Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill [HL]

My Lords, I believe that I am responding to Amendment No. 65A, which I understand covers the same ground as Amendment No. 143 that we debated in Grand Committee. I am grateful to the noble Lord for clarifying the intentions behind his amendment but I confess that I still lack understanding about who this independent arbiter would be that would hear the representations made by a business, or what powers it would have. For example, would the person be fully independent, such as the judicial person suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Cope? If the amendment seeks to introduce a truly independent arbiter, external to the regulator, we would strongly disagree with such an aim. This would replicate the existing criminal system, which we are trying to provide an alternative for in certain circumstances by requiring some form of substitute judge to determine whether a sanction may be imposed. The amendment is unnecessary given that the Bill already provides for there to be a right of appeal of the final decision to an independent and impartial tribunal. It would create two rights to have your case heard by two different judicial persons, both before and after a sanction was imposed. If we could figure out how such a body or person could be created, this would add a further level of bureaucracy which would not only make the process of imposing a sanction much more lengthy and cumbersome but would have the same impact on criminal prosecution itself. Therefore, this amendment would make the Part 3 sanctions unworkable and would give regulators no incentive to take up the new powers. The noble Lord suggested that the amendment was designed to ensure that decisions to impose a sanction are rigorously reviewed and challenged within a regulator before a final notice is issued. We would have considerable sympathy with that. Professor Macrory explored such matters in his final report and suggested different ways in which regulators could take decisions on penalties which would ensure quality and consistency. For example, the final decision to impose a penalty could be taken at a more senior level of the regulator’s organisation than that of the person who issued the notice of intent. The noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, provided an example of local authorities in that regard. Professor Macrory also suggested that training and monitoring can play important roles in ensuring quality and consistency. We believe that such matters should not be in the Bill and are better dealt with through guidance. We are prepared to amend the guide to the Bill to make more explicit how regulators can safeguard the quality and consistency of their sanctioning decisions by, for example, requiring that senior officers, independent of the initial regulatory officer, take final decisions. I hope that what I have said has reassured the noble Lord and that he feels able to withdraw Amendment No. 65A. I would like to speak also to government Amendments Nos. 67 and 68. Amendment No. 67 proposes making the undertakings provision at Clause 42(5) compulsory. This will mean that a regulator must allow the business the opportunity to offer undertakings in order to mitigate a discretionary requirement. This issue was raised in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell. We promised to consider the proposal and, on reflection, are very happy to make undertakings a mandatory part of the discretionary requirements provision. We have tabled a further amendment, Amendment No. 68, to clarify that while the regulator must allow the business the opportunity to offer undertakings, the regulator does not have to accept the undertakings.