Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Bill [HL]

It is true that a public body is much more comfortable with spending money on 3D assets—bricks and mortar—than on the provision of services. I know from my own experience of buildings being provided in which to meet people, but of nobody being told that they can meet in them and of there not being anybody to talk to when they got there. As the right reverend Prelate said, this whole question is much more a matter of people than of buildings—about how to make it work. I have an extended question about the Big Lottery Fund and why it is selected as it is in Clause 15(1). At Second Reading I raised some of the management issues facing the board of the Big Lottery Fund, as it shrinks in size—which it is undoubtedly bound to do because of the Olympics. It is in a state of constant flux and change, dropping some 19 programmes and starting up some 24. It is the heir to two lottery funds, one at least leaving behind it an unsatisfactory performance in the Government’s view, and to a third temporary fund—the Millennium Fund—which ran its course, also not without leaving problems behind. It is unwise to rely on Big, which has yet to establish a track record or any clear identity in the minds of the public, in contrast to the heritage, sport and arts funds. Indeed, Big may fail in its purpose, and it is an extraordinary proposal that it should become the monopoly distributor of 90 per cent of dormant moneys. Unfortunately, it is clear that the Government wish to control as much of the third sector as they can, which is surely out of order in this instance. As it is set out in the Bill, private moneys are to be exclusively distributed by a public sector body that is closely controlled to deliver a social engineering agenda. Its approach to additionality is defined by saying, "““Lottery funding is distinct from Government expenditure and adds value. Although it does not substitute for Exchequer funding, where appropriate it complements Government and other programmes, policies and funding””." In other parts of the document it is absolutely clear that Big sees its duty as delivering government themes and outcomes. Surely the choice of potential distributors needs to be widened. There is no case for a Big monopoly. It is not as if there are no other older and better established institutions. To cite but one, there is the Charities Aid Foundation. Nor would it be difficult to find other candidates to come forward and gain the Secretary of State’s support to be nominated as distributors.