House of Lords Bill [HL]

My Lords, I declare an interest in that my own appointment to this House was instigated by the current Appointments Commission. My stance in general is that this House is as legitimate a part of the constitution of this country as the Queen and the judges. The judges, for example, are not elected—for good reason—but may claim to change more law in their time than your Lordships’ House. The Bill strengthens the case for non-election, and I therefore support it. Every Government need checks and balances, especially when there is no written constitution. Our checks and balances have been unsettled by recent government action. The judiciary feels threatened by the Home Office rearrangement. The position of the Lord Chancellor has changed; the position of the Attorney-General has been questioned; and further announcements have been made about constitutional reform that might also undermine the bulwark of this House still further. We do not want a House built of straw, especially when the Parliament Acts will cease to have much of their purpose if this House is to be wholly or largely elected. In my view, there is nothing but your Lordships’ House standing between the so-called ““elective dictatorship”” of a slim majority in the other place and the people. Therefore, the criteria for appointment to this House should be, first, the ability to contribute by way of expertise. One need instance only recent government appointments to this House in pursuit of expertise to illustrate the role and value of that ability to put Members in this House because of their expertise. Secondly, the representativeness of different strands that make up this country is not a feature that can be ensured by election but it can be, and has been, by an Appointments Commission. Thirdly, an independence of spirit that comes from not seeking salary or office. Fourthly, Members of this House should be willing to be followed up to ensure that they are making the contribution they were appointed to make. That seems to me to represent accountability. In my view the existing Appointments Commission has done well. It has not shied away from difficult questions, has taken no shortcuts, is transparent in its process, has kept confidentiality and has achieved diversity in its appointments. The reformed commission, were it to come about on a statutory basis, as I hope it will, should resemble in its own make-up and choice other public service appointing bodies. The choice of the commission members should not be left largely to the Commons Speaker. There should be no limitations, for example, to Privy Councillors, as exists in the current Bill. It needs a strong chair who will not bend to party pressure. There should be no line management by a department or by the Prime Minister. It must be able to challenge nominations made to it. This Bill can sweep away all suggestions of an inappropriate choice process and can render this House even more expert, confirming its position in our constitution as influential but not powerful, useful but not used.