Treaty of Lisbon (No. 2)

I do not remember whether the hon. Gentleman was here before the speech of the right hon. Member for Leicester, West (Ms Hewitt). She discussed at some length towards the end of her remarks—in my view, her analysis was absolutely right—the real challenges relating to Russia. It is not attracting sufficient investment in its own industry to guarantee the supply in its own marketplace, never mind its ability to export; that is the real fear about Russia. My worry about Gazprom is not so much its power, but whether it will actually have the power to sell when the time comes. I am slightly less concerned about that, although it is a big and complex subject that we do not have time to debate now. I am grateful to Open Europe for its extremely good briefing on this debate, which points out that this is the first time energy will be subject to majority voting in the European Union, and that is a big change. I am not against pooling sovereignty, but the question is whether we need more powers to achieve the objectives we share. I do not believe that we do. The briefing emphasises:"““The Government said that these new powers were 'unnecessary' and that it had 'detailed concerns' about them.””" But they swallowed their concerns and gave way on every point. I have seen a document that suggests what their original negotiating position was; I heartily endorse that position, and I am sorry that they gave up on it. I do not believe that the treaty does anything helpful by way of consolidation, clarification or addition to add to the powers that we already enjoy to break up energy monopolies on the continent, which are so important with regard to our own security of supply and price. The necessary provisions are already there. I share with Open Europe the concern that the new energy powers will let the EU pass legislation on energy that has nothing whatsoever to do with the operation of the internal market. I cannot authenticate its figures, but Open Europe states:"““For example, in 2002 the Commission proposed a huge increase in statutory oil reserves. The UK vetoed this at the time, but under the Lisbon treaty the UK could not block it. If the Commission were to reintroduce the proposal in future it could cost the UK up to £6 billion to implement, with ongoing costs of £600 million per year.””" The briefing points out the impact that that would have on energy prices at a time when we are deeply concerned about fuel poverty in this country. Those are real issues, but the Government have not yet satisfied me as to whether they will have an adverse impact on our constituents. Let us consider the three articles that concern us—I am using the consolidated text. Article 4 defines for the first time, other than in case law, the shared competences of the European Union. The helpful Library note on shared competence says:"““In these areas Member States will have competence to adopt legislation to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. This has been interpreted by critics to mean, in ""effect, a back door to EU exclusive competence, giving the Union a right of first refusal with regard to competence, while Member States would only be able to do what the Union decided not to do.””" Given my view about the centrality of energy policy to this country's competitiveness and security, it worries me that the Government have yet to produce good arguments for that formalisation of the sharing of competence, with its consequent effect on this House's ability to legislate on energy policy. The second article, which we have already debated at some length and I have dealt with in response to an intervention, is article 122 in the consolidated text. It deals with"““the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products””." I have still not heard a convincing explanation of the sort of circumstances in which that power could and would be used. It is a freestanding provision, which does not relate to the second part of the article, which refers to difficulties"““caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control””," which is a broad definition. The Secretary of State suggested terrorism as an example, but I hope that, in those circumstances, the countries of Europe would naturally wish to do what was right and best for Europe, because that would also be in their self-interest. I do not understand the necessity for including a new power in the treaty. When I cannot understand the reason for doing something, I prefer not to do it. If there is a compelling reason for doing something, I will consider it. However, I am worried that we are adding powers for which there is no compelling need. Article 192 in the consolidated treaty provides that the Council can act unanimously on"““measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.””" That is helpful. The substantive article that we are debating—194 in the consolidated treaty—includes a subsidiarity provision, which states:"““Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources,””—" the North sea in our case—"““its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply””." That is a good, useful subsidiarity point, which I welcome.