Legal Services Bill [Lords]

I absolutely reassure the hon. Gentleman that under no circumstances would that be the case. I am talking purely about the practicalities of where the best place might be to look for someone with specialist knowledge. I know that consumer groups have been very supportive of amendment No. 8, and they are keen that the consumer panel is properly equipped to fulfil its role effectively. However, I am not convinced that there should be an explicit duty on the board obliging it to provide the panel with any information that the panel regards as appropriate. Under clause 168, the board can already give the panel any information that will assist the board in exercising its statutory functions. We could get into a burdensome situation if it also had a duty to provide any information for which the panel might ask. There is a possibility of creating a knock-on effect, with the board having to defend itself with judicial review if it judged that it would be inappropriate to provide certain information, even if sound reasons underpinned that decision. Let me deal with amendments Nos. 24 to 34 and 147, and Government amendments Nos. 102 and 106. I know that hon. Members appreciate the importance of independent appointment of members of the board—that has been debated at almost every stage in the Bill's passage. We must all ensure that we achieve that. However, I explained at length in Committee why I cannot accept concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice in appointing the chair of the board. The Bill is drafted to make it compatible with best practice, which, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) said, means being compatible with the code of practice of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The first principle of that code requires ultimate ministerial responsibility for appointments. That is essential to ensure that those who make appointments are properly accountable to Parliament. Concurrence with the Lord Chief Justice would undermine that process because it gives someone other than a Minister a veto on appointments to the board. That runs contrary to the principle of ultimate ministerial responsibility. It removes the formal role of the Commissioner for Public Appointments in the oversight and regulation of public appointments and undermines parliamentary scrutiny and accountability in the process. I have therefore suggested that the Lord Chancellor should consult the Lord Chief Justice on appointments to and removals from the board. I have listened carefully to views in the House and I want to ensure that the board is not only independent but seen to be independent, without conflicting with the commissioner's code at the same time as maintaining channels for proper parliamentary accountability.