Climate Change Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 139: 139: Clause 27, page 14, line 11, leave out ““advise the Secretary of State”” and insert ““decide upon”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have kept my powder dry throughout the proceedings this evening so that I can concentrate on this amendment. My noble friend referred to ““giving a fair wind”” to this non-departmental public body. That is what lies behind my amendments. I want to shift the emphasis of work from advice to Ministers to decision-taking. I regard the thrust of my amendments as being at the very heart of the Bill. I have a clear difference of opinion with the Government as to how that committee should operate and what its powers should be. My noble friend will recall that I set out my preliminary views on 14 January—Hansard, cols. 1064-66—of how the committee would function, on the back of someone else’s amendment. I do not want to repeat my arguments from that occasion. However, Amendment No. 175, one of the amendments I shall concentrate on this evening, sets out the need for the Government to agree reports with the committee. Apart from Amendment No. 176, my amendments are consequential. In Committee, I set out to show that there was a precedent for the concept of agreeing reports between departments and NGOs—in that case the National Audit Office’s Comptroller and Auditor-General and departmental officials on value-for-money reports from the NAO, and on appropriation account reports from the NAO. I quoted from a Joint Committee of the DES and the NAO, which the NAO had provided to the PAC on 23 April 1986, which dealt with the arrangements for agreeing reports. The minutes stated that, in agreeing reports, the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s intention was to establish, first, that all material and relevant facts have been included; secondly, that the facts were not in dispute; thirdly, that the presentation of the facts was fair; and, fourthly, where the report stated any NAO view or conclusions with which the departments were unable to agree, that would be made clear and the NAO and departments’ reasons properly represented with all necessary balance. The House will note tonight that my Amendment No. 175 is almost a straight lift from the minute of the Public Accounts Committee of 1986. Amendment No. 176 deals with the circumstances in which the committee and Government could not agree, and where the difference of opinion had to be referred to Parliament. In those circumstances, the Government would put their proposal to Parliament under the affirmative procedure. If defeated, they would then be required to put the committee’s proposal under similar procedural arrangements. To sum up, we have a mechanism here for seeking agreement, taking decisions, making recommendations and, where irreconcilable differences exist, referring them to Parliament for resolution of the dispute. While the committee could exercise a right to take decisions, it could also make recommendations—these things being distinctly different. The whole process could be further improved by a reference in Parliament to a Joint Committee which could refer its views to Parliament to aid resolution of the dispute. In my view, there will be many, many disputes. Governments of all persuasions will inevitably be tempted to duck big decisions; that is what concerns me. A whole generation of young people out there are interested in climate change and look to Parliament now, in this Bill, to introduce mechanisms which will avoid such conflicts. They are reliant on us, now, at the beginning of this millennium, to influence climate change over the rest of this century. Many of the decisions will be very controversial. To give an example, only yesterday, we had the Kingsnorth announcement, which was immediately opposed by many environmental groups on the basis that we were not dealing with the issue of carbon and CO2 emissions. We will be ever confronted with those kinds of problems in government. Very often, because of the power of outside lobbying organisations, Governments will be forced to back down. Another example is the decision taken by the Mayor of London on the Porsche congestion charge. Porsche is now going to judicial review. That is a further example of the kind of pressure that can be exerted on government—in this case, the Mayor—where very controversial decisions have to be taken. I want a mechanism that the Government can hold responsible for those decisions and, to use a phrase that I used before, on occasion, perhaps even hide behind that body, so that the public understand that we have given others a responsibility to take major decisions. I have previously cited the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. It is far easier for it to handle decisions of that magnitude than it was for the Chancellor when he or she knew that he or she would inevitably be confronted by electoral and other political considerations in the taking of decisions on interest rates. We need a committee with a dynamic tension in its relationship with government, in which the committee recognises the utmost seriousness with which it has to take its decisions. What is most important is that a chasm is not allowed to develop between the committee, the Government and public opinion: a chasm in which the public and the committee blame the Government for failing to act; in which successive Governments blame their predecessors for failing to act; and in which successive Secretaries of State blame their predecessors for failing to meet targets recommended by the Climate Change Committee. That would be the blame game at its worst, and I am fearful that that is what will happen, inevitably with an exasperated public looking on. We all know about drifts in public policy and in government decision-taking. My amendment is intended to stop that. Finally, I turn to an issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, when we were originally discussing these issues in Committee. He referred to politicisation of the committee. I think that we have completely misunderstood what the internal dynamics of that committee will be in the circumstances to which I am referring. I think that you get politicisation where individuals have only influence. The moment that you give them real power to take decisions, you will not get politics. You will find that the committee combines in those conditions to avoid political argument and to come out with a consensus view with which it can carry government with it. The danger is that the less responsibility you give the committee, the more likely it is that you will bring in to its deliberations political considerations. I listened very carefully to the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—he referred to it again this evening in response to my noble friend Lord Rooker. I think that he should reconsider the issue of politicisation before the Bill goes to the House of Commons, because, as I have said, a major misjudgment is taking place on this issue. I beg to move.