House of Lords (Amendment) Bill [HL]

My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, said: this is not the Bill to get this proposal on to the statute book. I am grateful for his instruction as to what goes on in another place and for his views on the merits of another Bill to which I do not propose to speak. This Bill has to be seen in its true perspective. That means, to use the expression of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that it has to be revisited. We have to revisit the Cranborne deal, a self-denying ordinance whose fundamental concept was to enable the House of Lords Bill to be passed by this House in the interests of this House. It is now established as a wholly well founded concept that this House has never been in better shape and is working at its best with the formidable expertise and dedication of the hereditaries, who serve on the Woolsack, the Front and Back Benches, and as chairmen and members of committees. The quality of those services is recognised on all sides of this House, including the Spiritual Benches and Cross Benches. The Cranborne deal is reflected in the Weatherill amendment and in the 14th draft of Standing Orders to seek to avoid hybridity. It was made in honourof Privy Council terms and was binding on the Government. It was made with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, who is a man of his word and would have honoured the deal. According to the fundamental concept, the deal was to continue only temporarily until enactment of substantial reform of the powers and composition of your Lordships’ House—stage 2 of reform. There is not a word about powers in the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. I shall not speak to that Bill but shall probably support some of his concepts for composition. That substantive reform, as discussed in your Lordships’ House, was inevitably related to reform of another place, and then the Cranborne deal was to end. It was also agreed under that deal that, only until that time, the remaining hereditaries should carry out elections to fill vacancies, as provided for in Standing Orders. It is easy to mock, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has done—rather enticingly, if I may say so—but it is much more difficult to construct. There is now no agreement on stage 2, substantive reform; as I said, no Private Member’s Bill makes such provision. This Bill and Clause 10 of the Steel Bill put an end to filling vacancies so as to enable hereditaries to wither on the vine; they pre-empt a Bill on substantive reform. The concept of this Bill and Clause 10 of the Steel Bill commended itself to certain hereditary Peers. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, in his place. I believe that both he and I thought that it rather a good idea, but there was no amendment to that effect in the Bill. It could not have been in the Bill because it was the basis on which the hereditaries were asked to assent to the deal. There it is: it could not be accepted as it conflicted with the basis of the deal. The Table advises that the Cranborne deal can only be rescinded by statute. The fact that it ends on stage 2 is under the deal, but its constitutional end can only be achieved by statute. It is interesting to revisit the essence of the concept. If this Bill were passed in your Lordships’ House, it would inevitably, subject to what the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, may say—one never knows, but it is sometimes very helpful—be defeated by objection in another place as a Private Member’s Bill. Reverting to the true perspective—the interests of this House—what is the need or justification for haste to end a process that will end in any event at stage 2, confirmed by statute? If the purpose today were to afford discussion, it has been afforded—some of it a little wide of the essence of the Bill—and will again take place on Clause 10 of the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Steel, which appears to reflect an informal selective cross-party consensus. To what conceivable constructive end shall your Lordships give this Bill a Second Reading, which by convention, albeit not acceptable to Government, they may not wish to oppose? I have nothing further of use to say.