Banking (Special Provisions) Bill

My problem with the Bill is simple: it is a disgraceful, shambolic exercise that has been brought through all its stages in one afternoon and runs completely counter to a whole raft of principles by which we normally legislate in the House. I am thinking not only of the truncation of time, but of the principles that underpin any proper legislation. In the first place, it is perfectly clear that the real reason for this so-called emergency legislation is, in part, to avoid the possibility of the Bill being declared hybrid. We will discover that in due course when the draft orders are examined. If any of them turn out to affect particular private interests in a way that designates classes and treats people within those classes differently, the Bill will be declared a hybrid instrument. We will then know that the Bill is nothing more or less than a con trick pushed through the House at short notice for the purpose of avoiding the difficulty that the Government would have in giving a fair hearing to the shareholders, who, under the hybrid procedure, would have the opportunity to have their case heard before a Committee of the House. Connected with that first principle is the fact that, as part of the avoidance of the hybrid procedure, the one thing not mentioned in the Bill is Northern Rock, which has been mentioned only in the debates. The Bill itself does not mention Northern Rock at all, yet that is what we have spent the entire afternoon discussing. That is part of the con trick that is being perpetrated on the House by this deceitful legislation. The second question relates to retrospective legislation. We do not legislate retrospectively in this House, but the Bill provides for retrospective legislation by order. In other words, it is another misuse of the conventions of this House to provide for retrospective legislation. If that were to be justified in any circumstances, it should be done only by primary legislation, not by order. Thirdly, as regards the tax consequences—this will not be debated in the House of Lords, because it is subject to privilege—examination of clause 10 shows that it would be possible, although in fact I believe that it is intended, to rearrange the tax arrangements, some of which may affect Granite, in such a way as to avoid tax altogether. The clause provides that no tax whatsoever should be paid in respect of the matters contained in the Bill. We do not know how far that will go, because the words used in terms of the order-making power are so wide; they appear in phrases such as ““in connection with”” and ““in relation to””. Connected with that is the fact that the tax consequences are specifically stated as including—[Hon. Members: ““Ah!””] I am deeply honoured that the Chief Secretary has come back. I dare say that it is possible that she has discovered answers to some of the points that were raised about 15 minutes ago by a series of hon. Members. I hope that she may take this opportunity to try to reply in the terms that were just suggested. Not only does the Bill contain very serious and dangerous provisions that could exclude the payment of tax in a whole range of permutations—[Hon. Members: ““Ah!””] Here is another one—members of the Cabinet are streaming in. The Bill also includes provision for the disapplication of statutory provisions of any kind and of the rule of law. It may seem astonishing to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as it does to me, that any statute should specifically provide that, by order—not by primary legislation—any statute or rule of law can be disapplied in order to achieve the scurrilous activities that lie at the heart of these arrangements. That is an astonishing state of affairs. Under the draft order, a copy of which I have, there is provision for directors of Northern Rock to be exempted from all liabilities under company law. It says explicitly that no director of Northern Rock shall be liable for any proceedings that may be taken against them in relation to their conduct of the affairs of Northern Rock. That includes not only the chairman, who is paid £1.2 million, but other directors. That is about as shocking and extraordinary a situation as one could possibly imagine. If the Government had gone down the route of selling off Northern Rock as a commercial concern to another commercial concern, would the same provisions have applied? Would the directors of Virgin, having acquired it, have been exempted in the conduct of its running from all liability of proceedings under the Companies Acts through a disapplication of law and statute? That is inconceivable, yet it is what is being done under these arrangements. Furthermore, under clause 2, it appears that there is a severe probability that the courts would be excluded from challenge. In other words, it would not be possible for any challenge to the arrangements to be made by order in the administrative court, enabling a person such as a shareholder to take action in the courts to rectify problems that they face. The final question is that of the carte blanche provisions in the Bill. In every conceivable respect this Bill, described as the Banking (Special Provisions) Bill, is a carte blanche one. Never, in my 23 years in the House, have I seen a Bill that was so incredibly invasive of the procedures, conventions and principles upon which legislation should be devised. I have given a number of examples that are all in this Bill; the Chief Whip, who is looking over here, knows perfectly well what I mean. The Bill is a total disgrace to the House. It gives by order—not even in primary legislation—a carte blanche to the Government to give indemnities, and to guarantee that those indemnities will be paid for by the Treasury. This Bill is a total and unutterable disgrace, and the Government stand condemned for the manner in which they have brought it in, in terms of time, content and the total, flagrant breach of the conventions by which legislation in this House is passed.