Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

That issue is not currently covered either by the ombudsman or by the statutory arrangements that we propose to put in place through the Bill. I am happy to consider the matter, but those arrangements are currently covered by other inspection and inquiry procedures. In part 3 of the Bill we seek to recalibrate a little the test for quashing convictions in favour of the victim, not the offender. In any democratic country—the rule of law is a fundamental precondition for that description—there are two tests for the justice system. First, was the person guilty? Secondly, was the process followed in establishing that guilt fair and acceptable in a civilised society? Both of those tests are of equal importance. They lie behind the profound truth that justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done. Without them, confidence in the justice system would be significantly undermined. Yet adherence to those tests should not in turn undermine the very principles that they seek to protect. Within the boundaries of fairness and equity set by the need to follow proper procedures, there should be scope for an approach that allows the Court of Appeal, when it is convinced of the offender's guilt and is sure that procedural impropriety in the case has not led to injustice, to uphold the original conviction. Equally, we cannot and should not sanction conduct by agencies of the state that would egregiously degrade the rule of law. It must be open to the Court of Appeal in exceptionally serious cases of abuse of process to quash the conviction, even where the court is satisfied as to the appellant's guilt or his or her guilt is not an issue in the appeal, as is more usual. Earlier this year my right hon. Friends the former Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General published a detailed consultation paper on the issue. Many responses were received, a summary of which is published today. Almost all the responses were critical of the drafting contained in clause 26. I can therefore tell the House that I am comprehensively reviewing the drafting of clause 26 as it is currently written. I intend to table a replacement, which I hope will meet the major criticisms made and the policy objective behind the clause. The consultation has, however, brought out a separate issue: the need to clarify the law, so that when the Court of Appeal is dealing with an appeal relating to a conviction of many years standing, typically on a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, it may do so on the basis of the law at the time of conviction. I shall bring forward amendments to cover that proposal too, which is sought by practitioners.