Greater London Authority Bill

As the noble Baroness has said, Amendments Nos. 100 and 101 principally relate to the requirement, for borough unitary development plans and local development documents respectively, to be in general conformity with the spatial development strategy. Simply put, they would amend the Town and Country Planning Acts in a manner that does not have much to do with the provisions of the Bill we have brought forward. Amendment No. 100 was tabled in the other place but not discussed. The practical outcome of these amendments would be to diminish the requirement for boroughs to look beyond their borders and do their part in helping to meet the wider challenges faced by London for housing and other development. We had a major debate on that yesterday, covering both planning and housing. The noble Baroness will not be amazed that I cannot accept her changes. I will explain why the principle of general conformity is so important. As I said earlier in Committee, we have a plan-led system in England and Wales with a hierarchy of development plans setting the framework of policies against which individual development proposals are considered. At the national level, the Government publish planning statements setting out key policies that must be taken into account at the regional and local level in preparing development plans. The London Plan is the strategic plan for London, creating an overarching framework for development in the capital. The London boroughs are closely involved in its preparation and the requirement for general conformity is intended to ensure that unitary development plans and now local development frameworks at the local level take proper account of wider regional and national priorities. Again, I am going to repeat myself: general conformity does not mean that there must be slavish adherence to the London Plan. Planning Policy Statement 12, which sets out the Government’s policy on preparing local development frameworks, makes it absolutely clear that the test is of general conformity and not one of conformity. By that we mean that only where an inconsistency or omission in a borough plan would cause significant harm to the implementation of the London Plan would it be considered not to be in general conformity. The fact that a borough plan is inconsistent with one or more policies in the London Plan, either directly through the omission of a policy or proposal, does not mean that the plan itself is not in general conformity. The test is how significant is the inconsistency from the point of view of the delivery of the plan. I want to make an important point here: it is not the Mayor who is the final arbiter of general conformity, it is the independent inspector who examines the borough’s draft plan. The Mayor can give his formal opinion to the examination of whether he considers the plan to be in general conformity, but it is the inspector who determines the issue. Outside this Bill, as an administrative change, we intend that the Mayor’s opinion on general conformity should be the starting point for the inspector’s consideration of local development frameworks, but again that does not affect the fact that general conformity, while it is an important principle, allows for local distinctiveness and difference. I turn now to subsection (8) of proposed new clause set out in Amendment No. 100, which certainly does relate to the provisions of this Bill. It would remove the existing power of the Mayor to direct a borough to refuse a planning application that was contrary to the London Plan. Not surprisingly, I cannot accept this either. The Mayor is responsible for ensuring that the strategic planning interests of London are taken into account in the policies and decisions of the London boroughs. The success or otherwise of many London Plan policies will depend on the decisions made on individual planning applications. The Mayor’s power to direct a borough to refuse a planning application if it is contrary to the London Plan has proved in the past to be an appropriate and useful tool, preventing development that goes against sound strategic planning in London. Again, as I said previously, it is to the credit of the Mayor that he has exercised this power with great care and restraint. Over six years, there have been 18 directions across London, an average of three a year. That is hardly a heavy-handed use of the power. We are convinced that this power has proved itself and we propose to maintain it under the new arrangements in the Bill. Where the Mayor exercises his new power to take jurisdiction of an application, he will need to approach it with an open mind and subsequently could either approve or refuse it. However, as now, there will be occasions when, having followed the progress of an application and considered all the relevant issues, there is no doubt in the Mayor’s mind that the application in its current form should not be given planning permission. Maintaining the power to direct refusal without having to go through the process of taking over jurisdiction is a practical measure to ensure speed and avoid bureaucracy, and I am sure all noble Lords want that. Subsection (9) is consequential on subsection (8). It would remove the ability of the Secretary of State to award costs against the Mayor or other parties for unreasonable behaviour on a planning appeal arising out of a mayoral direction to a borough to refuse an application. Following on the fact that I cannot accept subsection (8), I cannot accept this subsection either. The ability to award costs is undoubtedly a powerful disincentive against unreasonable behaviour, whether on the part of the Mayor or any other party, and we need to retain it. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will be persuaded that she can safely withdraw her amendment.