EU: UK Membership

My Lords, in this timely and welcome debate, it is right to put the inevitable focus on the forthcoming European Council meeting in the wider perspective of what has been going on in Europe in recent times. If you do that, the case for negative Euro-scepticism has never been weaker. Europe’s current broad economic momentum, which is currently faster than that of the United States, speaks for itself. In policy terms, there has been a steady movement in the European Union in the direction that the broad mass of British opinion favours. The Barroso Commission is perhaps the one that has been most liberal in its approach—and I use the word with a small ““l””—of all the Commissions that have existed. I shall be the third speaker to quote the City of London brief, which says: "““The European Commission has shown willing to press ahead with the ‘better regulation’ agenda. The agenda has received widespread support from practitioners in the City and beyond who have been calling for some time for both less and better legislation, and a genuine policy shift towards achieving more considered and intelligent regulation. At the EU and the domestic level, there is currently a major push towards these goals””." If we look at the vigorous competition policy pursued by the Commission, at what it has done and, at least as important, what it has not done in the area of financial services under Commissioner McCreevy, the story is the same: a steady movement in the direction that nearly all British political parties have favoured. Reference has already been made to the new leadership across Europe, by coincidence, with a change of personnel in many of the major countries. For this country above all, this is a time of opportunity so far as Europe is concerned, not a time for negativism. It is against the background that we have to look at the forthcoming European Council. In some quarters, there has been an insidious argument that there is no need for change; that in spite of what was said about the necessity for constitutional change in the wake of the enlargement of the European Union, decision-making has actually been going ahead quite well. In that context, using that rather specious argument, I find it curious to hear some of my Euro-sceptic friends applauding the European Union and its method of doing business in a way that I have not previously heard from their lips. The reality is that just because there is not currently total paralysis, that does not mean all is well. Even in the period, steadily growing more distant, when I was a member of the European Commission, I saw that it was getting more difficult to reach agreement, even with the mini-enlargement that took place at that time. The deliberations were steadily getting more cumbersome, and will get worse. Quite apart from the desire behind the move towards constitutional change—but not a constitution—to enable business to be conducted more efficiently, there is also a legitimate desire for Europe to have a more effective voice. That was reflected in the proposals in the abortive treaty relating to foreign affairs. Apart from that, the reality that has not so far been mentioned is that, whether we like it or not, there is, right across Europe, an almost universal feeling that the constitutional issue must be resolved before further progress can take place, or can even be permitted to take place, on the issues that are of supreme importance to this country and to the European Union. Of course, further enlargement—Croatia and Turkey have been mentioned—is the most dramatic example, where several countries have said that no further progress will be permitted until the question of the handling of this treaty is dealt with. But also in relation to energy supply, climate change, the common agricultural policy reform and the next consideration of the European budget, no significant progress is likely to be made until the question of the handling of the institutional arrangements and of the treaty is out of the way. The fact is that on all the international issues, quite apart from the internal European ones, we cannot globally achieve our objectives without Europe acting together. If the constitution is out of the way, the direction in which Europe has been moving in the past few years proves that we in this county would be pushing at an open door to get further, accelerated progress in the direction with which we feel comfortable. It is important and in the national interest for agreement to be reached at that European Council. We do not know whether or not that will be achieved, but if it is, the general outlines will be pretty clear. Reference has been made to them several times in this debate: the abandonment of the trappings of sovereignty and the creation of a European Council president on a more permanent basis than exists at the moment. Let me stress, in the context of a discussion about a referendum, that the creation of a more permanent president would not give him more power; it would make him more effective, but would not involve a transfer of power and sovereignty. Similarly, the bringing together of the High Representative and the Foreign Affairs Commissioner would also be in the interests of efficiency and a better European voice, but would not amount to a transfer of power or sovereignty. The proposed change in the voting system would, quite simply, give Britain a larger voice in the deliberations of Europe. Similarly, scaling down the size of the Commission does not involve a change in sovereignty; further change is in our interests as we have already given up one of our two Commissioners. And I find it difficult to see how an enhanced role for national Parliaments can be regarded as a transfer of sovereignty—quite the reverse. It is a move in the opposite direction. As for the increase in qualified majority voting, particularly on justice and home affairs, I remind the House that that originated because of a feeling that it was impossible to get the agreement necessary to deal with international crime and terrorism if any one country had a veto. We were more concerned about other people exercising their veto on matters which were of interest to this country than in exercising our own veto. But if it is felt that that was, in a sense, a pretty modest transfer of sovereignty—although a transfer of sovereignty none the less—which we could not live with, it has been clear that an opt-out would be available. Mr Barroso said so only a couple of days ago. Similarly, I think we will be able to ensure that there is a reduced status for the charter compared with what was in the constitutional treaty. It is therefore overwhelmingly in the national interest to work for a deal of the kind envisaged, to support it if it is agreed and then to move on. I hope that the Conservative Party—my party—rightly and reasonably looking to be the party of government after the next election, will put national interest above short-term party considerations. David Cameron will have to deal with his European colleagues when he becomes Prime Minister and it will be one of the most important things that he has to do. I feel sure that he would not wish it to be possible for political opponents to put round his neck the leaden label of being the person who opposed reaching agreement on this issue—an agreement which, if achieved, will be regarded not as a great step towards further European integration but rather as an agreement which will liberate Europe from further sterile debate and enable it to deal with the real issues of huge importance to its citizens. I have always believed that a constant resort to referendums is inconsistent with representative parliamentary government and therefore inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the British constitution. But even if one does not take that extreme view, it is clear that there is a consensus that referendums should be confined to major constitutional issues. This agreement, if reached, will not be such an issue. I have shown—I hope, convincingly—that in all important respects it does not amount to a transfer of sovereignty. It is therefore important that there should not be a referendum and that that should be resisted. This treaty, if it achieves anything like the character that seems probable, will be much less far-reaching than Maastricht and the Single European Act. I vividly remember my noble friend Lady Thatcher inviting us to approve it, not with the assistance of a referendum, but with the powerful help of a three-line Whip in the House of Commons. I hope that there will be a success for the treaty and that Europe can then move on to deal with other vital issues in the interests of the United Kingdom, Europe and the wider world, and that the Conservative Party will assist that process rather than resist it.