Climate Change Bill [HL]

The last comment of the noble Lord is useful because, if he thinks that that is the effect of the amendment, I should say that it is not. We now know what purpose he wants to effect. As it is drafted, the Government would have no discretion whatever. The only discretion that the Government would have would be not to bring the order to the House. If they brought an order, it would have to be from the recommendation of the committee, so the process would not be triangular. To be triangular, it would need another form of words. The analogy of the Monetary Policy Committee might look fair, but in terms of practicalities it is not a similar organisation; I will come back to that. I am not nit-picking about the amendments; for the next stage, it is useful for Members to know what I am about to say. The amendments would sub-contract effective, large-scale policy-making over a range of issues—not just the dates, but the consequences—to the climate change committee. The changes would not just be simple. The committee is being set up as an independent expert body—there is no question about that—because we want to manage the framework for emissions in a more transparent fashion that is more likely to deliver results. Clause 3 already requires, before amending the 2050 target or baseline year, that the Secretary of State must consult the committee as well as the devolved Administrations. Clause 2 already requires that any amendment to the target is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, which means that it has to have strong parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment would require the Government to seek parliamentary approval twice, both in considering the committee’s recommendation and when laying the relevant statutory instrument for the affirmative resolution. That is straightforward duplication. The key question that noble Lords have to ask themselves is whether it should ultimately be the responsibility of the Government, with parliamentary scrutiny, or of the Committee on Climate Change to take decisions on the way forward. Our view is that the decision should ultimately rest with the elected Government of the day, who will transfer over decades, subject to the strong parliamentary scrutiny in the Bill, which may be strengthened as it goes through Parliament. That is where the analogy with the Monetary Policy Committee divides. I am reliably informed—I shall read this out, because I would not have said it if it were not written down—that, "““unlike the clear relationship between interest rates and inflation, CO2 emissions do not respond to one well-understood lever—the rate that reductions will occur depend on many different factors””," such as changes in technology, processes, "““changes in energy demand, the energy and carbon intensity of the economy, multilateral action, the development of carbon markets””." In other words, because the relationship between interest rates and inflation is so tied and precise—that seems to be the way it works; I am reliably informed about that, not being an economist—that is a narrow area where the Monetary Policy Committee can have executive authority. The complexities go far beyond that narrow area of the Monetary Policy Committee. If a Secretary of State, having consulted the climate change committee, came to Parliament with an order that varied from its transparent and open advice, he certainly would have to be accountable and explain in great detail why his decision, with which he is asking Parliament to agree, is different. That is crucial. I am with the noble Lord precisely on that. Frankly, I will be more than happy to look at that aspect of the matter because, judging by his speech, that is what he is searching for, but the amendments do not do that. From that point of view, it would be useful to look at that aspect again. We will have scientific advice, but, as the generations and decades go by and Parliaments and Governments come and go and international relationships probably change as well, there will be political judgments on this which must be subject to democratic scrutiny. Parliament is the place for that. It is worth putting it on the record that the Joint Committee looked at the issue. It concluded: "““Overall, the idea that the Climate Change Committee should have analogous powers to the MPC, while attractive, would probably be unworkable … the wide range of the areas that the Committee on Climate Change must address would mean the Government””—" and Parliament in that sense— "““devolving significant policy decisions to an unelected body””." That does not mean that we are building into this Bill the process for the Government to ignore the Committee on Climate Change; far from it. The Government must be absolutely accountable for what they do, and the committee must be transparent. The committee’s advice will be highly influential and, as I said in an earlier debate, judging from what has been said in earlier debates it would be a brave Secretary of State who would come to Parliament with substantial variations from what the committee had recommended. If that were the case, they would have to explain that situation to Parliament and the court of public opinion, because we would have set up an independent body of world-class people who must be taken seriously. If that gets devalued, there are serious problems for the Government and Parliament. I need go no further. If the content of the second intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, is what he is seeking, this does not accomplish it. I am happy to look at what he seeks to see whether we can bring something forward. In the mean time, he and his advisers can take account of the fact that, as drafted, the amendment does not create a triangular relationship. It creates a two-sided relationship with the Government out of it. It would be Parliament and the climate change committee, and the Government would have no role. It would be terrible if the Government disagreed so much that they brought an order to have it voted down or did not bring an order at all. That would create a stalemate, which would do nobody any good.