Greater London Authority Bill

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Graham of Edmonton and Lady Turner for exposing the significance of this amendment. This is an amending Bill, but it does not amend the fundamental model that was agreed in the original Act, which was based on the principle that this is a unique model. It is a strong mayoral model—a strong executive Mayor with an Assembly holding him to account. The amendment is a serious attempt to weaken that and water it down. I take the point that the amendment would provide for a call-in period of 14 days to the Assembly, which is shorter than what was originally proposed, but that does not deal with the principle that we are defending. We cannot accept the amendment because it shifts the basic building blocks of London governance. The powers to issue direction and guidance to the functional bodies—TfL and so on—are one of the most important levers available to the Mayor to ensure the delivery of his priorities and objectives. They play an equally important role in ensuring that functional bodies are politically accountable to the Mayor. They also enable him, where necessary, to act quickly and decisively on day-to-day operational performance. The Mayor's powers are analogous to the statutory powers of direction that Secretaries of State have over many non-departmental public bodies, such as RDAs or English Partnerships. Given the importance of mayoral directions, it is obviously right that the Assembly should be able to scrutinise the Mayor’s decision to issue a direction. That is a vital aspect of the Assembly’s role of holding the Mayor to account. Very well established mechanisms already support such scrutiny. There is the periodic report to the Assembly. We have strengthened Clause 22, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said. However, it is right and proper that that scrutiny should be retrospective. Given the way in which the model works, it would be inappropriate for the Assembly to have a formative power—the power to deliberate and make recommendations to the Mayor in advance of the issuing of a mayoral direction to a functional body. That is basic; such a power would blur the line between executive responsibility and scrutiny. As I said, the power to issue directions is very much part of the Mayor’s oversight of his functional bodies and their performance. He must be able to act firmly and decisively. I made the analogy with NDPBs. Ministers do not normally consult Parliament on such directions and guidance before they are issued, but clearly Parliament, if it wants, can scrutinise any direction or guidance after it is issued. No doubt, if it is controversial, there will be parliamentary scrutiny after it is issued. Why should the Mayor be different? Even the shorter period of 14 days still cramps the Mayor’s ability to issue urgent directions, which may be necessary in rapidly changing circumstances. Although many of the Mayor’s directions to functional bodies may not have been time critical to date, there could be time-critical directions in future. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out, the amendment spreads out to the London boroughs. It would affect not just directions to functional bodies but the specific and limited powers of direction that the Mayor has over London boroughs in relation to transport, planning and waste, which are often time critical. As we discussed in Committee, that is especially important in relation to planning and strategically important planning applications. The amendment would make that power of direction unworkable because, under the Mayor of London Order 2000, the Mayor has only 14 days to issue a direction of refusal to the borough. The amendments would drive a coach and horses through that. To reiterate my main point, although I have listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, I believe that extending the Assembly’s power of scrutiny to decisions that the Mayor intends to make is a retrograde step. It would fundamentally alter the balance of powers within the GLA. It would prevent the Mayor from acting in a strong and decisive way on behalf of Londoners. It would fetter his mayoral discretion to act quickly in response to unforeseen circumstances. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.