Climate Change Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 16: 16: Clause 4, page 3, line 7, at end insert— ““( ) to set within each of the five years within a budgetary period an annual amount for the new UK carbon account (the ““annual target””) ( ) to set in every calendar year until 2044 an annual amount for the net UK carbon account for the year six years ahead (the ““rolling annual target””), and”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, our amendments in the group set up a mechanism for yearly milestones, which addresses a serious gap in the Bill. The Government have obviously recognised the gap but, in our view, have made an unsatisfactory attempt to address it. The rolling annual target mechanism provides for both flexibility and accountability in the budget process. The problem with the budgets as they are in the Bill is that there is no way of ensuring that the first few years of the budget period will see serious attempts and efforts on the part of Government to meet their targets. We would like to think that any Secretary of State will busy himself with reducing emissions from day one of a budget period, but that will be difficult. There is the obvious problem that if there is no accountability within the five-year period, it will be very easy for a Government to blame missing a target on the previous Government, or to have decreased motivation for achieving a target if it seemed likely that the next Government would take the heat. If we are to ensure that reductions happen, there needs to be steady pressure and constant accountability. Objections were raised about the variations that can occur from year to year that may make numerical targets difficult to meet annually or give the wrong impression about the success or failure of an Administration’s efforts. The rolling factor takes care of that. Each year, the following six years would have their annual targets adjusted, to take into account things such as cold winters, to ensure that the budgets are met on time. Likewise, the rolling factor can take into account successes that, by happy coincidence, occur in a Secretary of State’s tenure. If a series of heavily polluting power stations were phased out at the beginning of a budget period, the Secretary of State could rest on his or her undeserved laurels and still achieve the budget without making any other serious attempts at tackling emissions. One of the main objections was that it was difficult to set a single figure for a year because of too many contingent factors that would influence emissions. All targets are like that. We have no interest in setting off alarm bells unnecessarily, but the annual report gives the Secretary of State or, we hope, the Prime Minister a chance to explain. All government targets are contingent; the public realise that and we are kidding ourselves to think that there is not a widespread realisation that the nature of a target in general is a goal to be worked towards and one that will be met if appropriate actions are taken. There is not an extraordinary circumstance that derails it. The rolling feature of our proposed targets will provide the most realistic and robust goals and thus accountability. Consider applying the same argument to taxation and the PBR. Just because the fiscal budget is on a five-year period, it does not stop an annual report from being a useful tool for scrutinising a process. Like the rise and fall of emissions due to temperature, the Government’s fiscal budget has to account for any number of extraordinary circumstances. Would we accept the argument that we should not have an annual budget presented by the Chancellor because it is difficult to pin down where we should be for any given year? The Government’s amendments propose yearly indicative ranges of temperatures. This seems to be a fudge. How can it work in practice? For arguments sake, let us say that the first year’s indicative range is a reduction by between 3 and 5 per cent. What would that amount to? It would amount to 3 per cent becoming the target. Any Government would take all the credit that they could—the press officers overworked with reporting that the Government had delivered on their promises. The top end of the scale would become meaningless. A lot depends on how those ranges are set. If there were a minimum gap for the range, it may make the amendments more sensible. An indicative range of 3.00053 per cent as opposed to 3.00063 per cent would seem more persuasive. We want the targets to be at the upper limit of possibility, pushing Ministers to find ways to ensure that they are achieved. At the end of the day, or at the end of the budget period, doing just enough to meet the minimum requirement may not be good enough. We do not want Ministers continually to be able to justify their failures because of bad weather. Annual targets need to send clear signals; these ranges are anything but. It is like running a race with a victory ribbon that moves or, more aptly, it is like running the 200 metres but saying that anything between 175 metres and the finishing line will do. While we appreciate the Government’s recognition that there needs to be more accountability, the mechanism that they propose is too deeply flawed to represent even a step in the right direction. We strongly believe that if we are going to have genuine accountability during the budget period, it should come in the form of rolling annual targets—the rolling annual targets that we propose. I beg to move.