War Powers and Treaties

My Lords, I, too, am very grateful to my noble and gallant friend Lord Guthrie for obtaining this important debate and for leading us into it so very clearly. It is not easy to decide how the royal prerogative should be constitutionally changed because, as has been said, the whole issue is complicated and there are many divergent factors. At the outset, I should make it clear that I am enthusiastic about what the Government are now seeking to do to involve Parliament more in it. It is unthinkable that in this day and age our democratic Government should commit armed forces to a substantial war without the prior and manifest assent of Parliament. Only in this way can it be properly established that the country, which after all will have to see the war through to its conclusion, and at least the law of our land are formally behind such an enterprise, which may have many quite unpredictable international consequences. Such authority is also necessary both to sustain the highest morale of our Armed Forces, who have to carry out these operations and want to know that the country is fully behind them, and as a guarantee of some legal basis and authority for the war, for which further international authority may also be required. At the same time, the responsibility for deploying forces, which is quite separate from commitment—in accordance with, say, treaty obligations, initially perhaps in a deterrent or a warning posture—and for actually carrying out war-like operations once they are embarked on, must for obvious reasons remain with the Executive and the chain of command that they set up or inherit. Nor must anything be done to compromise the secrecy and security of operations still in their planning stage, as this might remove the element of tactical surprise that is often so vital for any success in battle. This would be particularly applicable in operations to rescue British hostages or to pre-empt terrorism of the sort that occurred in Sierra Leone; then there would be no alternative but to act first and inform Parliament later. Moreover, any force deployed to put pressure on a potential adversary to comply with or not break international law would hardly want its impact weakened by a debate that might throw doubt on whether such force would ever be used in practice. However, these diverging requirements can be reconciled by mixing regular, sensibly led and informative debates in both Houses, as is quite normal, with a clear commitment that before armed forces are actually committed to any large-scale, military action, assent of the other place is obligatory. This could easily have been achieved in the Falklands War before the landings, before the Anglo-American advance to recapture Kuwait, and before the coalition invasion of Iraq. In the latter case, there was an assenting vote in the other place, but it was on the wrong premise; otherwise, the result might have been different. It might not have been easy to get a supportive vote before the British and French landings at Port Said in 1956; I ask noble Lords to draw their own conclusions about that. It comes down to a question of timing and the leadership of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister cannot persuade Parliament, either the country is embarking on the wrong war or there is something adrift in the Prime Minister’s leadership. It is of course a matter for the Government to decide whether what they seek can be achieved within the royal prerogative by parliamentary convention or whether legislation is needed that combines the essential requirement of parliamentary authority with some flexibility to meet a wide range of circumstances. The views expressed in this debate will no doubt be helpful to the Government in making up their mind. The important thing is that the principle of Parliament having the final say must be paramount. Wars in which this country gets involved fall broadly into one of two categories: those of survival and those of choice. If it is one of survival, parliamentary approval is no problem; indeed, Parliament might well be in the lead. If it is one of choice, it is even more necessary that Parliament and the country have the final say, otherwise hideous errors may occur and the best interests of the country may not be served, particularly if the royal prerogative has ever been abused. If noble Lords think that all this may make it more difficult to ““slide”” into war—to make no declaration of war is now our tendency—I would find that infinitely reassuring. After all, when you think about it, unless the reasons for entering a war are cut and dried—as they have been in the past and may well be in the future—not only within the sensible interpretation of the age-old principles of a just war but above all over self defence of our own or allied territory, full scale war, as opposed to the more indirect and selective use of military force, can no longer be considered a rational instrument of national policy. The concept that a state can improve things by charging into the middle of alien territory to rearrange the pieces according to its own political philosophy, however desirable that philosophy may appear, seems to me wholly out of keeping with the age. As the great Duke of Wellington, a man of such infinite common sense, put it two centuries ago, at another time when British Governments were not backward in indulging in wild assaults here, there and everywhere: "““I always had a horror of revolutionising any country from outside for political object. I always said that if they rise up themselves, well and good, but to stir them up is a fearful responsibility””." If that or similar responsibilities are to be taken on board, they can be properly borne only by Parliament on behalf of the country, and not by a lone and perhaps lonely Prime Minister.