European Union (Amendment) Bill

I cannot give way to the right hon. Gentleman again, as other people want to speak. The point is that treaties have to be reversed from time to time, in whole or in part. The decision of Lord Denning, in McCarthy v. Smith, followed by Lord Diplock in Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd, clearly states the British Parliament's continuing right: it is unassailable constitutional law. With respect to the European Communities Act 1972 and the European treaty that is part of the treaty of Lisbon—the treaty of Rome and following treaties are all amalgamated with consolidation and amendments in the treaty of Lisbon—the British Parliament has the continuing right to override those provisions in whole or in part. The crucial words are"““or any provision in it””," meaning the treaty. As and when we decide that we want to renegotiate we have an unassailable right to do so as a matter of constitutional law and the case law that is at the very apex of our judicial system. It is essential for us to understand that point, which is why my new clause 9, supported by 47 Members, and the reasoned amendment that I tabled for today, supported by a new set of Members, are so important. I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) say, in response to my intervention, that we needed a constitutional safeguard. I shall not go through all the arguments we made the other day, but it is imperative that we come up with clear, legally watertight wording that reflects those decisions, or we shall be unable to renegotiate, although we know we must—for example, on over-regulation. By Commissioner Verheugen's own admission, over-regulation costs European economies £100 billion a year—many billions to the British economy. We shall have to renegotiate the provisions, so we need a sound constitutional basis in our domestic law to enable us, where negotiations fail or falter, to tell other member states that we have reserved our position. The House should be in a position to tell other member states that we will renegotiate because we have retained the right to do so. Without going through all the arguments again, I say only that the consequence of acceptance of the treaty is that the European Court of Justice and our courts will be determined to apply case law, because that is what declaration 17 says. It may be only a declaration but it will still be used, just like the working time provisions that were meant to be only a declaration. The courts will say, ““You have accepted the constitutional assumptions on which the European Court has made its determinations.”” Those assumptions include—unequivocally, as is shown in cases such as Costa and Handelgesellschaft—the fact that national Parliaments and national constitutions are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. All the legislating we do in this place will be reduced—pulverised—by the significance of the case law of the ECJ where it chooses to exercise it. Because we have given away so many powers by handing over competences, we are reducing and draining away the powers of the House, but they are not ours to give away. It is not our House. It is not our Parliament. It belongs to the voters. Churchill, speaking on this subject, said that Members' first duty was to their country, their second was to their constituents, and only in third place was their duty to their party's policy and programme. We Conservatives believe in that. I personally would like always to obey the Whip, and I have no problem whatever doing so in relation to the Bill. We have acted together. There have been one or two blips—the other night, for example—but that is not as important as the fact that we work together.