It is right that there should be great passion in the House about Europe because Europe and Britain's role in it is one of the great issues, for not only us, but the rest of our continent. The question is not whether we should be in the European Union but the sort of Europe that we wish to develop and whether Britain can be comfortable in it.
The House is being asked to determine two matters today. The first is the referendum and the second is whether the treaty, regardless of the referendum, deserves the House's support. The Foreign Secretary's attempt to create a new explanation for why the Government committed themselves to a referendum is unconvincing. The former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made it clear that he believed that the people should have their say on such an important matter. The Government's fear of losing such a referendum has made them change their position. It is not a question of the legitimacy of the treaty if there is no referendum, but of severe damage and erosion to the public's faith in Government.
However, the second matter is far more difficult—indeed, more difficult than some of the speeches have suggested. The question whether a treaty deserves our support is usually expressed in absolute terms. Many hon. Members are happy to describe themselves as hard-line Eurosceptics, who would be content for the country to leave the European Union and would oppose any treaty, whatever its terms. Others are instinctively sympathetic to whatever emanates from the EU and want to be positive towards it. For what it is worth, I describe myself as a moderate Eurosceptic. I am against the single currency and many of the EU's aspirations. I have therefore tried to consider the matter objectively and ascertain whether the criticisms of the treaty have substance or are exaggerated.
The criticisms have some substance, but not as much as is often suggested. If, for example, one considers whether there is significance in going from a treaty to a constitution or a constitution to a treaty, the critics are right that 95 per cent. of the documents are exactly the same. However, I am delighted that the treaty is no longer described as a constitution. Although calling it a constitution did not make the EU a state, it nevertheless disclosed a state of mind that wished to move Europe in that direction. When the document was called a constitution, included a proposal for ““a Foreign Minister”” and referred to flags and anthems, it contained all the paraphernalia of a state or state in the making. Although the treaty is not substantively different, I welcome the change in terminology.
To those who disagree, let me say that I remember debates in the House when the European Assembly was becoming a Parliament. It was argued that the word ““Parliament”” was significant, regardless of any other change of powers. It is important to make such distinctions. The European Court of Justice may have to interpret the significance of the document one day. If it is a constitution, the court could grant it the same significance in overruling other legislation as the Supreme Court in the United States would grant to the US constitution.
The proposal for a president is unnecessary. It is not an absolute requirement and I would be happy if it was not there. However, I refuse to accept that it has the sinister implications that are sometimes suggested. The person concerned will be a president of the European Council and his powers will be substantively the same as those that the president of the European Council has held for several years. He will be appointed for two and a half years, and therefore undoubtedly have more influence. However, he will be more like a President of Switzerland than a President of the United States. He will be an ambassador. Perhaps Tony Blair would be an adequate choice because, as with his current job in the middle east, the president of the European Council will argue the views of other people. In the case of the European Union, that would be the view of Governments in the organisation.
I do not believe that a high representative is necessary, but most people should welcome the combination of two jobs—that of the External Affairs Commissioner and that of the High Representative.
I set myself a fundamental test. If the proposals are accepted, would the British Government—whoever are the Government—be prevented from initiating British policy in the most crucial matters, which affect our national interest? If the terms had been in effect some years ago, would we have been unable—for good or ill—to go to war in Iraq against the wishes of most of the other countries of Europe? Would we have been able to defend our interests in the Falkland Islands or pursue our policy on other aspects of foreign policy? Only if the answer to those questions is no can we pass the rather dramatic judgment that is sometimes expressed. I am not keen on some aspects of the powers, but we should get them into proper perspective if we are not to do ourselves a disservice.
However, the most significant aspect is the opt-outs that the Government have negotiated, if they are watertight. The Government have a long way to go to prove that they are watertight. If they can do so, the facts that the charter of fundamental rights will not be justiciable and that we will not be bound by justice and home affairs matters unless we so wish, are important.
European Union (Amendment) Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Malcolm Rifkind
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 21 January 2008.
It occurred during Debate on bills on European Union (Amendment) Bill.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
470 c1275-6 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Librarians' tools
Timestamp
2024-04-11 17:45:56 +0100
URI
http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_436591
In Indexing
http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_436591
In Solr
https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_436591