Climate Change Bill [HL]

I support this amendment because it takes forward a discussion in which I have participated on two previous occasions. I refer to the whole question of the triangular balance between the three organisations to which the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, referred. At the weekend I watched our debates last week on the Parliament channel, in particular a debate held on the second day in Committee that I missed when I went for a cup of tea. In that debate the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, argued that he was passionately against the principle that the committee should be given the additional powers for which the Conservative Front Bench and I have been arguing. I have had time to reflect on his words and I understand perfectly where he is coming from. In the light of that speech, I have tried to work out another structure that might meet the concerns felt by some noble Lords on both sides of the Committee about the nature of this relationship. My mind went back to the period between 1981 and 1990 when I was a member of the Public Accounts Committee in the House of Commons. I considered the nature of the relationship between the accounting officers of departments of state—the Permanent Secretaries—and the National Audit Office. In those conditions, reports coming before the Public Accounts Committee had to be agreed. Last Monday, I rang the Clerk of the Public Accounts Committee and asked him whether he could find me some background text on the nature of that relationship. Using this amendment as a peg, I want to draw that information to the attention of the Committee because I hope that it might influence our debate and that held in the other place when it comes to consider the Bill. As I understand the relationship, there is no statutory basis for the principle of agreeing reports. It seems to have its roots in customs and practice. A Treasury publication entitled Managing Public Money states: "““The PAC expects that [the] NAO will agree the texts of these reports with the Accounting Officer(s) of the organisation(s) concerned … What this means in practice is that the factual content of every report is taken by the Committee to be undisputable. There are occasional disagreements””—" if we were to translate those into the circumstances we are talking about today, it might well be the case that there would be disputes here— "““between the NAO and a Department about the interpretation of the facts, but these are clearly signalled. This in part, according to the NAO, arises from a report on Redundancy Compensation Payments to University Staff. At the first hearing on this, in January 1986””—" a hearing which I attended— "““the PUS at the DES appeared to dispute a point of fact in the report. The Committee postponed consideration of the report until April that year, to give time for the NAO and the Department to agree a joint minute to the Committee””." The minute deals with the relationship which is at the very heart of this debate, and I want to refer to it. It was provided for the Public Accounts Committee on 23 April 1986 and in paragraph 4 stated: "““In agreeing the Report there was, as DES have said, extensive correspondence between NAO, DES and UGC and discussions that went on for quite some time (Q781). Throughout these exchanges the NAO assumed that departments understood that, in agreeing his Reports with departments, the C&AG’s intention was to establish that:""(i) all material and relevant facts had been included;""(ii) the facts were not in dispute;""(iii) their presentation was fair;""(iv) where the Report stated any NAO views or conclusions which the Department were unable to agree, this was made clear and the NAO’s and Department’s reasons properly represented, with all necessary balance””." This is important because here we are talking about the relationship between the department and the committee, where I believe that there is scope for amending the Bill. The minute went on to say: "““DES, however, understood that they were required only to satisfy themselves that the Report’s presentation of the relevant facts was fair. They did not consider they had been invited to express a view on the C&AG’s findings. It would clearly be unsatisfactory if there were continuing differences of understanding between departments and the NAO in clearing Reports. Action is therefore being taken by the NAO to remove any uncertainty that may exist, and to clarify the objectives of the clearance arrangements on the lines set out in paragraph 4 above. As a result, although there should always be agreement that the Report fairly presents all the material and relevant facts, it might disclose difficult differences of view between the C&AG and the Department over the interpretation of the facts and the conclusions to be drawn from them. This has long been accepted by PAC and does not stand in the way of agreeing that a Report is an appropriate basis for subsequent PAC consideration””." In other words, an accommodation was found. If we were to apply that principle, which works in this relationship between the NAO and departments, to the debate we are having here, it would mean, effectively, that both sides would have to agree. We are not saying that the committee only would be able to veto a government view; it would mean that they would have to put their heads together to agree facts, findings and conclusions—and, indeed, in our case, recommendations. It would create within this committee’s relationship with the Government a dynamic tension that would concentrate the mind of the committee on taking realistic and right decisions. At the same time, it would concentrate, within Government, the need to compromise with the committee’s objectives. In the event that they could not agree a position, no action would be taken. In those circumstances, it might well be referred to the committee. Last week, I proposed that there be a sort of climate change ad hoc Select Committee, which would intervene to deal with issues where agreement could not be found and try to take the whole process forward. Effectively, we would have two vetoes: the right for the Government to veto and the right for the committee to veto. In those circumstances, they would seek to agree. I believe that we should be going down that kind of route, as against giving the Government, with all the pressures I have referred to on previous occasions, the right simply to block what Parliament and the committee might feel to be a very constructive way forward in implementing policy on climate change. I have, perhaps, slightly abused debates in the Chamber today, but this is the only opportunity that remains for me to set out an alternative way of dealing with the problem of this relationship. The reality is that those of us who want to give the committee power are, at the moment, losing the argument because the Government insist on saying no. I understand the departmental decisions that will have been taken. I am trying to feed in an alternative approach and I ask my noble friend to consider it seriously.