Local Transport Bill [HL]

My Lords, I support the principles behind the Bill and welcome its introduction. Many local authorities have a good track record on supporting and promoting bus services. However, I will confine my comments to the specific points relating to the bus aspects of the Bill. If we are to give local transport authorities greater powers to determine the level and quality of bus services in the context of an overall transport strategy, there is an issue about what could prove to be a somewhat complex, time-consuming and potentially costly procedure for examining, challenging and presumably amending or halting local transport authority proposals. Under the Bill, a network of services can be franchised out in a similar way to bus services in London and the national rail network. These quality contracts would allow the local transport authorities in question to specify and regulate bus networks which bus companies could then bid to operate. Once a company was appointed, it would face no on-road competition for the period of that contract. The Bill proposes that an approval board, chaired by a traffic commissioner, will determine an application for a quality contract. The decision of the approval board can then be appealed to a transport tribunal on any matter by any consultee on the original quality contract application. The decision of the transport tribunal can then be appealed to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. I am not clear for whose benefit this potentially lengthy process has been proposed. Is it for the benefit of passengers or of those who may not be unhappy to see a lengthy and expensive decision-making process imposed on local transport authorities? The procedure looks likely to be time-consuming and costly. I would be grateful if in reply my noble friend could say why a three-tier process is necessary and whether it could become even longer by going beyond the Court of Appeal. I would like my noble friend to spell out for whose benefit or protection the procedure has been introduced and, in particular, why the proverbial passenger on the Clapham omnibus should be grateful that it is there. I would like my noble friend to say what adverse or damaging actions could be perpetrated, by whom and to whom, which only these procedures in the Bill could address. Perhaps my noble friend could also give some idea of what the Government envisage could be the costs involved in pursuing or opposing challenges being pressed right the way through the procedure set out in the Bill. Could it run into tens of thousands of pounds or hundreds of thousands of pounds, and who pays the bill? It is clear that if it is a potentially lengthy and costly procedure, it would be a deterrent to a small bus operator. But, equally, if confronted by one of the major bus and rail companies, it could lead to a transport authority not pursuing a quality contract scheme or heavily amending it to buy off objections if there was a possibility of the transport authority being left with a substantial bill for costs. Running the risk of having transport strategies for the benefit of communities determined not by the merits of the proposal, but by the financial clout of the parties involved does not seem to be a particularly effective process. Perhaps my noble friend could also give some idea of the maximum time the Government think it could take to determine an application that goes through all the stages of the process set out in the Bill. It will not be very helpful if the process can be strung out for so long that it can be used as a delaying tactic by those opposed to what is proposed and acts as a block on speedy and decisive action by local transport authorities. Are these, in terms of delay and costs, the Terminal 5 clauses in the Bill? I appreciate that traffic commissioners and transport tribunals have expertise in vehicle safety and operational issues, but the powers they appear to be being given under the Bill will, in practice, enable them to decide whether a local transport authority or city region’s transport strategy should be allowed to be implemented. Perhaps when my noble friend responds he will say whether this is the case and, if so, why it is felt that unelected bodies, with no responsibility or accountability for transport strategy, or, I would suggest, current expertise in this field, should be able to thwart elected bodies with that expertise, responsibility and accountability. If the principle is that power should be devolved as far as possible to local transport authorities for matters that relate to their particular area and do not affect national policy or strategy, or impact on other areas, why are decisions on whether and in what form local or conurbation transport strategies should be implemented being devolved down to traffic commissioners and traffic tribunals? If unacceptable or defective strategies are drawn up and implemented, why should redress be through an external, unelected body rather than through the ballot box as it is in respect of other areas of local government activity—including, as I understand it under the terms of the Bill, in respect of any decisions by local authorities on whether to exercise the power given to them in the Bill to introduce road-user charging schemes? I turn now to the situation which appears to exist for the staff affected if the right to operate bus services under a quality contract is transferred from one operator to another. I have read the relevant clause in the Bill, which appears to provide for protection of existing terms and conditions of employment for staff transferred from one operator to another in such circumstances. However, I am not sure whether the clause means that all staff employed in the operation of services so transferred will be transferred, or whether the new operator can decide not to take on all staff involved. It would be helpful if my noble friend could clarify that position and also the position on protection of the existing and future pension entitlements of staff affected. I am aware that this could be a difficult area. Obviously if a transport authority letting a contract wants to reduce the number of operators running services and instead have only one bus company running all the routes in question, then it may be that not so many staff will be required as an element of duplication may be removed. Thus the new single operator may not need all the staff previously employed in running the services when there were a number of different operators involved. On the other side of the coin though, the measures in the Bill on quality contracts are hardly likely to be received with enthusiasm if staff see them as a potential threat to their jobs and their pensions. There is a turnover of staff in the bus industry through which adjustments can be made to new staffing levels, and if the package is attractive enough some staff might take genuine voluntary redundancy. I hope my noble friend will be able to give some re-assurances on the point of job security in respect of both the initial introduction and the transfer of quality contracts. There are also questions relating to physical assets and infrastructure arising from the introduction or transfer of these quality contracts. The owner of a very large bus and rail company was quoted in a Sheffield paper just over a year ago as saying: "““If franchising or Quality Contracts are brought in we will put our depots up for sale in South Yorkshire. That is not a threat, it’s just that we don’t think it is the way to make the system work””." So, under quality contracts, what will be the position in regard to the transfer or non-transfer of, for example, vehicles and depots? Is it the intention that the transport authority letting the contract should own the vehicles or the depots; or will it be for a new operator to include the provision of such assets in any bids they submit? If voluntary partnership arrangements cannot be agreed—the provision in the Bill for ““admissible objections”” from relevant bus operators to stop such arrangements makes it appear more than likely—it is essential that we have a process and procedures for quality contracts that enable decisions to be made without undue delay by accountable bodies, and that allow for the voice of interested parties to be heard before final conclusions are reached. We also need to ensure that the introduction or retendering of quality contracts cannot be used as a basis for issuing redundancy notices to some of the staff affected. I hope that my noble friend will provide some assurances on the points that I have raised when he responds.