Greater London Authority Bill

My name is down to oppose the question that Clause 31 stand part. It may be convenient to speak fairly broadly, as noble Lords have done within the detail of their amendments. I have approached the matter this way because I find it hard to see how this and subsequent clauses can be amended satisfactorily. To a large extent, the clause hangs on the statutory instrument. I am aware that the Minister wants to hear what is said by Members of the Committee about the draft before publishing an amended order. I am grateful for that because it is hard for Government within the current rules to consult on an order such as this. It points up the difficulty of dealing with secondary legislation which we cannot amend. I suppose the Government might say that I have seen in some of the lobbying we have received that it is good to deal with these matters in secondary legislation because that is more easily dealt with and amended at a future date than primary legislation. That is not a view that I support. Perhaps I can ask a similar question to that which I asked on Clause 30. What is the problem and what research and assessment has there been about the current system, which has not been in place for so very long? There is quite a lot of anecdote, but I am not aware of any rigorous assessment having taken place. The Mayor has the policy powers. As I understand it, the Government think that there is a problem in relying on the boroughs for implementation of his policy, but is that any different from the relationship between national planning policies of central government and other local planning authorities? What is the problem that the clause seeks to address? The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred to paragraph 8 of the draft order. I shall not spend time talking about confusing size of development and its strategic importance. Mr Raynsford, who is the architect of the original arrangements in London, dealt with that extremely effectively in the Commons—as I listen to myself, I sound patronising. The new policy test is in paragraph 8. It seems that if the Mayor considers that any of the issues are of such a nature or scale that there would be a significant impact on the implementation of the spatial development strategy, the test, as it is expressed, opens up the possibility of a subjective judgment on the part of the Mayor. It does not meet the test of clarity—we have heard that said already. If we were to end up with an order in these terms, would the Wednesbury test of reasonableness apply to the Mayor’s judgment under paragraph 8(1)?