Treaty of Lisbon (No. 7)

That member state would be in breach of the treaty. Let us be clear: there is no remit for the court in those matters—at least, that is the way in which I currently interpret the treaty—but that member state would be in breach of international law, which would be a serious matter. If we think that that is likely to happen, we should not sign the treaty. Let us consider the other major innovation in defence in the Lisbon treaty. It is called ““permanent structured co-operation””. Again, I submit that, over time, it will become the framework in which all member states have to conduct their defence policies. Article 42(6) of the consolidated treaty states:"““Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.””" That refers to a small group of states that gets together to go further and faster than their counterparts. Article 46(2) makes it clear that"““the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation…by qualified majority voting””." Permanent structured co-operation is therefore established by QMV. The obligations on member states are shown in the second protocol to the treaty. They are onerous. The protocol refers to a member state undertaking"““to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces””." Let us be clear: the commitment of forces is a matter for unanimity, which is what the Government keep stating. However, paragraph 4 of article 46 of the consolidated texts says:"““If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol…the Council may…act by a qualified majority””" to remove that member from the structured co-operation. With the conjunction of those double qualified majority votes, the European Union's policy is effectively removed from the scope of a single member state's veto. It is therefore completely untrue that unanimity is the rule in defence, as the Government keep insisting. Let us step back from the detail for a minute. From defence being barely mentioned as a possibility at Maastricht, there is now a clear direction, with the introduction of the new decision-making mechanisms and institutions in the Lisbon treaty. First we had the St. Malo agreement. The then Prime Minister insisted at Amsterdam that the Western European Union should not become another EU institution, but he allowed that to happen at Nice. The Government opposed the whole principle of permanent structured co-operation because, as the then Minister, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), said, it would"““undermine the inclusive, flexible, model of ESDP that the EU has agreed””;" but here it is in the treaty, and it is easy to see the risks of allowing such an institution into the EU treaties. Permanent structured co-operation is the new defence decision-making mechanism in the Lisbon treaty, which, to quote from the protocol, claims to herald"““a new stage in the development of the European security and defence policy””." The provisions are therefore not just a tidying exercise; they are a big step forward. We know that the French intend to make defence a major priority of their presidency. The Government say that the provisions of title V remain intergovernmental in character, but the House must be aware that the term ““intergovernmental”” is not a precise term. NATO represents classic intergovernmentalism, but EU intergovernmentalism involves an altogether more fluid and dynamic structure, reflected in the mechanisms for decision making that I have described. The all-important relationship between NATO and European security and defence policy remains, however, ill defined and paralysed by technical disputes, with no certainty about who does what in the event of an international crisis, as the Secretary-General of NATO himself said just a year ago. The Lisbon treaty institutions and decision making will relegate NATO primacy to the status of a constitutional monarch: largely ceremonial and largely irrelevant to the day-to-day functioning of defence policy in the European Union. We would do well to recall Bismarck's adage:"““I have always found the word 'Europe' on the lips of those…who wanted something from others…which they dared not demand in their own names””." The real security threats to the European Union that European militaries should address lie far from our shores. Afghanistan is the most immediately pressing security issue currently facing the European Union. If the new EU institutions and decision-making mechanisms were seriously going to help the Europe in, to quote the treaty,"““fully assuming its responsibilities within the international community””," its members would be actively fulfilling the combined joint statement of requirements for the NATO mission in Afghanistan and not leaving the bulk of the fighting to NATO's Anglophone members.