Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

I understand what my hon. Friend says, and I certainly would not vote against the 28-day extension, but I think we need to question the evidence on which it is based. The problem is that we do not have detailed enough evidence to contradict, or for that matter to confirm, what the Government say. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner gave my Committee some information about the airline bomb plot following which 24 suspects were arrested in August last year. The information we received was that 17 of them were charged with offences. Of those 17, six were charged only after their detention had been extended beyond 14 days, and two wee charged just four hours before the end of the 28-day period. Of the seven who were not charged, four were released without charge within the old 14-day period, but three were released without charge well after that time, including two who were released only at the very end of the 28-day period. It is clear to me that that bare statistical information is not sufficient to answer the question ““Does the airline bomb plot demonstrate the need for the extension to 28 days?”” On the face of it, the fact that six suspects were detained for more than 14 days before being charged would appear to show that the increase was necessary. On the other hand, the fact that three of the five who were authorised to be detained for the full 28 days were released very close to the end of that period could be said to raise concerns about whether the power to detain for up to 28 days was being used to detain those against whom there was the least evidence. A series of more detailed questions need to be answered. Let me give some examples. I do not say that this actually happened; we simply do not know. Was the evidence on which the individuals were charged after 14 days available before the expiry of the 14-day period? How precisely has the 28-day period enabled prosecutions to be brought that might otherwise not have been possible? How did the longer period affect the urgency with which the police pursued the investigation in relation to each of the suspects? How often were the suspects held for the longer period questioned by the police? Did the longer period available to the police have any noticeable effect on the amount of disclosure made by the police to the suspects? Are investigations being pursued in relation to any of the three suspects who were detained for almost the full 28-day period and then released without charge? The next question has already been raised today. How would the availability of post-charge questioning have affected the way in which the police conducted their investigation? Could some of the suspects have been charged with the same offence earlier than they were in fact charged? Here is an equally important question. What was the psychological impact on those who were detained for nearly four weeks before being released without charge? What worries me is that the report of the statutory reviewer, Lord Carlile, does not provide the sort of detained scrutiny that would answer questions of that kind. The problem is that the statistics do not settle the issue one way or another unless we dig deep into the information. It has been suggested that there should be a Privy Council inquiry, but I do not think that that is the answer. What we need is for the statutory reviewer to do his job properly, and provide us with answers to the questions that I have posed. That is what is required if we are to make informed decisions on whether to extend the period—initially from 14 days to 28 days, and perhaps subsequently for longer. I have no reason to doubt what the police and the Government have said about the 28-day period, but it must be noted that it is difficult to challenge what they say. There are also important issues to do with the available judicial safeguards, and in particular the questions that judges are expected to ask in respect of granting a longer period of detention. The first question is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that further detention is necessary to preserve relevant evidence, and the second is whether the investigation has been conducted diligently and expeditiously. However, neither question addresses the substantive and basic issue of whether there was material in the first place that provided reasonable grounds for believing that the suspect had committed a terrorism-related offence. There is no onus on the police to justify to the court the basic premise for the suspect’s detention. Why was the person arrested in the first place? Is the basic test for arrest met, never mind the test for continued detention? We must bear that important point in mind. I also want to discuss the conditions in which people are held at Paddington Green police station. A while ago, my Committee paid a visit to that station and members were horrified by what we saw. Paddington Green was not, of course, built for its current use. It was initially reinforced to provide additional security when those suspected of IRA terrorism were questioned, but the detention periods were much shorter then. The staff at Paddington Green do a very good job under difficult circumstances. I was impressed by the custody sergeants we met and the other staff, who try to look after people in their charge in a humane way. There are, however, problems with Paddington Green. There are only 16 cells, but more than 20 people at a time have been arrested during certain investigations and therefore some of them have had to be sent to Belgravia, which is not set up to deal with terrorism suspects. Paddington Green is also an ordinary police station that serves its local neighbourhood, and its normal day-to-day work is severely disrupted by such suspects. There are no dedicated facilities for forensic examination of suspects on arrival, and cells have to be specially prepared for that purpose, which exacerbates the shortage of accommodation. There is no dedicated space for exercise, so part of the car park is used for that—all the vehicles have to be moved around to create an inadequate exercise space. Only one room is provided for suspects to discuss their cases in confidence with their solicitor. There are no facilities on site for forensic examination of equipment such as computer hard drives, and the video conferencing room is too small. That also raises a question about video conferencing being used as a means to extend periods of detention via judicial hearings, which does not allow for a proper examination of suspects. Suspects held for such long periods are allowed no family contact, except for a monitored telephone call. If people are to be held for lengthy periods, we must consider whether strictly supervised family contact might be appropriate—letters, for example, are not currently allowed, but I do not understand why they should not be if there is also censorship. We need to consider the conditions in which people are held, and the inadequate conditions in which the police have to conduct their inquiries. We have inevitably come to the conclusion that Paddington Green must be replaced and that a new facility should be established as soon as possible. It should be located in London, and it should strike an appropriate balance between the need for high security and the desirability of it being accessible to the local community. It should be part of a functioning police station, rather than an exclusive terrorist facility, in order to maintain public confidence that people are being dealt with within the ordinary legal system. Proper accommodation for the police must also be close at hand. We heard stories about police officers having to live in hotels while conducting inquiries because of the long hours that they have to work. The facility must also be significantly larger, to cope with the requirements of holding many people and with the need to be adequate for detentions of at least the 28-day period that we are debating. Under the current arrangements people are moved from Paddington Green to Belmarsh after 14 days, and then shipped backwards and forwards to allow interviewing to continue. It is undesirable in principle for suspects to be transferred from police custody to prison custody during the period of pre-charge detention. We also ought to make it mandatory that police interviews of terrorist suspects are videoed. At present, that is not compulsory, which leads to arguments. Such videos would provide a safeguard both for the police against allegations of ill treatment and for suspects that the interviews are conducted properly. I will not oppose today’s orders. If we are to be asked to consider a renewal next year or a further extension, we should have better evidence and scrutiny than we are currently provided with. However, regardless of whether we are asked to do so, we must ensure that the facilities in which people are held are adequate for the police and suspects.