Greater London Authority Bill

It is a disarming amendment, but it has been extremely well dealt with by my noble friend Lord Harris. It is hard to disagree with him, and we have had testimony to that fact from the noble Lord, Lord Tope. The amendment raises some important questions, which I shall address briefly because we have had a thorough debate on the implications thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Essentially, as the noble Lord, Lord Tope, implied, the amendment would bring about a major change in the governance of policing in the metropolitan district. It overlooks the effectiveness of current arrangements and would overturn a settlement that we reaffirmed last autumn. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out, it shows up some technical difficulties and pre-empts some of the work that the Government have commissioned in this area. As noble Lords said in the previous debate on LFEPA, if it ain’t broke, why fix it? Its not being broke is reflected in the remarkable improvement in investment in the police authority, in terms of falling crime. I do not want to weary the Committee, but I shall give a few figures. Since the first year of the Metropolitan Police Authority, it has received an additional £827 million in grants, an increase of 50.6 per cent. The number of police officers as of last September is over 5,600 higher, or 22 per cent more, than in March 2001. Every local government ward in the Metropolitan Police district, in addition to the usual response and specialist squads, has a safer neighbourhood team of one sergeant, two constables and three police community support officers. I could go on, but I shall not, because the most important thing to say is that we are seeing the results in that investment in the fall in crime. Overall, crime fell in the Metropolitan Police district by 9 per cent between 2002-03 and 2005-06. The Metropolitan Police’s own figures for the past year include further falls in particular areas such as gun crime and crime against the person. This is an opportunity to pay tribute to the MPA and the officers involved. Amendment No. 72 amends the Police Act 1996 by inserting new Section 5AA, which would abolish the MPA and hand the role of police authority to the GLA. The noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, sought to accommodate the dual nature of the GLA by assigning executive functions to the Mayor and a power of scrutiny to the Assembly. We have heard how that would either become more complex or would not be as effective as the present arrangements. New Section 5AB provides that the Mayor shall set the component budget in respect of policing, and new Section 5AC provides that the London Assembly in its role of scrutiny, both of the Mayor’s executive functions and of the Metropolitan Police service, shall establish a committee for that purpose to which four magistrates shall be co-opted. That overturns what we sought to establish in the Greater London Authority Act 1999, a settlement that we modified only last year. The reason for the 1999 Act was to create a police authority for the Metropolitan Police district that was based on the model of police authorities elsewhere and integrated with the democratic governance of London, which was also being changed. The current model was introduced by the party opposite in the mid-1990s. It has a mix of individuals; the majority are elected and the others are magistrates and members of the public chosen for their skills. This model was a Conservative Government reform. The first members were appointed in 1995 to provide a greater skill base, which has led to greater diversity. Noble Lords will know that a tripartite relationship governs policing in England and Wales. In practice, that means that the Home Secretary holds a strategic and national role, the chief officer has operational responsibility and the police authority is accountable for performance and setting local priorities. The police authority must have a policing plan that sets out local priorities following consultation. However, there is a distinct difference between the role of a police authority as a single-purpose authority and that of a local authority, which is responsible for the delivery of a wide range of public services. In addition to the arguments of my noble friend Lord Harris and the noble Lord, Lord Tope, there are two further arguments that I shall address briefly. I understand the argument for a greater role for the Greater London Authority, but we have already enhanced the role of the Mayor in respect of the MPA through the Police and Justice Act 2006, which only recently passed through this House. Its provisions include removing the bar on the Mayor being a member of the police authority and specifying that the Mayor of London is to be the chair of the authority, should he choose to be on the authority, or must appoint a chair from among the members of the authority—currently the members of the MPA elect their own chair. In addition, the Mayor may appoint one or more vice-chairs to the authority. These provisions, including those to give greater functions and flexibility in membership of police authorities, were debated as recently as last autumn. They are additional to the existing provisions on the role of the Mayor in choosing the Assembly Members on the police authority, setting the component budget and expressing a view in the appointment of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. We have tried and succeeded in enhancing the role of the Mayor without chucking out a tried-and-tested system, which this amendment would do. My noble friend Lord Harris asked the critical question whether the amendment will lead to a more effective system. The answer is no because it overturns existing arrangements and has significant flaws. One of them is that it is not clear how the division of responsibility between Mayor and Assembly will work in this scheme. Amendment No. 72 inserts new Section 5AA into the Police Act 1996, assigning executive functions to the former and scrutiny to the latter. The problem is that nowhere in this amendment or existing legislation is there a definition of the executive functions of a police authority as distinct from scrutiny functions. If we are unclear about how they may be separated and have no knowledge or experience of it, how can that deliver greater clarity, transparency, accountability or effectiveness? A key function of a police authority is to secure continuous improvement in policing services and regularly to monitor performance. The MPA undertakes direct oversight of the Metropolitan Police service through a range of committees which deal with matters such as professional standards, finance and performance. The police authority is the corporate budget-holder for policing the Metropolitan Police district. Corporately, it is responsible for the annual policing plan, priorities and consultation. In what sense are these executive or scrutiny functions? The executive functions are further complicated because the chain of command exists within the force and not the police authority. The provision in proposed new Section 5AB for the Mayor to present the component budget for policing already rests with the Mayor in Schedule 6 to the Greater London Authority Act 1999. The co-option of magistrates and lay justices to the Assembly to form a police committee in proposed new Section 5AC would restore the precise position that the Police and Justice Act 2006 sought to correct. My noble friend Lord Harris dealt with the replication of the provision requiring four magistrate members as opposed to a reduction to one, for very good reason. The noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, spoke about layers of complexity, but we should again note that London is different, which explains much of that complexity. Nowhere else, for example, is the commissioner appointed by Her Majesty the Queen. I hope that I have addressed the remaining arguments which make it difficult for us to accept the amendment. I shall answer the question whether there is a need for change, which raises important issues. There is cause for debating how we can continue to seek greater effectiveness and improvement. In the Government’s security, crime and justice policy review, Building on Progress, of 27 March, we acknowledged that, following the achievements of the past few years, there remains the challenge of, "““empowering local people and bringing together the police, local authorities and other agencies more effectively to pursue community safety in a visible and accountable way””." That challenge is one of four key elements in the review of policing in England and Wales that we announced that day. The other three elements were: reducing bureaucracy, mainstreaming neighbourhood policing and making the best use of resources. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has appointed Sir Ronnie Flanagan, the former Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Police Service of Northern Ireland and currently Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, to lead this review of policing. We have made it clear that that review will look at the experience of directly elected mayors such as we have in London. Obviously, I cannot prejudge the outcome, but it will allow us to reflect further on how we strengthen accountability. The noble Lord’s amendment pre-empts the outcome without, for example, addressing another key point identified by his party’s own interim report on police reform; namely, what it claims is the desire of Londoners for the Metropolitan Police service to be more accountable. A debate on improvements is therefore taking place between the parties. Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 relate to the appointments process for the commissioner and the deputy commissioner of police. In the light of the forensic demolition job by my noble friend Lord Harris, I shall not pursue them because they are consequential on the proposal. The debate has illuminated important issues, but I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.