Greater London Authority Bill

I would not dispute that. The noble Baroness may wish to take advantage of an invitation to talk through with us some of those consultations before Report. The Assembly’s ability to amend its budget is limited, and we will deal with that in later amendments. Why have we done it this way? We can all agree that it is right, timely and proper to give the Assembly its own budget. Its consolidated budget represents £11 billion of expenditure on strategic services: public transport, the police, fire and emergency services, economic development and regeneration, and the budget for City Hall. The budget process has worked well. It has been predictable and has delivered for London, particularly on policing and transport. The Bill involves as little disruption and change as possible. In order to deal with unusual one-off payments, such as the Olympic precept, the authority’s chief finance officer may direct that specified amounts are left out of the budget requirement calculations for the purpose of determining that limit. We will come on to that in a later amendment. As part of this complicated set of provisions, reflected in the amendments, a parallel set of ““virtual”” arrangements in Clause 14 makes similar provisions for subsidy calculations. I listened to the arguments on the amendments but I cannot agree with them, because there are built-in checks and balances. First, the Assembly keeps its existing power to amend the first draft budget by simple majority, which allows it to give the Mayor a clear and early signal of concern, disagreement and controversy and enables him to change his later drafts. Secondly, it has the power to amend by a two-thirds majority, which ensures that, under the strong mayoral model, there is consensus on the budget. The challenge for the political parties in the Assembly—this is where we come to the realpolitik—is to work together to maximise its influence over the preparation of the budget. That is the democratic way of doing it, and I believe that it is better for the reputation of the Assembly if it galvanises its forces rather than our making arrangements for that to happen by guaranteeing a simple majority. With this new power over the budget, it will be able to focus on doing that. It would go down far better with Londoners if the Assembly were seen to have the courage of its convictions. I do not think it is necessary to have a PR system to build coalitions. Two short quotations support the case. First, the GLA’s own website shows that the Assembly has made a distinct contribution to this process. It states: "““The London Assembly has saved Londoners more than£125 million by reining in the Mayor’s budget””." That is confirmation of the positive power. Secondly, in the other place, the opposition spokesman Michael Gove said: "““Far from being an ineffectual scrutiny body, the GLA—" I think he meant the Assembly— "““can be a powerful one, if it can command the votes required””.—[Official Report, Commons, Greater London Authority Bill Committee, 9/1/07; col. 60.]" I think that that is a rallying cry. Referring to the strong mayoral model, Robert Neill MP said: "““We do not have a problem with that model””.—[Official Report, Commons, Greater London Authority Bill Committee, 9/1/07; col. 71.]" I am therefore not clear why noble Lords are trying to change the model, which the amendment would do. It would enable a narrow majority of Assembly Members to decide London’s strategic budget, it would overturn a successful model and, as my noble friend said, it would introduce real confusion between the scrutiny and executive functions. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, said about the benefits of that model and the certainty that it brings. It would create the risk that the Assembly would routinely take on the executive function of setting the budget and it would be a recipe for confusion. There is one other, strong argument. Such a change would not stop at London; it would have implications for other local authorities run on the mayoral model. The two-thirds rule also applies to mayor-in-cabinet and mayor-in-council management models up and down the country. We need to think very seriously about the implications of introducing such a change. On those grounds, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.