Channel Tunnel Rail Link (Supplementary Provisions) Bill

I very much agree. There is huge demand for continental freight transport and I am concerned about the quantities of freight that are likely to arrive in the UK—the industry suggests another 2 million trucks-worth within 10 years. The only way it can be moved successfully through the country is to have more freight capacity on our rail lines overall. I am a fan of dedicated freight lines, which are not a subject of the Bill, but the idea feeds into its general structure, as the framework could be affected by the terms of the Bill. The quality of procurement for the project is relevant, because the Bill would shape the sale of the underlying asset—possibly the next step. As the Minister is aware, in 2005 the National Audit Office took the view that the taxpayer was still likely to be called on to fund a shortfall in LCR's cash flow, and that the economic justification for the links remained marginal. Those issues will have to be addressed in the next step. In 2006, the Public Accounts Committee came to similar conclusions and recommended that the Department for Transport should actively manage the size and timing of LCR's call on the access charge loan, to give LCR and Eurostar an incentive maximise revenues. It would be interesting to understand how the Bill, and the sale that will follow on, will impact on those issues. The Minister has confirmed that, in effect, the Bill is a preparation for sale. Rob Holden, the chief executive officer of LCR, said:"““After November 14, the restructuring””—" I think we can safely read the word ““sale””—"““will be our No 1 priority.””" I fully support what was said in the Treasury minutes, in 2006, in response to the National Audit Office. It was noted that"““the best way of protecting the taxpayer's interests would be for there to be an open, competitive and transparent process before the sale of LCR””." The Minister has been kind enough to let us know that the likely structure will involve a division between track and train operations, and property. He has confirmed that it will be possible for Network Rail to be one of the bidders. I wonder whether he is able to go into some of the ways in which the Bill could help to make sure that the project remains an integrated part of our overall network—rather than standing alone—given that the rest of the track in the country is owned directly by Network Rail. There is also the issue that I raised before: ensuring that we do not, through the creation of complicated consortiums that own different pieces, find ourselves once again facing an anti-competitive conflict of interest—which seems to have expressed itself in resistance to allowing other freight operators to use the tunnel. I am rather unclear about the impact of the sale. Will the Government receive an equity return that involves getting their 35 per cent. stake back? What will happen to the debt? Will that be repaid through the financing? Given that the construction risk was one of the primary arguments for the Government agreeing to stand behind £3.7 billion of debt, and that construction risk is now over, will we have some assurance that guarantees on that figure will be removed? Can the Government try to give us some confidence that the public will genuinely get value for their support for, and investment in, this project? I just give some warning in relation to the recent example of Northern Rock. That reminds us that the private sector tends to think that it can play fairly fast and loose with public money and with the Government in these kinds of circumstances. The Minister will be conscious of the pain and anguish that has followed the collapse of Metronet's public-private partnership. That demonstrated that such negotiations will be exceedingly complex, if they are to be successful. I want to ask the Minister about the use of the proceeds from the sale that the Bill structures. Others, including the Conservative Front-Bench spokesman, have mentioned that the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee reminded the Government in 1999 that, when the Channel Tunnel Act first got parliamentary approval in 1987, the regions were promised a benefit. It was to be for them as much as for the people in London. The ETRA Committee report that looked at the final project said:"““The regions have been cheated””." The Government could begin to fulfil that promise to the regions by directing all or part of the proceeds from the sale into expanding the high-speed rail network. That would not pay for the network from beginning to end, but it could begin to provide part of the Government proportion and begin to pay for the planning and feasibility studies. We could begin to look at the kind of structures that have been used for the Crossrail project, for example—the kind of structures that could bring development and business money in, to enable a high-speed network to be developed. My party is going to look at a lot of that over the next year. I join with others in saying that high-speed rail has huge potential in this country. The Government are being short-sighted in putting off even looking at high speed 2 until 2012. Although they may argue that with three or four hours to spare a person can make a rail journey between significant parts of the UK, the benefits that come from high-speed rail—we shall see them in Kent—are jobs and regeneration. Given the intense population pressures in the south-east, the use of a rail network that combined high-speed rail with dedicated freight lines, to take business, jobs and opportunities across the country, rather than keeping them essentially south-east and London-centric, would be of benefit to absolutely everybody. We have a pot of money—not the largest in the world, but a significant one—that the Government must, to some extent, regard as a windfall; it could be put towards trying to make that happen. That would live up to the early promise associated with the channel tunnel and the beginning of the idea of an exciting, new and different future for rail in this country.