Children and Young Persons Bill [HL]

I, too, wholeheartedly welcome the Bill. It is a progressive and imaginative piece of legislation. On my attitude to the matters before the Committee, I wholeheartedly agree with every word of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss. As one who was a circuit judge dealing with family work for many years, I and all my colleagues have immense admiration for my noble and learned friend for the supreme and splendid leadership she gave as president of the Family Division, and for many years before that as a senior judge. The Bill in its entirety is an accomplishment for those who have thought deeply and considered the needs of the community in this regard. It can be improved in many radical ways. It may well be argued that this is perhaps not the vehicle for all those possible improvements—that vehicular defence is always raised in respect of any radical legislation—but we should remember that we may not go along this way again for quite some time. It is unlikely that we will see another children’s Bill for many years. Where one is in doubt about whether a particular matter should be mentioned in the context of the Bill, it might be better to err on the side of inclusion rather than stay silent about the possibilities. I wholeheartedly agree with the proposition that even contemplating the application for a care order on the part of a local authority should be regarded as a policy of last resort. When you consider all the sanctions that the courts have with regard to the criminal law, still one of the most impactive and significant orders dealing with human liberty that a court can ever contemplate making is a care order. I am sure that every court that has ever been seized of that jurisdiction is aware of that responsibility. That means that a local authority should consider applying for a care order only when it is convinced that it has exhausted all the other practical possibilities, as so many Members of the Committee have already mentioned. Even then, of course, it has to consider under Section 31 of the Act whether the basic criteria have been satisfied, and even then, in the light of those tests having been successfully passed, whether it is appropriate, in relation to the needs of that particular child, to make a care order. A judge has to be satisfied not only that those tests have been successfully proven but that the care plan has been imaginatively and thoroughly put together. A great deal depends on each circumstance, but I am afraid a great deal also depends upon the financial and human resources of a local authority. I speak with regard to certain local authorities in Wales. The latest local government reorganisation in Wales allowed Wales to go back to a scheme of 22 counties. Many revelled in that; I was glad to see my ancient county of Cardigan reinstated in its full local government sovereignty. The reorganisation means, however, that many of those counties are extremely weak in financial terms. I have often thought that it might have been better, in relation to certain matters, for there to be an amalgamation of services, and children’s services might have been at the front of the queue for consideration. The poverty of many of those local authorities makes it difficult for them to commit all the resources, human and financial, that they would wish to commit to children in many circumstances, with the result that care plans are put forward, with the best will in the world, with inadequate examination and incomplete consideration. That means that often a care order will have been made in circumstances where it is not absolutely necessary—where there has been no detailed examination, as my noble and learned friend has said, with regard to all the family members who might be adequate to assist in the matter. I am not sure how one goes about that. I salute Amendment No. 1 for everything that it represents, although it would probably never achieve its aims because it deals with children who are the subject of Clause 1 and Clause 1 deals with children who are already looked after. Most of those looked-after children will be the subject of a care order already and one has to intervene at a much earlier point. Other children who are not the subject of a care order will be looked after under the other provisions of the Children Act 1989. Clearly, it has to be inculcated in the minds of all concerned with the care of children that one should resort to this scheme—a care order—only when all other possibilities have been exhausted. To my mind, that can never be over-endorsed or over-supported in financial and human terms. If these amendments do no more than concentrate the mind on such matters, they will have succeeded. However, I may be wrong and it may be possible for there to be a specific piece of statutory precept included which will operate at an appropriate time for the childcare case and for children who do not actually go into care.