Greater London Authority Bill

I thank noble Lords for a useful debate, which enables me to explore a little about why planning obligations are important and why the clause is important. Amendments Nos. 92, 97, 98 and 99 all relate to removing scope for mayoral involvement in planning obligations. I do not think it will surprise Members of the Committee to hear me say that I cannot accept any of those amendments. To do so would effectively leave the Mayor unable to grant planning permission for applications that he is responsible for deciding. That would not be in the interests of applicants or the proper planning of key development proposals in London. I will come to the drafting point that the noble Baroness raised in a little while. Noble Lords are well aware that there is a close and direct relationship between planning applications and planning obligations. Planning obligations are crucial to mitigating the impacts of individual development proposals, and without the mitigation provided through the obligation, in certain cases, the development would not be granted planning permission in the first place. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out the great local benefits that can come from planning obligations. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, pointed to the environmental benefits. That is absolutely the case. It is therefore right and necessary that where the Mayor becomes responsible for determining a planning application, he also becomes responsible for agreeing any obligation related to it. That is what Clause 32 provides and what Amendments Nos. 92 and 97 would undermine. The noble Baroness raised a drafting question about Clause 32 and the word ““agree””. As I understand it, where the authority requires the obligation as a condition of the permission, it can require agreement or giving a unilateral undertaking. The wording of Clause 32 achieves that. I will ask officials to write to the noble Baroness to unpack some of that language so that there is no confusion. Amendment No. 98 would remove the requirement for the Mayor to consult the relevant London borough before agreeing any planning obligation. That is consequential to Amendment No. 97 and I cannot accept that amendment, and it would hardly stand in isolation anyway. That is for some very good reasons. Many of the impacts, even on very large schemes, are still local in nature, and there can be no doubt that boroughs are best placed to advise on those issues and how and whether they might be mitigated through planning obligations. Therefore, it is right and proper that the Mayor should consult the borough before agreeing any planning obligation. Clause 33 provides for the Greater London Authority to receive sums of money under the terms of aSection 106 agreement, and for the Mayor to enforce the terms of such an agreement and to recover costs associated with any such enforcement action. Concerns have been raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Hanham, and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, about what that will mean. The concern has been expressed that the Mayor will seek to divert all the Section 106 moneys for his own schemes, ignoring local issues. However, I can put noble Lords’ minds to rest that this is simply not true. Current policy on planning obligations in England, as set out in circular 05/2005, requires fair, open and reasonable negotiation of planning obligations so that the obligations allow developments to go ahead which might otherwise have been refused. The circular states, among other factors, that planning obligations are to be sought only where they meet all the following policy tests: they must be relevant to planning; necessary to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms; directly related to the proposed development; fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed development and reasonable in all other respects. In approaching the negotiation of obligations and who should be the recipient of Section 106 moneys, the Mayor, in common with the boroughs, will need to comply with these requirements and the relevant policies set out in the development plan—both his London Plan and the borough’s UDP or local development framework. I believe that there is enough security in those conditions to convince the Committee that Section 106 moneys are safe in that respect. It may be helpful if I explain the purpose and importance of the other clauses which deal withissues related to the Mayor and planning obligations. Clause 34 expressly requires the Mayor to consult the local planning authority before exercising any enforcement power in relation to a Section 106 agreement agreed by him. The clause also amends Section 106B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to provide that where the Mayor fails to give notice of his decision in response to an application to modify or discharge a planning obligation or refuses such an application, the applicant shall have a right of appeal to the Secretary of State. The clause also provides for the Mayor to be treated as the local planning authority in relation to appeals concerning planning obligations. These powers are necessary to ensure the effective operation of the planning obligations system where the Mayor is involved as a decision-maker. Finally, Clause 35 contains technical provisions relating to planning contributions under Section 46 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. Section 46 of this Act empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations which will enable planning contributions to be made in relation to the development or use of land in the area of a local planning authority. The LPA could be required by such regulations to set out in a document which developments and uses it will seek contributions for, where it will not seek a contribution, the purposes to which receipts from contributions may be put, either in whole or in part, and the criteria for determining the value of the contribution. This clause provides a technical amendment to the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 to allow those regulations to provide for the making of a planning contribution where the Mayor is the local planning authority in relation to a particular application. I hope that I have convinced the Committee of the very practical importance of providing for the Mayor to be responsible for planning obligations relating to planning applications he decides. I cannot accept these amendments. I hope that, given the grounds I mentioned, Members of the Committee will feel able to withdraw them.