Offender Management Bill

I think the mood of the House is that I should be fairly brief in trying to respond to this serious and important debate. It may not only assist us in later debates but enable some of them to be more concise. As is often the case, the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, encapsulated the two questions that had to be addressed in my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. Should the new clause come before Clause 1, when Clause 2 is serving that purpose, and is my definition ““proper punishment”” the right one? The noble Lord, Lord Warner, prayed strongly against the idea of having a new clause. Perhaps he will forgive me if I say that I heard the strains of an old tune played on a ministerial violin in his opposition to principles clauses. He went on to say that this is a different, market-based, commissioning system and he will hear me say later, as I have said before, that I support contestability. It is a new system, but I will try to make sure that it is more locally accountable. That is why I believe that the drafting of my new clause is correct and that it is appropriate for it to come before Clause 1. It not only applies to the Secretary of State—whose aims are covered in Clause 2—but addresses the issue of the providers. Some noble Lords, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, will say that we should really be debating the services that are provided rather than the providers. However, I am stuck with what the Government have given me. This is the Bill as it is; as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said, it is about the management of the managers of the offenders. I am stuck with that; I am trying to make the best of it and to make it work. A principles clause is of value, as the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, has said, in providing clarity in preparation for our later debates. I was asked a specific question by the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, about whether the principles in my new clause are in the right order. I do not attach any order of priority or special significance to the way in which they fall. If I had, I would have made it clear in the drafting. I am glad that he raised that point because we will have to address it in a later amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, where some significance may be allotted to part of the functions of the probation services. But in this amendment all the matters listed have equal significance. I considered very carefully the words ““proper punishment””. Could I or should I come up with another definition? As the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, said, I have borrowed heavily from the amendment that was agreed to by my right honourable friends in another place. I said in my opening remarks that we welcomed it—we still do—but within the context of Clause 2. In the context of my new clause, I felt that it had to be looked at again. I considered this extremely carefully. The noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, provided some very helpful attempts to look at something different. I considered the wording that he suggested, but the more I considered it, the more difficulty I found in seeking any other definition that might serve. We are trying to convey the fact that the probation providers are carrying out the orders of the court; the court has determined the sentence, which has to be human rights-compliant. I felt that if I tried to change the words ““proper punishment”” to anything else, I would find myself in difficulty. Overall, I agree with my noble friend Lord Waddington that we have to consider that the public must have confidence in what the service is providing. I am therefore stuck with ““proper punishment””. I began by saying that I hoped that the amendment would bring clarity, but it may not have brought quite the clarity I hoped for. I also said that I hoped it might be conclusive. In that spirit, I do not wish to bring it back at Report because I wish to put an end to this matter today. I feel that I know what that will be, given the weight of the opinions that have been expressed, but I wish to test the opinion of the House. On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to? Their Lordships divided: Contents, 69; Not-Contents, 165. Clause 1 [Meaning of ““the probation purposes””]: