Greater London Authority Bill

I think that I have enough time to answer most of the points that have been raised. I will proceed fairly quickly and deal with the amendments in my own order, if I may, so that I can address them slightly more logically. Much of what we have been debating is about how we can determine the new powers for the Mayor in relation to the potential and strategic importance of applications. We have discussed higher thresholds in the City and whether the Mayor should have any role in the enforcement of planning control. Those issues relate to the powers in Clause 31 for the Mayor to take jurisdiction over certain planning applications. Let me briefly set the scene, although the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, has more or less done it for me. London is growing and changing at an incredible pace. That brings massive challenges. The need to address those challenges is reflected in the London plan, which sets out shared vision. We have to meet the future without shrinking from it. That is why, as we have discussed, we are through the new power in Clause 30 enabling the Mayor to ensure that local development plans are taken forward positively. Let me stress that whether or not the crucial development envisaged in these policies, such as for regeneration, takes place depends on individual decisions on planning applications, which are, rightly, primarily the responsibility of the boroughs as local planning authorities. I very much take the point that the noble Lord has just made about the way in which London has developed. Nothing in this Bill changes that. The first GLA Bill provided a power for the Mayor to see planning applications of potential strategic importance and, if they were contrary to the London plan or would otherwise prejudice the strategic planning of London, to direct the borough to refuse them. The Mayor has exercised this power with great restraint. In six years, he has carried through 18 directions—an average of three a year. That has not been a heavy-handed use of power at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked why we need these powers now. Have the boroughs failed? This is not about failure. As my noble friend Lord Harris said, it is about enabling the Mayor at this point in the development of London to deliver a positive vision for London as set out in the London plan. His powers so far have been negative ones. We think that this is the right time—indeed, the essential time—to ensure that he can implement his policies in a positive manner. Clause 31 gives effect to this important change of approach by amending the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to give the Mayor power to direct that certain of those planning applications that are referred to him as being of potential strategic importance should be determined by him in place of the local planning authority. That also applies to the connected applications relating to, for example, listed building approval. There is an additional safeguard. The Mayor will have to have regard to the guidance issued by the Secretary of State and, where a direction is made, to give his reasons for making it. Clause 31 also provides for secondary legislation to be made enabling the Mayor to exercise enforcement functions. The draft order that we have published to inform the Committee’s consideration sets out the detail of the matters to be considered. I listened to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, but let me make our position clear. The detail of how applications of potential strategic importance are defined and how the Mayor should go about this should not be set out in the Bill. Instead of having an unwieldy and inflexible set of arrangements, we believe that that this should be placed in secondary legislation. The key elements will be in primary legislation, but practical operation needs to be flexible, which is why the new powers will be set out in secondary legislation. We need to bear in mind that the process is in two stages. How we define an application as strategically important has been slightly misunderstood. As I said at Second Reading, it is important to recognise that we propose a two-stage process. First, we have set a series of thresholds in the draft Mayor of London order, which will identify applications as being of potential strategic importance by virtue of issues such as size or height. If an application meets a threshold it must be referred to the Mayor by the borough that received it. These thresholds for referral are based on those already used to trigger referral under the Mayor’s current power. They are well understood by developers and boroughs. On average, the thresholds capture around 300 out of 90,000 applications a year, so we are not talking about a wholesale redistribution of power. Examples of development proposals that would be caught by the thresholds are an application that proposes 500 homes or more or one that proposes a waste management facility with a throughput of more than 50,000 tonnes of waste. However, it is fair to say that some of the existing thresholds were designed around the Mayor’s power to direct refusal, whereas we want the new power to focus on the developments of most importance for the implementation of the London plan, whether by virtue of the implications of size or because of the critical need for certain types of development in London, such as affordable housing and waste management. I announced at Second Reading that we recognised that some of the existing thresholds captured smaller proposals because of the harm they could cause strategic policies such as protection of the green belt rather than on the basis of their contribution to the delivery of the London plan. These are set out in parts 3 and 4 of the order. As such, the Mayor does not need a power to approve such schemes; what is relevant is his power to direct their refusal. Therefore, we announced that the Mayor’s new power will not apply to the majority of the thresholds set out in parts 3 and 4 of the order. Amendment No. 93A would go further and place an additional limitation on when an application could be judged to be of potential strategic importance by inserting a provision that this could not be the case solely because the application failed to accord with the development plan. I hope that the noble Lord was reassured to some extent by the fact that we will not apply the Mayor’s new power to the majority of parts 3 and 4 of the draft order; the Mayor will not be able to take over any applications just because they depart from the development plan. However, the fact that an application does not accord with the development plan may itself increase the likelihood of it having damaging impacts at local or regional level. It is legitimate for the Mayor to be able to express a view on some of these applications and, if necessary, direct a borough to refuse it. This has been the situation for the past six years, and there is no evidence, in the City or elsewhere, that it has caused unnecessary problems. Looking more widely, we have also considered whether new thresholds are needed in certain areas to reflect types of development of particular importance to London, such as on waste. Therefore, we included additional thresholds to allow the Mayor to be consulted on large waste management proposals. I hope that my comments will reassure the Committee that we have listened very closely to the argument and will continue to listen. Meeting one of the thresholds only identifies an application as being of potential importance; it does not mean that the Mayor will take it over. Whether the application is really of strategic importance will be determined by the second-stage policy test in Article 8 of the draft Mayor of London order, which the Mayor would apply only after the borough has made a draft decision on an application which met the thresholds. Up to this point, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, the policy test we have proposed has been whether the Mayor considers that any of the issues raised by the development to which the application relates is of such a nature and scale that there would be a significant impact on the implementation of the London plan. To be of strategic importance, the application would have to meet the threshold and then satisfy the policy test. Amendment No. 93 deals with the content of the policy test and the definition. I do not accept that it is necessary to have the provision in the Bill, but what the amendment proposes is very important. First, the amendment would introduce a geographic element into the policy test such that an application would need to raise issues that have a substantial effect beyond the borough boundary. As my colleague the Minister for Housing and Planning made clear in the other place, there are strongly held arguments for and against the inclusion of a geographic element—we have heard the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, describe the reaction of London First. The amendment would have profound implications. The matter therefore needs very careful consideration, and the debate today will form part of that. I cannot say more at this point, but I am sure that we will return to the issue on Report. Secondly, the amendment would test the impact of the proposal on the London plan. Article 8(1) of the draft Mayor of London order already requires the Mayor clearly to show that a development is of such a nature and scale that there would be a significant impact on the implementation of his London plan. Proposed subsection 4A(b) of the amendment is therefore redundant and is simply an alternative way of expressing what we already propose. Our wording is broader, not least because the amendment would relate to situations only in which the local planning authority intended to grant planning permission. It is equally important for the Mayor to be able to intervene in situations in which refusal of planning permission could have a major impact on the implementation of the London plan. Thirdly, the amendment, along with Amendment No. 92A, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, seeks the inclusion of a requirement of sound planning reasons for treating an application as being of potential strategic importance. In another place we agreed to consider whether that could be included in the policy test. I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that we accept the principle behind this change and will include in the policy test in Article 8(1) a requirement that the Mayor should demonstrate that there are sound planning reasons for intervening in an application. That means that the Mayor must take account of the decision that the borough proposes to take in relation to the application and be able to demonstrate why the borough’s draft decision to approve or refuse the planning application is deficient in planning terms such that he would be justified in taking over jurisdiction of the application. This also means that a Mayor could not intervene in a case for purely political reasons. Planning reasons are those based on the statute-based, plan-led system. To summarise our position, to be of genuine strategic importance an application must first trigger one or more of the thresholds in the Mayor of London order and must demonstrably raise issues that would significantly impact on the implementation of the London plan—there must be sound planning reasons for the Mayor to intervene. The draft order makes clear that, in applying the policy test, the Mayor must take account of the borough’s performance against relevant London plan targets. Currently they relate principally to new housing or affordable housing provision, which should be an important factor in the Mayor’s decision whether to intervene in an application. Given the critical importance of achieving more affordable housing, we are looking at whether there are ways to strengthen this requirement. Amendments Nos. 93, 93A and 94A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, relate to thresholds for the referral of applications from the City of London. I have previously said we have had helpful meetings on this matter with City leaders and can say that we recognise the unique position of the corporation and the importance of its continued success to the local, regional and national economy and the unique characteristics of the City. I can announce today that we can respond positively to the amendments and will amend the thresholds along the lines sought. This will mean that we are minded to raise the height threshold for buildings in the City to 150 metres, and the floor-space threshold set out in category 1B will be 100,000 square metres. For the avoidance of doubt, let me be clear: as Amendments Nos. 93 and 93A recognise, it would not be appropriate to apply these new higher thresholds to buildings adjacent to the Thames—I have to disappoint the noble Lord in that respect—given the river’s wider contribution to the character and views of the city. To reflect the unique situation of the Thames, it is not necessary for us to agree to Amendment No. 94A, which introduces an express power for an order under Section 2A to make provision in relation to applications for the erection of buildings adjacent to the Thames, because that power is already encompassed by the wider order-making powers in new Section 2C(1)(a), and the draft Mayor of London Order already sets a specific height threshold of 25 metres for these buildings. That threshold, set out in category 1C of the draft order, will remain for such development proposals. The only other issue on which I cannot agree with the Opposition is that the new 100,000 square-metre floor space threshold should be in addition to the floor space of any building already on the site. If we were to agree with that and if a 100,000 square-metre building were already on a site, the replacement building would need to be doubled to 200,000 square metres in order to be referable to the Mayor. That would be a step too far. Amendment No. 93B would have us go further and, in the case of the City, also exclude any applications which depart from the development plan and which propose developments over 2,500 square metres if they are for financial and professional, business or non-residential institutional use. These matters are currently set out in category 3E of the draft order. I cannot accept this change. We believe that we have moved a long way to meet the City’s concerns. We previously announced that the Mayor’s new power would not apply to the majority of applications in Part 3 of the order, including these, and therefore only the existing power for the Mayor to direct refusal will remain. This provision has operated for the past seven years and we think that we should leave it. Amendment No. 91 deals with how the Mayor will make decisions. I understand why the noble Baroness has introduced it but I reassure her that it is unnecessary. The position that she wishes to achieve is already a feature of planning legislation. Where any decision-maker, be it a London borough or the Mayor, determines a planning application, they are acting as the local planning authority. As such, they must comply with the requirements of the planning Acts. In relation to the noble Baroness’s concern, Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires the decision-maker to determine the application in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise. Section 38(2) of the 2004 Act made the London plan part of the development plan alongside the borough’s plan. Therefore the decision-maker must take proper account of the policies in both the borough’s development plan and the Mayor’s London plan. Where there is a conflict, there is a clear mechanism in Section 38(5) of the 2004 Act to resolve it in favour of the policy contained in the last document to be adopted. That seems most sensible. Amendment No. 92B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, would prevent an order made under Section 2A making provision for an applicant to ask the Mayor to intervene in an application unless the borough had had at least 20 weeks to consider that application. We think it is important that decisions on planning applications are made within a reasonable timescale and we have already set targets in that respect. For major applications of the type referable to the Mayor, the target is that 60 per cent should be determined within 13 weeks. That recognises that some applications will take longer than 13 weeks, and many of the applications that will be subject to the new power will be of this type. Applicants often recognise this and may agree a longer period for the local planning authority to consider an application. However, there are occasions when that does not happen, and there is a case for saying that the applicant should be able to move matters on in these circumstances. Under existing planning law—Section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990—an applicant has a right of appeal to the Secretary of State if a local planning authority has not made a decision on an application after the requisite period of 13 weeks. Our proposal provides for the applicant to choose after 13 weeks whether to allow the borough more time to consider the application, to appeal to the Secretary of State or to request the Mayor to intervene, if justified. However, I recognise that there may be scope for an applicant to play the borough off against the Mayor. Providing up-front for an additional period may be a possible way out, and I will consider that further. However, it is important to remember that the Mayor will have to demonstrate that the policy test is satisfied in order to take jurisdiction over the application. My bout of generosity has come to an end, and I am glad to say that I have almost done so too. However, I am afraid that I am unable to accept Amendment No. 95 because it would open the door to the risk of planning conditions attached to planning permissions granted by the Mayor not being enforced, resulting in development that causes harm to the local environment or the wider planning interests of the capital. That would not be in the interests of the borough, the Mayor or Londoners. It would limit all enforcement powers to the borough and would cause a problem. The clause does not seek necessarily to substitute the Mayor for the borough in applications decided by the Mayor; rather, it provides for the Mayor to have enforcement functions parallel to the borough. That is a sensible safeguard to ensure development takes place under the terms in which permission was granted. I know that mayoral involvement in planning applications is not always popular with the boroughs. We want to encourage constructive working arrangements between the Mayor and boroughs. Both have legitimate interests in the planning of London. The powers in Clause 31 provide a balanced approach. I hope that noble Lords who have not been satisfied by my remarks will still feel able not to press their amendments.