph 7.82 of our report. We have heard today and no doubt we will hear a great deal more about the referendum on the treaty. Put boldly, the accusation is that the Government have acted in bad faith, and that will be repeated. Both sides of the argument will accuse each other of putting party before national interest and of trying to obscure the real argument. Both sides will quote their supporters, and both sides will attempt to trump each other in the importance of those whom they quote. It is all pretty predictable stuff. We shall no doubt have every opportunity to go over it in detail. Perhaps I may make one or two points in opening on our side on some of the points made by the noble Lord, who I am glad to see has now returned to his place. As I understood it, the IGC mandate records that the agreement of all 27 heads that the constitutional concept that consisted in repealing all existing treaties and replacing them by a single text called a constitution is abandoned. I understood that that was what had been agreed. The constitutional treaty, as I understood it—but maybe the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, can tell me that I am wrong—was legally unprecedented. It would have abolished the EU and refounded it under a single constitutional order. The Lisbon treaty, by contrast, amends the existing treaties in no way differently from the Single European Act and the treaties of Maastricht, Nice and Amsterdam—a pretty important difference between the original constitutional treaty and the treaty before us today. By dropping the name of the Foreign Minister, getting rid of the treaty’s references to flags, anthems, currency and mottos, and removing the charter from the body of the treaty, the so-called constitutional trappings have all gone. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, may think that that is paltry stuff, but I prefer to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, who, after all, is not part of this political scrap, that these are not trivia but hugely important issues for all nations and we attach great significance to them. The really important point was what was negotiated after the original treaty—the so-called red lines, which really do mean that Britain is in a different position from that of other signatories to the treaty. The red lines include a legally binding protocol that is specific to the United Kingdom in the Charter of Fundamental Rights—I make that point particularly for the noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite, who is looking sceptical—is applicable in both the UK courts and the European Court of Justice, and confirms that the binding charter will have no impact on UK domestic law and will create no powers for the EU to legislate. That is pretty significant. I turn to the criminal law and police and judicial process, regarding which the Government secured an extension of our existing opt-in rights on migration, asylum and immigration issues. My goodness, if we had not, we would be hearing all about that today from the other side, who believe it is a very significant point. On social security, the Government secured a provision allowing us to insist on unanimous voting by EU member states if we were concerned that a proposal would affect important aspects of our social security system. That is the third point. The fourth red line is, of course, where we secured an agreement on common foreign and security policy whereby it will continue to be intergovernmental and on which there would, again, be voting unanimity by EU member states. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, may think that that does not count at all and that those red lines, negotiated after the original constitutional treaty, do not count. I beg to differ, and most sensible people would, too. The noble Lord was allowed to finish his remarks without being interrupted. Perhaps he would extend the same courtesy to me. In the mean time, nothing can take the place of detailed analysis of what this treaty changes in respect of our current treaty and our treaty obligations in the EU. We have to look at what the treaty actually says, not what some people would like it to say. When the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, held a press conference on the publication of our report a couple of weeks ago, a number of journalists—in fact, quite a few journalists—turned up. They searched desperately through the report for the condemnations, for the criticisms and for the sensational conclusions. They searched in vain. What they found were the considered judgments to which 80 of your Lordships had contributed—measured, sensible and accurate judgments. Of course, nothing appeared in the press. That is what we call ““balanced reporting”” on the European Union in this country. I left the press conference with a number of journalists, one of whom said very sadly to another, ““I thought that the Lords was full of Eurosceptics””. One of his colleagues replied, ““They are, they are—like Lord Pearson of Rannoch””. I allowed a brief pause and said, ““No. Believe me, there is no one in the House of Lords quite like Lord Pearson of Rannoch””. I trust that the noble Lord will not disappoint us today when he rises to give us his version of events.